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 Abstract 
 
This thesis considers the role of the Zhenotdel (Woman’s Bureau) of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Soviet Central Asia through a close 
reading of its activist journal Kommunistka from 1920-1930.  
This research seeks to address conflicting narratives within academic literature 
concerning the Zhenotdel’s status within the CPSU, and in particular between 
accounts of its role in Central Asia rather than in European parts of the Soviet 
Union. Historians who have written on a campaign, known as the Hujum, launched 
by the CPSU in a direct attack on indigenous society in Central Asia in 1927, have 
tended to view the Zhenotdel as a compliant part of the Party apparatus. This 
interpretation contrasts with accounts of the Zhenotdel’s far more problematic 
relationship with the Party outside of Central Asia during the same period.  
A close reading of Kommunistka throughout the entire period of the Zhenotdel’s 
work in Central Asia has not previously been undertaken, although the journal has 
been relied on along with other source materials by various historians. Therefore, 
this study brings new and original material and analysis to further our 
understanding of the Zhenotdel’s activities in Central Asia. It provides a close 
examination of the views of activists and leaders, and a better understanding of 
the Zhenotdel project on its own terms, as opposed to the goals of the CPSU. The 
shifts within Zhenotdel policy over the decade can also be situated within the 
changing conditions of the 1920s within Soviet Central Asia, and the discussions 
within its ranks.  
This thesis analyses the opinions expressed by Zhenotdel activists about indigenous 
women, along with the methods employed to interact with these women. It gives 
a detailed account of the Zhenotdel’s social, economic and legal strategy and 
contrasts it with that of the CPSU.  This thesis also considers the relationship of 
the Zhenotdel to the CPSU in the context of Central Asia. It shows how the tensions 
and conflicts within that relationship, already discussed through research focusing 
on the experience in the RSFSR and other European Republics, expressed 
themselves in the specific conditions of Central Asia. This research throws new 
 light on many of the assumptions made about the Zhenotdel’s programme in 
Central Asia and shows how this programme actually diverged very significantly 
from that of the Party leadership. A revaluation of the role of the Zhenotdel in 
the Hujum has been possible, based on this study. It shows that the involvement 
of the Zhenotdel in the Hujum and all other aspects of its activity in Central Asia 
has to be understood on the terms of an organisation which was committed to a 
woman-centred socialism. Ultimately this research shows the Zhenotdel in a 
struggle to make progress for its own programme while at the same time seeking 
to establish itself as a core part of the Soviet strategy in Central Asia. 
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Introduction 
 
In this thesis I consider the role of the Women’s Department of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (Zhenotdel) in early Soviet Central Asia, and primarily 
in Uzbekistan. The historical period under examination begins in 1920, in the 
months leading up to the conclusion of the civil war and ends in March 1930 in the 
first years of Stalin’s Five Year Plan.1 This was a time of momentous change, not 
least for the women’s movement that had emerged after the revolution. The first 
leaders of the Zhenotdel believed that finally the time had come for them to lead 
the way in transforming the lives of Soviet women and thus provide an example 
to the wider world. It was a period when debate still took place within Communist 
Party journals, and when some of those debates centred on issues of sexual 
equality and the development of a new type of human relationships in a society 
free from capitalist repression. 
My research is based on a close reading and original analysis of articles from the 
journal Kommunistka,2 the central organ of the Zhenotdel, which was the forum 
for theoretical debates, meeting and congress reports and discussion of strategy. 
It provides a window into the world of Zhenotdel activists in the first years of the 
Soviet Union. I initially considered exploring Russian archival materials on the 
Central Asian Zhenotdel, either as an alternative or a supplement to 
Kommunistka. However, I decided that a focus on Kommunistka was an important 
opportunity to obtain an insight into what was within the knowledge of activists 
and subscribers who did not have access to private meetings. It would also allow 
an understanding of the degree to which Zhenotdel activists were willing and able 
to publicly fight for and debate their ideas and the manner in which they 
expressed criticism. Finally, it would provide an opportunity to review previous 
analyses which drew on Kommunistka in a limited way as a supplement to other 
                                                          
1 S. Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution (Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 68-92 for a summary of that 
period. 
2 The articles which are the subject of this research do not always have the full name of the writer and this 
is reflected in the fact that generally surnames, rather than full names, are used. 
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materials, by using it instead as a key source for extensive and targetted analysis 
of reports and articles concerning the Zhenotdel’s work in Central Asia over the 
entire ten years of its existence. 
I initially planned to consider the entire region described in Kommunistka as the 
‘East’. This encompassed the Caucuses, including Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Armenia, as well as the Tatar and Chuvash oblasts of Soviet Russia, the Soviet ‘Far 
East’ bordering Korea and China, the North Eastern region which included Siberia, 
and Central Asia. The peoples of this vast region had extremely diverse histories, 
languages, cultures and religions. The diversity was reflected in the position of 
women within those societies, from the relatively secular Tatar women who 
engaged in public life, to the secluded Uzbek women, to the semi-nomadic women 
of the Yakut peoples. Having translated a number of articles from across the entire 
region, I decided that the experiences were too varied to allow for a systematic 
analysis of the ideological and policy agenda of the Zhenotdel.  
Another key reason for focusing on Central Asia, and particularly on Uzbekistan, 
connects with the reason for focusing on Kommunistka as my sole primary source. 
It was because of my wish to relate my research to existing literature on the role 
of the Zhenotdel in the region. I wanted to recontextualise existing studies which 
have focused in the main on the dramatic events of 1927 in Uzbekistan, when the 
Sredazburo (CPSU Central Asian Bureau) used the language of women’s liberation 
to launch an attack on the social fabric of that society.3The current literature on 
this attack on indigenous society, known as the Hujum (meaning ‘assault’ in 
Turkic); which was aimed primarily at the public unveiling of secluded women in 
Uzbekistan, has largely considered the Zhenotdel to be either a loyal ally, or a 
servant of the Central Party leadership during what was essentially a struggle for 
authoritarian domination. This seems to me to be a problematic analysis, 
especially when viewed in the wider context of literature on the Zhenotdel in 
other parts of the Soviet Union, which demonstrates a great deal of conflict 
                                                          
3 G. J. Massell, The Surrogate Proletariat: Muslim Women & Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia 
1919-1929 (Princeton University Press 1974); D. Northrop, Veiled Empire: Gender & Power in Stalinist 
Central Asia (Cornell University Press 2004); S. Keller, To Moscow not Mecca: The Soviet Campaign against 
Islam in Central Asia, (Praeger Press 2001) and M. Kamp, The New Woman in Uzbekistan: Islam Modernity 
and Unveiling Under Communism (University of Washington Press 2006) are central contributions on the 
woman question in 1920s Central Asia which focus on Uzbekistan and on the Hujum (unveiling campaign) 
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between the Zhenotdel and the Party, both centrally and locally.4 Such analyses 
are limited, further, by their consideration of the Hujum as an isolated or abrupt 
moment of change; instead, mid-term patterns of change and continuity need to 
be explored. With this in mind, my research sets out to answer the question of 
how exactly the Zhenotdel approached ‘the woman question’ in Central Asia? This 
inquiry demands a study of the Zhenotdel’s key policies in the region from the 
outset of its involvement and an examination of how those policies were shaped 
by factors such as its relationship to the Party, by the political trajectory of its 
leading figures, and by its engagement with local women and local culture. It also 
necessitates an analysis of the Zhenotdel’s methods of transformation, 
economically socially and legally, and how they interacted with the Party, the 
state, and the indigenous population. 
In her study of the Zhenotdel, Elizabeth Wood sets out how activists battled 
continually against attempts to close the organisation down.5 Barbara Evans 
Clements points to the disparity between the Zhenotdel’s conception of socialism 
and that of the Central Committee. She mentions Armand and Kollontai for their 
“distinctive form of utopianism…widely shared among less prominent 
zhenotdelovki”, and argues that these activists “crafted from the Marxist analysis 
of women’s emancipation a vision of the socialist future and the means to achieve 
it that diverged in very significant ways from those articulated by the Party’s male 
leaders”.6 Moreover, she argues that the Zhenotdel’s leaders and key thinkers 
believed in localised woman-centred co-operative economic forms, rather than 
the male-dominated large scale industrial model which was advocated by leading 
members of the Central Committee, including Lenin and Trotsky. 7 Richard Stites 
has observed: 
                                                          
4 W. Z. Goldman, Women at the Gates Gender & Industry in Stalin’s Russia (Cambridge University Press 
2002); E. A. Wood, The Baba and the Comrade: Gender & Politics in Revolutionary Russia (Indiana University 
Press 1997); R. Stites, The Women’s Liberation Movement in Russia – Feminism Nihilism & Bolshevism 1860-
1930 (Princeton University Press 1990) and B. Evans Clements, Bolshevik Women (Cambridge University 
Press 1997) are just four examples of an extensive literature on the relationship of the Zhenotdel to the 
Party as a highly contradictory and problematic one 
5 E. A. Wood, The Baba and the Comrade: Gender & Politics in Revolutionary Russia 
6 B. Evans Clements, ‘The Utopianism of the Zhenotdel’ in Slavic Review Vol 51 No 3 (Autumn 1992), pp. 
485-496 pg. 485. 
7 B. Evans Clements, ‘The Utopianism of the Zhenotdel’, pg. 488. 
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The Zhenotdel represented a combination of class and sexual struggle and 
thus was a working out not only of Marxist notions about the female half of 
the labor movement, not only of the revolutionary Populist tradition of the 
“common cause”, but also, in some ways, of the much more feminist belief, 
given expression by Lenin in 1919 that “the emancipation of working women 
is a matter for working women themselves.”8 
Others such as Carol Eubanks Hayden have highlighted the central contradiction 
at the core of the Zhenotdel, of attempting to combine a fight for women’s self-
emancipation with loyalty to an increasingly authoritarian Central Committee.9 
This contradiction seriously restricted the potential of a post-revolution women’s 
movement to act autonomously. Yet, as almost all of the above agree, the initial 
Zhenotdel leadership saw itself as a voice for those women and fought hard for its 
programme in difficult circumstances. Wendy Goldman has shown how this 
struggle was not confined to the leadership and how activists continued to battle 
on right up until March 1930 when the Zhenotdel was dissolved, while at the same 
time protesting its closure.10 Indeed, even after the Zhenotdel was shut down on 
the orders of Stalin, those same activists continued to fight for women’s rights 
within difficult and repressive conditions and without the aid of a journal. Studies 
of the struggle of the Zhenotdel within the CPSU have thus far been largely 
confined to experiences within European parts of the Soviet Union. My research 
therefore, aims to bring a much needed perspective from Central Asia, so as to 
add to the understanding of the scope and scale of the Zhenotdel’s work, and as 
outlined above, to challenge some assumptions about its role in relation to the 
Hujum and other CPSU campaigns in the region. 
Marianne Kamp has studied the experiences of indigenous Zhenotdel activists in 
Uzbekistan and detailed the merger of their ideas with the national Zhenotdel 
programme.11 In contrast my research considers this history from the perspective 
of Zhenotdel leaders and activists as gleaned through their writings in the Russian 
                                                          
8 R. Stites, The Women’s Liberation Movement in Russia, pg. 345. 
9 C. Eubanks Hayden, ‘The Zhenotdel and the Bolshevik Party’ in Russian History Vol. III, 2 (1976), pp.150-
173 
10 W. Z. Goldman, ‘Industrial Politics, Peasant Revolution and the Death of the Proletarian Women’s 
Movement in the USSR’ in Slavic Review Vol 55, No 1 (Spring 1996), pp.46-77 
11 M. Kamp, The New Woman in Uzbekistan. 
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language Kommunistka. Thus, rather than an examination of personal stories, my 
research presents an analysis of the political views, debate and methodology of 
the Zhenotdel. A close reading of Kommunistka from the inception of coverage of 
Central Asia, allows me to build on existing analyses by exploring the Zhenotdel’s 
own strategic priorities in the region in the decade from 1920.  
Kommunistka has already been drawn on by a number of writers who have 
considered the role of the woman question within Soviet Central Asia. For 
example, Gregory Massell has referred to Kommunistka in some depth in his 
ground-breaking study of the imperatives of the CPSU Central Party leadership in 
launching the Hujum, and has connected it with a deepening authoritarianism 
within the Party.12 Douglas Northrop has drawn on Kommunistka in his examination 
of the imperialist attitudes of the CPSU in Central Asia and the backlash by the 
indigenous population against a deeply repressive mass unveiling campaign.13 
Kommunistka has also been included as a component of other research, such as 
for example, a study by Shoshanna Keller of the role of the Hujum in a full-frontal 
attack on the influence of Central Asian Islam14and the research by Marianne Kamp 
into the views and political histories of the indigenous women who joined the 
Zhenotdel and Uzbek Communist Party and who rallied in their thousands in March 
1927 to take part in dramatic unveilings.15 
Notwithstanding the inclusion of Kommunistka in previous research, a systematic 
and detailed study of the journal from 1920 to 1930 has been lacking, in particular 
one that considers all aspects of the Zhenotdel experience in Central Asia in that 
period. Such a study is critical in order to see more precisely how the Zhenotdel 
interacted both with Soviet policy in the region and the local population. It can 
consider to what extent the ideological and programmatic tensions at the heart 
of the Zhenotdel expressed themselves in Central Asia, if at all. Furthermore, 
there has not been a study of the Zhenotdel’s role in the region from the 
perspective of its programme to achieve women’s liberation in the post-revolution 
                                                          
12 G. J. Massell, The Surrogate Proletariat. 
13D. Northrop, Veiled Empire: Gender & Power in Stalinist Central Asia (Cornell University Press 2004)  
14 S. Keller, To Moscow not Mecca: The Soviet Campaign against Islam in Central Asia, (Praeger Press 2001)  
15 M. Kamp, The New Woman in Uzbekistan. 
6 
 
period - for which I use the term ‘Zhenotdel socialism’.16 This is a useful definition 
in that it combines concepts of women’s emancipation and socialism within a 
state-building programme. Its support for the Soviet state can be distinguished 
from the policy of opposition of Bolshevik women to all state involvement in 
women’s lives prior to the revolution.17  
Kommunistka began publication under the editorship of Nadezhda Krupskaya in 
June 1920 and the final issue was published in March 1930 when the Bureau was 
closed down by the CPSU Central Committee. The journal was published on a 
monthly or bi-monthly basis until 1929 when it became a fortnightly publication 
for the last year of its existence. It began with a reported print-run of 30,000 in 
1921, which decreased to 20,000 by 1923. This drop was despite a drive launched 
in October 1923 calling on “every activist working with working class and peasant 
women to subscribe to Kommunistka”.18 The biggest slump in circulation occurred 
in 1926, from 24,000 in April to 11,000 in December of that year. This smaller 
print-run continued for the remainder of the journal’s existence, averaging 
between 10,000 and 13,000 per issue. The target audience was a layer of women 
activists in and around the Zhenotdel. In a special issue of the journal to mark the 
third anniversary of its launch, then national Zhenotdel secretary, Sofia 
Smidovich, wrote that “Kommunistka provides direction to activists on issues 
which are of importance to the mass of working class and peasant women” and 
“informs them on how to engage with mass work from a correct political 
positon”.19 It connected theory with practice, and “was prepared to discuss 
difficult questions like child mortality, abortion, birth control”.20 The editorial 
board aimed to “engage activists in local areas in developing resolutions for 
Zhenotdel and Party meetings”.21   
Issues of the journal comprised on average between 50 and 90 pages of feature 
articles, theoretical contributions, reports, discussions of strategy, meetings and 
                                                          
16 B. Evans Clements, ‘The Utopianism of the Zhenotdel’ where Clements describes the Zhenotdel’s vision as 
utopian. 
17 C. Porter, Alexandra Kollontai A Biography (Merlin Press 2015)  
18 ‘Dorogie toverishchi’, Kommunistka 10 (1923) pg. 1 
19 S. Smidovich, ‘Znachenie Kommunistka dlia raboty sredi zhenshchin’ Kommunistka, 7 (1923) pp. 7-9 
20 Quote from N. Krupskaya in ER ‘Nesmeniaemyi pedaktor Kommunistka N.K Krupskaya’, Kommunistka 7 
(1923) pp. 6-7 
21 S. Smidovich, ‘Znachenie Kommunistka dlia raboty sredi zhenshchin’ Kommunistka, 7 (1923) pp. 7-9 
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membership debates. This focused on discussion of the ‘woman question’ both in 
the wider Soviet Union and internationally, as the Zhenotdel sought to encourage 
other parties of the Comintern to follow suit and establish their own women’s 
departments.  
Discussion of ‘women of the East’ did not properly begin until Kollontai took over 
as National Secretary of the Zhenotdel in late 1920. Coverage in the first issues of 
the journal had been limited to very short reports on work among ‘Muslim women’. 
Reportage increased significantly from October 1920 under Kollontai’s leadership, 
and from this point indigenous women were described as ‘Eastern Women’ or 
‘Women of the East’.22 From then until early 1923, when Serafima Liubimova was 
appointed as Head of the Turkestan (Central Asia) Zhenotdel, the proportion of 
the journal given over to the topic was less than 10%. Liubimova’s appointment in 
February 1923 introduced more focus on the East, and particularly on Central Asia, 
with coverage averaging between 12-15% up until the end of 1924. This included 
specific articles on Turkestan or on specific questions for Eastern women, within 
which Uzbek, Kirghiz, Turkmen and Kazakh women were included. 
From 1925, with the implementation of National Delimitation and the creation of 
Soviet republics and oblasts, Central Asia began to emerge more clearly from other 
discussion on the East. Between 1926 and 1927 there was a regular section of 
Kommunistka dedicated to work in the Soviet East, at times making up almost 20% 
of the journal. This development saw specific articles on Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, and what was then known as Kirgizia (later Kyrgyzstan). A number 
of issues focused on organisational questions such as women-only clubs and 
delegate meetings. Others dealt with legal issues and the conditions of life of 
women in Central Asia or the East generally.  
Reports of activist gatherings were described geographically or as all-Union 
meetings of activists among ‘Women of the East’. From 1927 until the end of 1928, 
articles focused mainly on Uzbekistan. Articles on Kazakhstan did not emerge in 
the journal until 1926 and became more prominent in 1928 and 1929, with the 
introduction of the Five Year Plan. 
                                                          
22 All references in this section to Kommunistka 
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 In 1928, Kommunistka featured a significant debate in the run-up to an All-Union 
Meeting of Activists among Women of the East in December of that year. Coverage 
on the Soviet East rose to almost a fifth of the journal that year. This pattern was 
reversed in 1929, with less than 10% of the journal dedicated to discussion of work 
among Eastern or Central Asian women. Also in 1929 there was a shift away from 
reports on Uzbekistan or other parts of Central Asia to themes concerned with the 
implementation of the Five Year Plan and the War on Religion throughout the 
Soviet East. In March 1930, the final issue of Kommunistka was published, with an 
article announcing the re-organisation of work and the closure of the Zhenotdel. 
An analysis of coverage over the decade reveals that the Central Asian experience, 
though highly specific, was a microcosm of a greater, multi-layered history of how 
the new Soviet State attempted to transform local societies and cultures, 
specifically in relation to women and gender relations. This thesis demonstrates 
not only how Central Asian Zhenotdel activists tailored their strategy to the 
broader project of the Zhenotdel, but also, how they tried to impact on, and give 
specific meaning to that broader project. It shows how the Central Asian 
Zhenotdel’s attempt to articulate its vision interacted with local and central Party 
policy and the attitudes of the local and central male membership. Finally this 
thesis aims to demonstrate that, while the fundamental problems of male 
chauvinism and authoritarianism the Zhenotdel grappled with were not unique to 
Central Asia, they had a particular expression within a society deeply divided on 
grounds of gender. 
In using Kommunistka to trace the experience of the Zhenotdel in Central Asia, I 
should stress that I am not treating this journal as an unbiased reflection of 
historical reality. While it published statistical material on the way of life, social 
and economic interaction of indigenous women, analysis of the relevance of this 
material varied according to the individual author’s own views or the agreed line 
of the Zhenotdel or Party on schools, women’s clubs, childcare provision etc. At 
times claims of the “potential for revolution” among indigenous Central Asian 
women or of their support for Soviet and Zhenotdel policies were clearly 
exaggerated – along with a minimisation of the hurdles which needed to be 
overcome. This does not lead to the conclusion that there was any deliberate 
motivation to mislead. Instead, the articles on Central Asia and Kommunistka 
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itself must be seen as the voice of an organisation committed to bring about what 
it described as the “emancipation” of women against the odds. It was a partisan 
project, committed to the programme of introducing Zhenotdel Socialism to 
Central Asia, and the analyses and views published in Kommunistka were situated 
within the parameters of this programme. 
An analysis of the Zhenotdel activist base in Central Asia illustrates some of the 
contradictions at the core of its project. The regional department was initiated 
by Russian female members of the CPSU, dispatched there by Alexandra Kollontai 
to “awaken” the women of the East to the news of the revolution and their 
impending liberation.23 These women were relatively recent recruits to the Party, 
and came from urban working class or middle class backgrounds. Women like 
Serafima Liubimova and Zinaida Prishchepchik had worked in the Central 
Department of the Zhenotdel before being sent to Central Asia. They were young 
women who burned with enthusiasm for the challenge ahead, but had little or no 
experience of working with Muslim women, or within a peasant community. They 
did not speak indigenous languages and had to engage translators.24 
From 1924 there appears to be a shift within the Russian speaking activist base in 
Central Asia. While Kommunistka does not distinguish between those sent from 
Moscow and those from the local Russian population, a number of writers emerge 
who focus on local issues alone and appear to have a more nuanced understanding 
of local culture. A recruitment drive to train Uzbek, Kirghiz and Turkmen women 
as Zhenotdel organisers coincided with a reported increase of Russian speakers 
who could also speak indigenous languages.25 However, this appears to have been 
simply a secondary layer of leadership, and the Central Asia Zhenotdel continued 
to be dominated by women from outside the region. 
A major boost to the organisation of indigenous women came in 1924, with the 
launch of an Uzbek language journal, Yangi Yol (meaning ‘New Life’) by the 
Zhenotdel. Sobira Xoldarova, a young Jadid radical was appointed as its first 
                                                          
23 A. Kollontai, ‘Posledniaia rabynia (k s’ezdu zhenshchin narodov Vostoka)’, Kommunistka, 7 (1920), pp. 24-
26 
 
24 M. Kamp, The New Woman of Uzbekistan p. 267, where she identifies Oiposho Jalilova, a prominent Jadid 
and teacher from Tashkent as one of Liubimova’s translators. 
25 E. Butusova, ‘Zhenskie lavki v Uzbekistane’, Kommunistka, 9 (1927), pp.62-67 
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editor.26 In terms of age and social profile Xoldarova reflected a group of urban 
based Jadid women who merged their aspiration for modernity with the Soviet 
project. Kamp describes how Xoldarova was unique among them in being able to 
speak Russian and how, as editor, she translated articles by Russian Zhenotdel 
leaders into Uzbek as the lead articles in Yangi Y’ol. Unlike Kommunistka, Yangi 
Yo’l was a mass popular journal and aimed to win the female population over to 
uniquely indigenous notions of modernity.  
The divisions between Russian and indigenous Zhenotdel activists were based on 
nationality, ethnicity, language and political ideas. Having two separate journals 
in different languages did not assist the overcoming of divisions. And while 
Kommunistka was aimed at educating activists, it could not reach the majority of 
indigenous women.  The lack of indigenous women who joined the Communist 
Party was an additional barrier. The percentage of women members of the Party 
in the CPSU as a whole was tiny, remaining below 10% before 1927 then rising to 
13.9% in 1929.27 As I discuss in Chapter 6, this number was even smaller in Central 
Asia, in large part because of the seclusion of women within that society. Of the 
12,401 members of the Uzbek Communist Party, less than half were of indigenous 
origin. Women of both Russian and indigenous origin - comprised less than 3% of 
that membership in 1927, with approximately 400 female members. No official 
membership figures appear to be available, but from an analysis of Kommunistka 
and secondary sources, it seems that less than a dozen of Communist Party 
members were Uzbek women.28 The indigenous membership of the Kirghiz Party 
was 80%, with 1,401 members. Of these only three were women.29 I will explore 
the reasons behind these low figures in chapter 6, along with a discussion of 
debates and conflicts around the failure to recruit indigenous women to the 
Communist Party. 
Kommunistka provides fascinating insights into the conflicts engendered by the 
issues of nationality, race and gender described above. And, as well as reflecting 
                                                          
26 M. Kamp, The New Woman of Uzbekistan pg. 100-107 for a history of the leading women involved in 
Yangi Yol 
27 T.H Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the USSR 1917-1967 (Princeton University Press) Princeton 
New Jersey, 1968 pg 361 table 31 Sex Structure of CPSU Membership 1922-1967 
28 A. Khalid, Making Uzbekistan, Nation Empire and Revolution in the early USSR (Cornell University Press), 
Ithaca & London 2015, pg. 176 
29 T.H. Rigby, Communist Party Membership, pg. 360 note 16 
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the tensions, it reveals surprisingly creative approaches taken by Russian activists 
in adapting their methods of work, and in learning from indigenous activists. It 
also reveals the frequent frustration of activists at lack of support from the Central 
Committee and local Party organisations.  
Kommunistka also has a wider significance in reflecting the fluctuating political 
climate of 1920s Soviet Union, from the confusion and indifference of the NEP 
years to the instigation of dictatorial methods to mobilise women in 1927. 
Kommunistka illustrates how Stalin’s growing dominance over the Central 
Committee impacted on Zhenotdel activists and how they responded to the 
increasing interventionism of the Central Committee and Sredazburo in their 
work. Through the publication of a range of views, from both Party loyalists and 
more oppositional voices, Kommunistka provides unique insights into the 
Zhenotdel’s struggle for change in Central Asia.  
My research methodology involves following the focus of debate and work in 
Central Asia reflected in Kommunistka over the decade of its existence. Thus, 
after reading the initial articles on Muslim women, I moved on to consider 
discussion of Central Asia within articles on the Soviet East, and then to examine 
Central Asia specifically, as it emerged more clearly within coverage of the Soviet 
East. In 1927 and 1928 I concentrated on articles which dealt with Uzbekistan or 
the debates around questions which involved that region. This approach was 
prompted because the majority of coverage focused on Uzbekistan during this 
period and I was able to follow the main themes in the debate. I did consider 
including other parts of the Soviet East within my research and translated articles 
on Azerbaijan, Georgia and Tartaria. Azerbaijan also experienced the unveiling 
campaign in 1927. However, I finally decided to narrow my research to Central 
Asia, because the Zhenotdel’s experience in that region has been at the centre of 
significant academic debate and is of great interest in terms of the treatment of 
the ‘woman question’ in the Soviet Union. 
I accessed the majority of Kommunistka on microfilm with the assistance of 
Glasgow University Library. There were a number of significant gaps in the earlier 
years of the Zhenotdel and I obtained access to these issues at the National Library 
of Russia in St. Petersburg. I began translation from a broad chronological 
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perspective. I considered Central Asia through the prism of the Soviet East and 
mapped the shifts in the views and work of the Zhenotdel over the decade. On 
completion of translation, I pinpointed the themes which reflected the experience 
of the Zhenotdel in the region. I reconsidered translated articles a number of 
times in order to explore these themes more fully and to ascertain if there were 
other matters which could throw light on the views of leading activists and the 
interaction with the Soviet project as a whole. I focused in particular on the views 
of Liubimova, because of her centrality to the project, and also because of the 
overlap between many of her views and those of Alexandra Kollontai, the driving 
force behind the Zhenotdel and initiator of its work in Central Asia.  
 
Thesis Structure 
In chapter one of this thesis, I consider the secondary literature on the Zhenotdel’s 
genesis as an organisation and the main influences on the ideas of its leading 
members. I consider, in particular, the views of Alexandra Kollontai, the most 
important proponent of Zhenotdel Socialism as well as the most pro-active 
advocate of a separate women’s bureau within the Party. I then examine the 
resistance of Zhenotdel activists to being described as feminists and their fears 
that advocacy of women’s rights would be dismissed because of this apparent 
association in the minds of Bolshevik leaders. I then proceed to consider the 
contradictory position of the Zhenotdel as a self-appointed voice for women’s 
rights within a Party that was extremely dismissive of practice around the ‘woman 
question’, despite its formal programmatic adherence. This chapter concludes 
with a summary of the experiences of Zhenotdel Directors and what this reflects 
regarding their struggle for autonomy throughout the decade. 
In chapter two, I consider the existing literature on the role of the CPSU in Central 
Asia, and, in particular, the various attempts to politically and socio-culturally 
incorporate the region into the Soviet Union. I analyse the views of the Zhenotdel 
on indigenous women and the organisational initiatives that it was involved in prior 
to 1927. I argue that I believe there is a contradiction between the methods of 
the Zhenotdel before 1927 and the claims made by some historians that it was an 
enthusiastic supporter of the Hujum. To this end, I refer to existing studies, in 
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particular that of Marianne Kamp, which shows the disquiet of Russian activists 
when informed that they were to lead a mass unveiling campaign.30 I then explore 
existing literature on the call for a ban on the veil in the aftermath of the Hujum, 
and the fact that despite apparent support from the Uzbek government, no decree 
was ever passed. I point to the various inconsistencies in accounts that see the 
Zhenotdel as a voice of the Central Party leadership, before turning to the 
articulation of my original view on the organisation’s role in the events, discussed 
in the following chapters.  
In chapter three I consider the views on and strategy for women’s emancipation 
of Zhenotdel members as expressed in Kommunistka. I look initially at the 
difficulty of adapting its core programmatic goal of transcending the traditional 
family to the conditions of Central Asia. I analyse how the Zhenotdel originally 
believed that the Russian revolution would spread to the region and inspire 
indigenous women to rise up against their oppression. This conviction connected 
with its establishment of non-Party forms of organisation among indigenous 
women in this period, as the Zhenotdel leadership hoped that indigenous women 
would develop their own forms of struggle. I explore the loss of the initial 
leadership with the deaths of Inessa Armand in 1920 and Konkordiia Samoilova in 
1921 and the expulsion of Alexandra Kollontai in 1922, and the shift to a more 
paternalistic approach to indigenous women. I illustrate how the Zhenotdel’s 
methods connected with the view that there should be incremental change that 
did not put indigenous women in any jeopardy from their family and community. 
This culturally sensitive approach contrasted with a continuing negative 
interpretation of indigenous society and the manner in which women lived. I then 
consider the response to the Hujum as reflected in Kommunistka and the various 
problems which this campaign presented for the Zhenotdel, not least the 
destruction of its existing work. 
In chapter four I undertake a detailed examination of reports of the organisational 
initiatives developed by the Zhenotdel. I consider the discussions on how to 
develop economic independence among indigenous women and how to provide 
them with a support system to allow them to become involved in Soviet society. I 
                                                          
30 M. Kamp, The New Woman in Uzbekistan, pp.164-165. 
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consider the various problems encountered by the Zhenotdel in developing these 
initiatives, the breakthroughs that began to emerge after 1924, and the growing 
involvement of indigenous women. I then explore the impact of the Hujum on this 
work and the continued efforts to sustain earlier initiatives despite the odds. 
Finally, I discuss the new situation which emerged in 1929 and the forced 
collectivisation of indigenous women. 
In chapter five, I consider the legal strategy of the Zhenotdel and how it sought 
to implement a programme of transformation through Soviet law. I trace how 
activists began with interventions in the indigenous Court system and then 
rejected this work because of the obstacles involved, only to face the same 
problems in the Soviet People’s Courts. I explore the contradiction between 
facilitating women’s economic and social engagement in a culturally sensitive 
way, while at the same time attempting to impose a European family form on 
them. Returning to a central theme of the thesis, I consider claims made by 
Gregory Massell and Douglas Northrop that the Zhenotdel’s legalism and negativity 
toward indigenous culture led it to embrace the Hujum.31 I show that this is not 
evidenced in my study of Kommunistka and that, in fact, the Zhenotdel wanted 
to use legislation in an incremental way and believed that it could provide 
indigenous women with safety. Thus, the debate in the aftermath of the Hujum 
reflects calls for a legal ban on the veil in order to send a message out that 
indigenous women were protected by Soviet society.  
In chapter six, I explore the difficult and contradictory relationship with the 
Central Committee, Sredazburo and the local indigenous membership. I show how 
the Zhenotdel was able to act with a degree of autonomy precisely because of its 
isolation from local Party organisations. I also discuss the continued struggles for 
support and the refusal to accept that the Central Committee had no genuine 
interest in advances for indigenous women. The negative attitudes of Zhenotdel 
activists toward indigenous Party members and the frustration with the obstacles 
to the recruitment of women are also discussed. I then analyse the debate on 
autonomy which emerged in 1928 and the struggle over that question within the 
Zhenotdel. Finally I explore the clampdown on debate within Kommunistka and 
                                                          
31 G. J. Massell, The Surrogate Proletariat, pp. 185-212 and D. Northrop, Veiled Empire, pp. 46-68 
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the consequent involvement of the Zhenotdel in a purge of male communist party 
members in the region. 
In each of the chapters outlined above, I note the significant shifts in the final 
year of the Zhenotdel’s existence and how Kommunistka changed from being a 
journal where criticisms and debate could be expressed to one where the only 
issue was the successful implementation of the Five Year Plan. The Zhenotdel 
went from being of no interest to the Central Committee to being forced into 
giving up its own programme and instructed to lead a campaign which many 
members opposed.  
Overall, the material presented in this thesis demonstrates that, rather than being 
willing servants of the Central Committee, Zhenotdel activists in Central Asia had 
their own independent aspirations which were generally in conflict with, or of no 
interest to, the Central Party leadership. Their work was based on a commitment 
to incremental change. However their simultaneous commitment to the Soviet 
project and the belief that the CPSU represented the only way forward meant that 
they would find themselves in perpetual conflict. By the end of the 1920s, in a 
situation where the balance of forces was ranged against them, Zhenotdel 
activists were finally forced to give up on their programme of transformation and, 
instead, to try to survive the dictatorial environment of 1929 and 1930. It was only 
in these years, when all avenues for discussion were closed, that the Zhenotdel 
eventually suspended its criticism of the Central Committee and its separate 
approach to the woman question in Central Asia. Thus, an in-depth study of the 
Zhenotdel and Kommunistka does much more than simply offer an organisational 
history: it maps the tensions inherent in the early Soviet ambitions to enact 
profound socio-cultural change; it traces what became of such aspirations in the 
context of turbulent political upheaval across the USSR and in the Party; and it 
explores the complex local impacts of attempts at utopian construction and 
destruction. 
I use the term ‘activist’ to describe members of the Zhenotdel. While Zhenotdel 
leaders were undoubtedly members of the CPSU, it does not appear that all 
members of the Zhenotdel were members of the Party. Being a journal for 
activists, Kommunistka assumes a level of knowledge on the part of the readership 
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about general events in the Soviet Union at that time. It therefore does not always 
provide background and context in the way a more general publication might. It 
does not provide a great deal of information on the Communist Party sections in 
the region, perhaps because of its general isolation from those organisations. 
Finally, I use the term ‘Hujum’ and ‘unveiling campaign’ interchangeably 
throughout this thesis, denoting that in my view they were essentially the same 
policy. I have translated the Russian word ‘soveshchanie’ as ‘meeting’ throughout 
this thesis, making it clear when these are all-Union or local meetings. 
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Chapter One  
The Zhenotdel and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
 
1.1 The Origins of the Zhenotdel 
The establishment of the Zhenotdel (Women’s Department) in August 1919 was a 
critical moment for Russian revolutionary women. It was the first time an 
organisation of this type had been permitted within the Bolshevik Party or its 
predecessor, the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP).And, crucially, 
the Zhenotdel was created in an environment still reverberating from the impact 
of the 1917 revolution, in a time of unprecedented social initiative. In 1918 
Vladimir Lenin had proclaimed that the world was entering a new historical epoch 
-“the period of transition to socialism”. It was a time “unprecedented in history” 
which could not be “studied from books.”1 The Russian working class had, though 
its revolutionary sweep to power, inaugurated a: 
…long period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the break-up of all that 
belonged to the past, the ruthless destruction of all forms of capitalism, the 
co-operation of the workers of all countries, who would have to combine 
their efforts to ensure complete victory.2 
In line with the Bolsheviks’ programmatic commitment to women’s equality, the 
Soviet state announced unprecedented legislative changes for women. The Code 
on Marriage, the Family and Guardianship, introduced in 1919, ended the religious 
sanction of marriage and legalised divorce on demand for both men and women. 
It pronounced men and women equal under the law and guaranteed equal pay for 
equal work. It legalised abortion and abolished illegitimacy, set the minimum 
                                                          
1 V. I. Lenin, ‘Speech to Third All Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers, Soldiers & Peasant Deputies’, Pravda 
February (1918) in Lenin’s Collected Works, Progress Publishers, Moscow, Volume 26 (1972), pp. 453 
2 V. I. Lenin, Speech to Third All Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers, Soldiers & Peasant Deputies, pg. 453 
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marriage age at 18 for males and 16 for females, and required the consent of both 
parties to marry.3  
Bolshevik advocates of women’s rights found themselves in an unprecedented position. 
Women such as Alexandra Kollontai, Inessa Armand, Konkordiia Samoilova, Nadezhda 
Krupskaya, Klavdiia Nikolaeva, and Lyudmila Stal all shared a history of struggle. They 
were veteran members of the Bolshevik wing of the RSDLP, with the exception of 
Kollontai who had joined shortly before the revolution.4 Yet despite being a 
relative outsider, Kollontai was enormously influential, and had already made her 
mark on Russian politics by becoming the Commissar for Welfare in the first Soviet 
government.5 She was a prolific writer, and had published books and pamphlets 
on a range of topics, most notably on women’s oppression, the role of the family 
and the tasks of women’s emancipation under socialism, many of her works being 
republished after the revolution.6 Kollontai was particularly vocal in her demands 
for radical change in the traditional family, and had fought tenaciously for a 
separate women’s organisation since 1905.7 She saw the establishment of a 
women’s bureau within the Party as a major personal achievement, describing its 
formal endorsement by the Eighth Soviet Congress in March 1919 as “an enduring 
victory” in her struggle.8  
The creation of a separate organisation to work among women had been discussed 
on numerous occasions for over a decade and Kollontai had not been its only 
proponent. Nikolaeva had co-founded the short-lived Women’s Mutual Aid Society 
with Kollontai in 1907, despite the opposition of the RSDLP St Petersburg 
Committee, in order to assist working women in the poor districts of the city.9 She 
had also worked with Samoilova in various initiatives to organise Russian women 
from 1913 onwards, including the Bolshevik women’s journal Rabotnitsa and 
                                                          
3 R. Stites, The Women’s Liberation Movement in Russia – Feminism Nihilism & Bolshevism 1860-1930 
(Princeton University Press 1990), pp. 362-363 
4 B. Evans Clements, Bolshevik Women (Cambridge University Press 1997), pp.12-21 
5 C. Porter, Alexandra Kollontai A Biography (Merlin Press 2015), pp.269-292 on her time as Commissar for 
Welfare 
6 B. Evans Clements, Bolshevik Feminist The Life of Aleksandra Kollontai (Indiana University Press 1979), 
pp.40-81 for a description of her activity before 1917 
7 C. Porter, Alexandra Kollontai, pp. 342-346 for an example of these views 
8 A. Kollontai, The Autobiography of a Sexually Emancipated Communist Woman (Schocken Books 1975), pg. 
43 
9 B. Evans Clements, Bolshevik Women, pp. 38-53 
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Women’s Day events.10 However, the response from the RSDLP and the Bolsheviks 
to such efforts to organise women separately has been described as almost 
uniformly hostile.11 Another attempt to form a specific women’s organisation was 
made following the February Revolution in 1917, when long-term Bolshevik Vera 
Slutskaya, made a proposal to the Petrograd Party Committee that a “Bureau of 
Women Workers” be set up. Her proposal was rebuffed and it was made clear to 
her that “no independent women’s organisation whatsoever will be created” and 
that “all work will be carried out in full accordance with the decisions of the 
Petrograd Committee.”12 
Antipathy toward separate organisation also stemmed from the official Bolshevik 
position that ‘the woman question’ was a collective task for the entire Party. 
Nadezhda Krupskaya, Lenin’s wife, was a leading proponent of this view. In her 
pamphlet The Woman Worker, first published in 1901, she argued that all men 
“must help the women workers to organise themselves, to awaken class 
consciousness in them, as conscious and organised women will be less receptive 
to the employers’ demands and will not allow themselves to be twisted around 
the boss’s little finger.”13 The struggle for women’s equality had to be part of the 
general struggle for socialism. Krupskaya had always worked closely with Lenin 
and, with his support, had convinced the RSDLP to include a demand for women’s 
equality in its programme in 1903.14 She was thus of pivotal importance in 
establishing formal adherence to women’s rights within the Party and believed 
very firmly that Communist men had an obligation to take up the fight for women’s 
rights as a central part of the struggle for socialism.15 Her loyalty was very firmly 
to the Bolsheviks, and subsequently to the CPSU, and she was wary of anything 
which would split the Party.16 In late 1917 Krupskaya along with other leading 
Bolshevik women, such as Samoilova and Nikolaeva, were concerned that separate 
organisation would bring about disunity within the Party and that they would be 
                                                          
10 R. Stites, The Women’s Liberation Movement, pp.253-255 
11 W. Z. Goldman, Women at the Gates: Gender & Industry in Stalin’s Russia (Cambridge University Press 
2002), pp. 33-70 for a description of the antipathy experienced by women activists before the revolution 
12 Pervyi legal'nyi Peterburgskii komitet Bol'shevikov v 1917 g. (Moscow, 1927), p. 40 cited by M. Donald, 
‘Bolshevik Activity Amongst the Working Women of Petrograd in 1917’ in International Review of Social 
History Vol. 27 Issue 2 (August 1982), pp. 129-160 pg. 134 
13 N.K. Krupskaya, The Woman Worker, Manifesto Press Cooperative Ltd. Britain 2017 pg. 19 
14 R. Stites, The Women’s Liberation Movement, pg. 242 
15 B. Evans Clements, Bolshevik Women, pp.109-116 
16 B. Evans Clements, Bolshevik Women, pp.109-116 
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denounced as splitters. Thus they rejected Kollontai’s initial effort to organise a 
separate women’s organisation at a women’s conference held in November 1917.17 
The individual who was to become the first Director of the Zhenotdel, Inessa 
Armand, had been a close collaborator of Krupskaya and Lenin before 1917. 
However, she had shown herself to be far more radical than either of her two 
comrades in her views on marriage and women’s sexual emancipation. Armand 
begun her political journey within the Russian women’s movement, and her 
views on women’s sexual autonomy in 1915 bore a close resemblance to 
Kollontai’s writings.18 Interestingly, both these women had left their own 
marriages in order to pursue their revolutionary careers and had lived 
unconventional personal lives.19 Armand believed strongly in the need to 
revolutionise conventional marriage and sexual relationships, and had been 
attempting to develop her perspectives in a pamphlet in 1915. She was forced to 
abandon this project partly, because of the outbreak of war, but also, according 
to her biographer, RC Ellwood, because of Lenin’s active opposition to what he 
considered to be a libertarian and bourgeois project.20 Nonetheless, Ellwood 
asserts, Armand had not abandoned her convictions, and that she used her 
appointment to the position of Director of the Zhenotdel in 1919 to test out her 
ideas in practice.21 
Prior to February 1917, those women who were to become the leadership of the 
Zhenotdel had struggled to maintain work among Russian women in conditions of 
political repression. Krupskaya, Kollontai, Armand and Stal had all been forced to 
live abroad as political emigres, while Nikolaeva and Samoilova continued to 
organise women workers through underground activities in Russia.22 In February 
1914, Samoilova joined forces with Anna Ulyanova (Lenin’s sister) and others on 
the Russian section of the editorial board of Rabotnitsa, the first Bolshevik 
women’s journal. Ulyanova and Samoilova liaised with Krupskaya, Armand and Stal 
                                                          
17 W. Z. Goldman, Women at the Gates, pg. 38 
18 R. C. Ellwood, Inessa Armand: Revolutionary and Feminist (Cambridge University Press 1992), pp.145-151 
19 R. C. Ellwood, Inessa Armand, pp. 40-43; M. Pearson, Inessa – Lenin’s Mistress (Gerald Duckworth & 
Company 2001) for Armand’s personal life; B. Evans Clements, Bolshevik Feminist, pp.3-39 and C. Porter, 
Alexandra Kollontai, pp.7-37 for Kollontai’s background 
20 R. C. Ellwood, Inessa Armand, pp.145-151 for a description of Lenin’s opposition 
21 R. C. Ellwood, Inessa Armand, pp.231-261 for her activity in the Soviet women’s movement 
22 B. Evans Clements, Bolshevik Women, pp.55-91 for the women of the Bolshevik underground movement 
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outside Russia in producing and distributing a journal aimed at working women.23 
Stites described Rabotnitsa as a crucial step towards women’s organisation among 
Bolshevik women.24 Battling state suppression, including the arrest of the majority 
of the editorial board on the eve of publication of the first issue, those involved 
managed to produce seven issues of the journal between February and June 1914, 
when the Tsarist police finally shut Rabotnitsa down.25  
Following the upsurge of activity among women in the February Revolution of 
1917, Rabotnitsa was re-launched. Its first issue was published in May and activists 
organised around under the leadership of Nikolaeva and it became the centre of 
Bolshevik organisation among women during a period of intense struggle for 
women’s rights. The “thirteen issues published from May 1917 to January 1918 
each sold around 50,000 copies.”26 A conference was organised by Petrograd 
Rabotnitsa activists on November 12 1917, attended by 500 delegates representing 
80,000 women from local soviets, factories, trade unions and youth 
organisations.27 At that conference Kollontai’s calls for a separate women’s 
organisation were rejected because this approach was still seen by leading 
Bolshevik women as unnecessary and divisive. Nikolaeva declared that “class 
conscious women workers know that we have no special women’s interests and 
that there should be no separate women’s organisations.”28 She was emphatic that 
“[W]e are strong only when organised together in one fraternal proletarian family 
with all workers in the struggle for socialism.”29 Samoilova supported Nikolaeva 
and refused to agree to separate organisation. A compromise was agreed, with 
Rabotnitsa to form a secretariat from its editorial board to lead work among 
women, but with that work to be limited to what was considered possible in local 
conditions. The conference also called on the Bolshevik leadership to convene “an 
All-Russian Congress of Women Workers” early the following year.30 This 
conference can be seen as an important staging post on the way to the creation 
                                                          
23 B. Evans Clements, Bolshevik Women, pg. 104 
24 R. Stites, The Women’s Liberation Movement, pg. 252-258 for women’s organisational initiatives between 
1913 and 1914 
25 B. Evans Clements, Bolshevik Women, pp.102-105 and K. Turton, Forgotten Lives: The Role of Lenin’s 
Sisters in the Russian Revolution 1864-1937 (Palgrave Macmillan 2007), pp.61-70 
26 M. Donald, ‘Bolshevik Activity Amongst the Working Women of Petrograd in 1917’, pg. 134 
27 C. Eubanks Hayden, ‘The Zhenotdel and the Bolshevik Party’ in Russian History III, 2 (1976), pp. 153-155 
28 C. Eubanks Hayden, ‘The Zhenotdel and the Bolshevik Party’, pp. 153-155 
29 M. Donald, ‘Bolshevik Activity Amongst the Working Women of Petrograd in 1917’, pg. 157 
30 M. Donald, ‘Bolshevik Activity Amongst the Working Women of Petrograd in 1917’, pg. 157 
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of the Zhenotdel. Yet leading women’s rights activists remained very wary of 
taking too decisive a step in the direction of women’s organisation. 
It was not be until the following year, when Rabotnitsa had ceased publication 
and the planned Congress of Women Workers had not taken place, that she, 
Armand, Samoilova and Krupskaya, finally admitted that formal steps were 
needed to create an organisation dedicated to women’s rights. The experience of 
the civil war had shown them that loyalty to the Soviet project would not 
necessarily result in an advance in women’s rights. As Kollontai stated “the 
revolution has brought rights for [women] on paper but in fact it has only made 
life hard for them.”31 It was time to accept the need for a separate women’s 
organisation. 
 
1.2 Anti-Feminism 
The antipathy expressed by Nikolaeva and Samoilova towards feminism was not 
new. Wendy Goldman has argued that “the Bolsheviks regarded ‘feminism’ – the 
idea of separate women’s organisations designed to advance women’s interests – 
with hostility and mistrust.”32 According to Marxist ideology, women could only be 
emancipated through socialism, which itself could only be achieved by the working 
class. For the Bolsheviks, it followed that an ideology which based itself primarily 
on a challenge to male supremacy would weaken the unity of the working class by 
placing women against men. Women activists were thus apprehensive of 
accusations of separatism.33 Kollontai stated later that “Comrade Samoilova could 
not endure anything that smelled of feminism; she regarded with great caution 
any organisational scheme, which in her opinion introduced a ‘division according 
to sex’ in the proletariat.” 34 Samoilova and Nikolaeva had initially not drawn any 
comfort from Kollontai’s record of strident anti-feminism. Similarly to Klara 
                                                          
31 C. Porter, Alexandra Kollontai, pg. 300 
32 W. Z. Goldman, Women at the Gates, pg. 36 
33 C. Eubanks Hayden, ‘The Zhenotdel and the Bolshevik Party’, pp.150-155 for a description of the concerns 
of Bolshevik women 
34 A. Kollontai, "Tvorcheskoe v rabote tov. Samoilovoi," in Tsentral'nyi komitet RKP(b), komissiia po istorii 
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Zetkin, the German revolutionary and champion of women’s self-organisation, 
Kollontai had fought for recognition of the need for special organisation among 
working class women, while, at the same time strenuously opposing feminist 
groups. In a speech in 1913 Kollontai condemned feminism as an anti-working class 
ideology of the women of the capitalist class. She claimed that it sought merely 
“to achieve the same advantages, the same power, the same rights within 
capitalist society as those possessed now by their husbands, fathers and 
brothers.”35 Leaders of groups such as The League for Women’s Equality and the 
All-Russia Women’s Society were condemned for cynical manipulating working 
class women to advance their own bourgeois ambitions.36 Feminism was seen as a 
dangerous diversion for working class women, producing illusions in capitalist 
reforms and inciting antagonism towards male workers. Along with Zetkin, 
Kollontai would not brook any collaboration with the feminists.37 
Kollontai’s animosity toward feminism reflected a frustration with the fact that 
the broader Russian women’s movement was playing a very significant role among 
the working women of urban Russia by 1913, and had far surpassed the RSDLP in 
terms of recruitment.38 In 1905 the Union for Women’s Equality had 80 branches 
and a membership of 8,000. It had its own left wing, including women such as 
Lyubova Gurevich and Olga Volkenstein, the latter belonging to the Socialist 
Revolutionary tradition.39 In 1909 the Union was supplanted by the League for 
Women’s Equality, also a mass organisation with support among working women. 
The Union, and latterly the League, held meetings in working-class areas to win 
support for the suffrage campaign. They, and the more radical Women’s 
Progressive Party were able to attract working class women to meetings because 
they listened to the specific problems which they faced in the workforce. Kollontai 
was irritated that these organisations continued to have such influence, especially 
as she had made such efforts to undermine their hegemony between 1905 and 
1908.40 Before fleeing the Tsarist police for Germany in 1908, she organised a 
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militant intervention at the first Russian women’s Congress in December that year. 
A small group of 40 working class women, calling themselves the “Workers Group” 
were sent to disrupt this attempt to create a broad alliance between women from 
all sections of Russian society.41 The event has been described as a chaotic affair, 
with the Workers Group using every opportunity to stir up arguments amongst the 
1,000 Congress delegates and finally staging a walk-out. The Congress collapsed 
in confusion as the police moved in to attempt arrests of RSDLP members. 
Kollontai, who had been present as an observer, was forced to escape from the 
police and left Russia immediately afterwards. She later described the 
intervention of the Workers Group with pride and argued that it had drawn “a 
clear line of demarcation between the bourgeois women’s movement and the 
women’s liberation movement of the working class in Russia.”42 It had cleared the 
way for a working-class women’s organisation to take root. 
Unfortunately for Kollontai and her supporters, the RSDLP had little interest in 
giving leadership to the tens of thousands of women in factories of St Petersburg 
and Moscow. In her autobiography, Kollontai expressed her disappointment at 
“how little our Party concerned itself with the fate of the women of the working 
class and how meagre was its interest in women's liberation.”43 Advocates of 
women’s rights were still being told that women’s liberation would come about 
because of the inevitable triumph of future communism. In the meantime they 
should sacrifice their immediate demands for sexual, social and economic freedom 
in the interests of working-class unity. Despite the programmatic commitment to 
women’s equality inserted into the RSDLP programme in 1903, both the Bolshevik 
and Menshevik wings of the Party were apathetic or antagonistic to specific 
organisational initiatives among women. Perversely, and despite their avowed 
anti-feminism, Communist women were often denounced as splitters.44  
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By 1918 feminist organisations in Russia were fragmented and in disarray, in part 
because of their support for a deeply unpopular war.45 They could no longer be 
described as an “independent political and intellectual current”46 of any 
significance. However, an antagonism among the Bolsheviks towards anything that 
could be considered feminist had not disappeared and most male comrades were 
apathetic or even hostile to women’s rights, seeing demands for maternity rights 
or childcare as trivial matters in the face of the civil war. They failed to grasp the 
need to support the mass of women who had been drawn into the workforce.47 
The majority of the Party leadership appeared disinterested in implementing the 
decrees on women’s equality. When publication of Rabotnitsa was closed down in 
January 1918 ostensibly because of a lack of printing paper, and the Women’s 
Congress due to be held on March 8th was cancelled, there was great 
disappointment among Bolshevik women. It became evident that, for the majority 
of women, their new found rights existed only on paper. While being expected to 
sacrifice all for in the cause of winning the civil war, Russian working women were 
still being treated as second class citizens.48 
This realisation was a decisive turning point in the thinking of Armand, Nikolaeva 
and Samoilova. They had lost Rabotnitsa and were aware that many thousands of 
women workers were very quickly becoming very disillusioned with the Bolsheviks. 
Barbara Evans Clements states that by 1918 women workers “were not turning out 
en masse to support the Bolsheviks.” “[G]enerally they were more suspicious of 
the party than were their menfolk…”49 Armand, Samoilova and Nikolaeva worked 
together with Kollontai and Krupskaya to organise an all-Russian Congress of 
Women Workers and Peasants in November 1918 to address the persistent 
structural inequalities.50 The 1,200 delegates, who had travelled from the furthest 
corners of the Soviet state, saw themselves as representing a mass mandate for 
change. They committed themselves to overcome “the double standard of 
morality” in Soviet society, to “refashion woman and to ‘give communist society 
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a new member’.”51 This dual goal reflects that the Zhenotdel believed it was just 
as important to recruit women to the Soviet project as it was to liberate them. 
There was now no further hesitancy about the need to put a permanent 
organisation in place.52 Bolshevik women were convinced of the necessity to 
implement Kollontai’s proposal.53 A leadership was elected, which included Inessa 
Armand and Alexandra Kollontai, and they began the immediate formation of a 
network of women’s commissions. They were given formal approval by the 8th 
Party Congress in March 1919. Carol Eubanks Hayden states that the impulse 
behind the Zhenotdel came from activists themselves, with the Moscow 
commission demanding in May that the Central Committee “upgrade its status to 
department (otdel) and give it more organisers.”54 Although these demands were 
initially refused, further complaints resulted, firstly, in a Moscow women’s bureau 
and then, in September 1919 the Central Committee conceded to calls for support, 
and brought these commissions together in the Zhenotdel, a Bureau of the Central 
Committee, which reported to directly to the Central Committee. Paradoxically, 
this success in achieving official status was to become the most serious obstacle 
to making serious progress. Being under the direct control of the Central 
Committee would profoundly damage the Zhenotdel’s efforts to organise and 
ultimately lead to its liquidation. I will critically examine how this conflictual 
relationship expressed itself in Central Asia in chapter six. 
From the beginning there was ambivalence regarding the Zhenotdel’s relationship 
to the rest of the Party. From the perspective of its leaders, the new structure 
was to serve as an advocate for women. From the Party leadership’s view it was 
a means of ensuring that the women’s movement remained under its control. RC 
Ellwood argues that the creation of the Zhenotdel was simply “a product of 
organisational housekeeping by the Central Committee itself.”55 This analysis is 
supported by points made by Lenin in his interview with Klara Zetkin in 1920 where 
he stated that the Zhenotdel’s formation was necessary to “arouse the masses of 
women workers, to bring them into contact with the Party, and to keep them 
under its influence”. For Lenin, separate organisation of women was merely a 
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matter of “practical, revolutionary expediency.”56 However, others have argued 
that, in spite of Lenin’s claims of ‘business as usual’, the Zhenotdel was actually 
completely at odds with Bolshevik policy up until this point in time. Carol Eubank 
Hayden contends that it was a breach within the belief system expounded by Lenin 
which “understood anti-feminism to include opposition to any separate 
organisation.”57 I will examine the Zhenotdel’s relationship to the Party in more 
detail in the last section of this chapter. First, it is necessary to look more closely 
at the theoretical basis of the Zhenotdel’s programme to transform the lives of 
Soviet women. 
 
1.3 Zhenotdel Socialism 
 
Studies of the Zhenotdel, or of its leading members, often use the term “socialist 
feminist”, “Bolshevik feminist” or “Marxist feminist” to describe the ideology 
which grounded their programme.58 This distinguishes the Zhenotdel from the 
wider women’s movement, at the same time, locating it as a component of First 
Wave feminism. Yet, as I have illustrated, Zhenotdel leaders had been very much 
in conflict with the wider Russian women’s movement. Richard Stites has made 
the point that the feminist movement in this period saw suffrage for women as its 
ultimate political aim.59 And it was precisely this limited goal which women such 
as Armand and Kollontai were so disparaging of, as they were committed to the 
liberation of the entire working class.60 One of the most commonly repeated 
arguments against the women’s movement was that it aimed at achieving rights 
under capitalism, thereby sowing illusions among working class women in an 
impossible project. Kollontai warned in Social Basis of the Woman Question that 
“Class instinct – whatever the feminists say – always shows itself to be more 
powerful than the noble enthusiasms of ‘above class’ politics.”61 Accordingly, the 
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only way forward was through an overthrow of class society and the creation of a 
collectivised alternative whereby women could escape the chains of the family.62 
The Zhenotdel identified with Marxism and hoped to show to the rest of the world 
that socialism, as opposed to ‘bourgeois feminism’ would liberate working class 
women. 
I use the term, ‘Zhenotdel Socialism’, to describe the approach of the Bureau to 
the post-revolutionary Soviet project. This is a useful definition in that it combines 
concepts of gender emancipation and socialism within a state-building 
programme. Barbara Evans Clements has argued that the Bureau had “crafted 
from the Marxist analysis of women’s emancipation a vision of the socialist future 
and the means to achieve it that diverged in very significant ways from those 
articulated by the Party’s male leaders.”63 As communists, Kollontai, Armand, and 
Krupskaya all looked to their own movement for theoretical and ideological 
underpinnings. In particular they were deeply influenced by the ideas of August 
Bebel and Frederick Engels who had both written on primitive communism and the 
woman question in the latter part of the 19th century.64 
The centrality of the writings of Bebel and Engels for Zhenotdel leaders lay in the 
connection they made between attaining a communist society and securing 
women’s freedom. Their consideration of studies of tribal and early human 
societies had led them to believe that primitive communism had been an ideal 
form of societal organisation for women. Women’s role in communist production 
and reproduction had been equal, if not more important, than that of men as all 
family ties were traced through the mother. It was not only “a general community 
of women and men but also a community of children.”65 All society shared 
collective benefit and responsibility for children. Members of the commune shared 
in the produce of the labour of both men and women. However, the emergence 
of private property through agriculture had destroyed the communal bonds and 
concentrated property in the hands of a minority, ultimately leading to state rule, 
                                                          
62 A. Kollontai, ‘The Social Basis of the Woman Question’ in Selected Writings of Alexandra Kollontai, A. Holt, 
(Allison & Busby 1977), pg. 64-73 for Kollontai’s views on the necessity to supersede the family 
63 B. Evans Clements, ‘The Utopianism of the Zhenotdel’ in Slavic Review Vol 51 No 3 (Autumn 1992), pg. 
487 
64 A. Bebel, Women under Socialism (Schocken Books Incorporated 1971); F. Engels, The Origin of the 
Family, Private Property and the State (International Publishers 1975) 
65 A. Bebel, Women Under Socialism, pg. 16 
29 
 
the privatised family and the supremacy of men over women. In Engels’ words, 
the collapse of primitive communism symbolised the “historical downfall of the 
female sex.”66 Women became marginalised and isolated from civil society and 
enslaved by domestic labour and childcare. The monogamous family of 19th 
century was just the most recent example of a repressive family form within which 
women were themselves treated as property. Both class society and the 
conventional family had therefore become an impediment to the progress of 
humanity.67 
This analysis was a very powerful one for women seeking emancipation within the 
socialist project. It provided a means to link their ambition for personal 
emancipation from the restraints of convention with the broader fight for socialist 
change.68 Advocates of women’s rights were able to point to Bebel’s critique of 
the bourgeois family as “a place of darkness and superstition” in their attacks on 
that institution. On sexual morality they could refer to his claim that “the sexual 
impulse is neither moral nor immoral; it is merely natural like hunger and thirst; 
nature knows nothing of morals.”69 In demanding freedom from state restrictions 
on divorce they could quote Engels on the need to recognise that in the absence 
of love “separation is a benefit for both partners as well as for society – only 
people will then be spared having to wade through the useless mire of a divorce 
case.”70 And to back their demands for economic and sexual independence they 
could refer to his view that not only was women’s entry into productive labour 
essential but that involvement in “social production would transform sexuality” 
and challenge the roots of the bourgeois family.”71 Accordingly the connection 
between women’s economic activity and the supersession of the family was made. 
It showed that under socialism women would attain economic freedom and 
equality with men. Freedom from the drudgery of domestic labour and childcare 
would allow them to enjoy a free social, political and sexual life.  
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Klara Zetkin, who collaborated with Bebel within the SDP, is an example of 
someone for whom these ideas were central. She lauded Bebel’s work as of 
ground-breaking significance in revealing “for the first time the connection 
between the woman question and historical development” of class society and 
particularly capitalism.72 Zetkin utilised the theoretical authority of Bebel and 
Engels in her fight for recognition of ‘the woman question’ and to assist her to 
persuade the German SDP to set up special women’s commissions at the Erfurt 
Conference in 1891.73 She became the leading women’s advocate within the 
Second Communist International, and was described as a pugnacious and 
determined figure who was not afraid to condemn socialist men for their 
reactionary views on the woman question.74 She won over the Second International 
to a commitment to campaign for women’s suffrage and the establishment of 
International Women’s Day as part of the socialist calendar.75 As a member of the 
left wing of the German Social Democratic party and a close ally of Rosa 
Luxembourg, Zetkin was held in high esteem by Lenin and the Bolshevik party 
leadership.76 A strong supporter of the Zhenotdel, Zetkin drafted a resolution to 
the newly formed Third International in 1921 calling on all parties of the 
International to form their own Zhenotdels.77 She discussed and agreed this 
resolution with Lenin and claimed that he was a backer of the initiative.78 
Although Zetkin was an important ally because of her support for a separate 
organisation, she was more moderate in her views on the family than either 
Armand or Kollontai, the two individuals most intrinsic to the Zhenotdel’s 
programme.79 Both these women had played a central role in the Zhenotdel’s 
creation and leadership in the formative years. Barbara Clements Evans argues 
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that the Zhenotdel leaders can be distinguished from the rest of the Bolsheviks 
because of their avowal of a “distinctive form of utopianism”, which was also 
“widely shared among less prominent zhenotdelovki.”80 In 1908 Kollontai wrote 
that to “become really free, women had to throw off the heavy chains of the 
current forms of the family, which are outmoded and oppressive.”81 Socialism 
implied radical changes to the traditional family, which was “not only useless but 
harmful” to the development of socialism.82 Kollontai saw herself as a trailblazer 
for women’s rights within the Marxist movement and leaned more towards Bebel’s 
libertarianism than the more conservative Engels. In contrast to Engel’s hope that 
“monogamy would become real” in socialist society, she posited a “theory of free 
love and differing types of love relations.”83 All relationships short or long should 
be based on “a comradeship of mutual interests and deep feeling in a “communist 
society unified by platonic and erotic love.”84  
Kollontai echoed Bebel in a speech in 1921 where she argued sex “should be 
natural like the satisfying of hunger or thirst”.85 Such a view was strongly 
condemned by Lenin.86 Kollontai had also enriched her thinking on human 
relationships through reading Freud and Nietzsche, both of whom were dismissed 
as bourgeois ideologues by the Bolsheviks.87 For Armand’s part, her biographer has 
argued that “[t]here is no doubt that her 1915 pamphlet, had it appeared, would 
have advocated sexual emancipation and sexual equality.”88 In her letters to Lenin 
that year she had argued for him to recognise the importance of connecting the 
struggle for women’s sexual freedom with the class struggle. She bemoaned the 
position of a married woman who: 
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...does not exist for herself, as befits a human being, but only to bear 
children and keep house. Not only love but often respect are out of the 
question – she is simply the head slave of her husband.89  
Human relationships were of as much importance to Armand as the economic 
position of human beings. In her speech to the 1918 Congress, Armand argued that 
the revolution had laid bare both the capitalist economic system and the 
‘bourgeois-capitalist family.’90 Ellwood argues that for Armand “the time had now 
come to replace the household economy and free women as housewives so that 
they could participate in party, soviet and other communal activity”.91 She wrote 
in 1919 that until the old institution of the family was abolished “it is impossible 
to obliterate exploitation and enslavement; it is impossible to create the new 
person; impossible to build socialism.”92 
Among the Bolsheviks who supported the supersession of the conventional family, 
there was a great deal of divergence over the pace of change. Lenin, Krupskaya 
and Samoilova were much more cautious than Kollontai and Armand. Indeed, Lenin 
was particularly harsh on what he termed “the obsession with sexual 
relationships.”93 Kollontai was by far the most audacious and impatient for 
change. At a series of lectures at Sverdlov University in 1921 she dismissed those 
who claimed she was too impatient and argued that the quest for a new morality 
could not be postponed. For Kollontai, “the ideology of a social group, and 
consequently of sexual morality, is accomplished in the very process of the highly 
difficult struggle of given social groups with hostile social forces.”94 A new socialist 
man and woman involved in “less traditional forms of sexual relationships” would 
come into being as a result of a radical challenge to existing norms.95 Kollontai 
believed that the Soviet state should lead this challenge by developing new moral 
standards.  
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Alongside a belief in the necessity of radical action to shape change, the Zhenotdel 
leadership also adhered to the notion of women as the agents of their own 
liberation, connected with the Marxist notion of working class self-liberation. 
However, there was a tension between that ideal and an adherence to a vision of 
a ‘New Soviet Woman’. Women were described by both male and female members 
of the CPSU “as more backward, ignorant, superstitious, resistant to change, 
susceptible to incorrect influences than men.”96 ‘Backwardness’ was an idea 
central to Bolshevism and used to distinguish the ‘advanced’ section of the 
working class who supported their political aims from those others who had not 
been won over. It also was used to describe the peasantry and their lives. At the 
bottom of the pyramid of backwardness were peasant women, viewed as “the 
‘darkest’, most backward layer of the Russian population, a dead weight and a 
potential source of counterrevolution.”97 Their lives were perceived as being 
engulfed by ignorance and superstition. A key aim of the Zhenotdel was to awaken 
these women to an understanding of their historical destiny in the socialist 
revolution. However what began as a campaign of enlightenment became, under 
conditions of growing intolerance, increasingly negative. With the introduction of 
the Five Year Plan in 1928, latent bigotry towards rural women in particular 
assumed very authoritarian forms.  
The influence of Kollontai’s views on Serafima Liubimova, Head of the Central 
Asian Zhenotdel from 1923 to 1926, is apparent in the leading role assigned by 
Liubimova to Soviet law as an instrument of change. Like Kollontai, Liubimova had 
a fundamental conflict in her thinking in terms of one the one hand encouraging 
self-activity, and on the other hand, urging indigenous women to adopt a Soviet 
model of the family. This tension was aggravated by the deeply negative attitude 
towards many aspects of the lives of indigenous women. While the Zhenotdel did 
attempt to facilitate self-sufficiency among indigenous women, its advocacy of 
Soviet law as a model for their personal lives was deeply intrusive and culturally 
insensitive. It sought to organise women’s cooperatives around carpet making and 
silk-weaving, which had traditionally been done by women. It also sought to 
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organise culturally sensitive women-only clubs and ‘corners’ for women to meet.98 
But within these forums, the Zhenotdel promote the implementation of European 
family forms, and for indigenous women to prosecute their fathers and brothers 
to Soviet Courts for breach of laws prohibiting kalym (bride-price) and polygyny. 
This was tantamount to demanding that indigenous women break with their 
families and communities. I will address these contradictory policies and the 
impact on indigenous women in chapters three, four and five. 
 
1.4 The relationship of the Zhenotdel to the Communist Party 
For the only organisation dedicated to pursuing women’s emancipation to be 
under the direct control of the Central Committee was certainly not ideal. All the 
more, given that the majority of members of that Committee lacked any more 
than a formal commitment to the ‘woman question’. The lack of interest among 
leading male Bolsheviks is evidenced in the failure of those like Zinoviev, Bukharin 
or even Trotsky to debate or develop the original visions of Engels and Bebel. 
Elizabeth Woods notes that, with the exception of Kollontai, the Bolsheviks “wrote 
virtually nothing original on the woman question before 1917.”99 While Lenin 
complained about the chauvinism of his comrades, he himself had done little to 
direct his own attention to women’s equality in his writings – something which 
would have been of enormous importance in influencing ordinary male Party 
members.100 The Bolshevik Party was in power with a membership that, largely, 
viewed the promotion of women’s issues as irrelevant or trivial, or were 
antagonistic to the Zhenotdel’s very existence.  
Thus, while it had won the right to exist, the Zhenotdel most certainly had not 
won the Party majority to its programme. Wendy Goldman has argued that the 
Party leadership only established the Zhenotdel because it “was shoved 
unwillingly toward change by the spontaneous militancy of women workers 
themselves and the tenacious efforts of women like Kollontai, who refused to 
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ignore women as a constituency.”101 The Zhenotdel may have caused annoyance 
with its demands, which were considered impracticable by many, but it was 
preferable to the demands of an autonomous women’s movement, particularly in 
a period of civil war.102 Carol Eubanks Hayden argues that the Zhenotdel’s attempt 
“to serve both the interests of the Party and those of Russian women at the same 
time” meant that when there was a conflict between the two “the needs of 
Russian women received a very low priority.”103 The Bolsheviks were thus able to 
absorb the energy and enthusiasm of women and curb their autonomy. 
There is no doubt that the lack of autonomy was a profound problem for the 
Zhenotdel’s ambitions, and one of the key issues which this thesis addresses. Yet 
I take issue with Hayden’s further claim that “despite periodic rebelliousness”, 
“in the course of the 1920s [the Zhenotdel] came to serve primarily as a vehicle 
for Party influence among women.”104 Wendy Goldman has addressed this point, 
and has demonstrated from her research into the activities of Zhenotdel industrial 
activities in the 1920s, that “Hayden is right to highlight this tension but wrong to 
assume that it was resolved by 1924, for the struggle between party goals and 
women’s issues continued well into the 1930s.”105 Hayden describes Kollontai as 
arguing that the role of the Zhenotdel was not just “to popularise the general line 
of the party among women, but to introduce into the building of the new state 
principles based on the interests of women.”106 This would require it being able 
to bring about “unprecedented changes in the nature of sexual relations” and “a 
revolution in the outlook, emotions, and the inner world of working people.”107 I 
consider that this goal persisted among Zhenotdel activists after Kollontai’s 
removal from the position of Director. Indeed, my research shows how a 
commitment to acting as a voice for indigenous women reflected itself in Central 
Asia right up to the end of 1928. At the same time, however, it is an inescapable 
fact that the Zhenotdel was directly under the control of the Central Committee, 
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and was vulnerable to decisions taken, not only by the leadership, but also by 
regional committees.108  
While the Zhenotdel attempted to utilise the authority of the leadership for its 
own agenda, it was unable to convince the male Party membership to assist it in 
achieving its aims. The Zhenotdel was not accepted as a legitimate part of the 
Party and the perception of it as a feminist enclave persisted right up until its 
demise. What is more, Lenin himself accepted that the majority of his members 
remained deeply hostile to women’s rights: “unfortunately we may still say of 
many of our comrades, ‘Scratch the Communist and a philistine appears’. To be 
sure you have to scratch their sensitive spots, such as their mentality regarding 
women”, which, he contended, was that of the “slave-owners.”109 It did not help 
that even Lenin, the highest ranking supporter of the Zhenotdel, saw the 
organisation in purely functional terms. He made clear in the same interview that 
the Bureau’s role was “to arouse the masses of women workers, to bring them into 
contact with the Party, and to keep them under its influence.”110 These 
“unpolitical, unsocial, backward” women had to be brought under the sway of the 
Party. No doubt Lenin’s narrow approach to the question of organising women 
presented a major barrier to the Zhenotdel gaining any legitimacy or acceptance 
as a permanent body within the Party.111 This atmosphere made its continued 
survival insecure, while also burdening the Zhenotdel with the workload of 
recruiting women to the party. Although there was a formal obligation on the part 
of all party members to assist the Zhenotdel’s work, in practice this rarely 
happened.112 
During the years of the civil war a perception existed among Zhenotdel members 
that viewed women’s emancipation as advancing as an intrinsic component of the 
Soviet struggle. There was little conflict between the Zhenotdel and the rest of 
the Party on the need to mobilise women to defend the Soviet Union.113 Barbara 
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Evans Clements writes that the concentration of the Party on military matters in 
this period left the Zhenotdel “free to champion all the elements of female 
emancipation that had been laid down by the founders of Marxism: Zhenotdel 
publications openly endorsed the radical restructuring of the family and sexual 
liberation, and prophesised the imminent creation of a new woman.”114 It 
pioneered a raft of new measures to assist women in achieving this ideal, with 
public canteens, literacy courses, employment training, workshops and 
cooperatives. However, the end of the civil war, the return of men from the front 
and the introduction of market forces in the New Economic Policy (NEP), revealed 
a far more sobering reality to that they had imagined existed. The pages of 
Kommunistka contained numerous articles bemoaning the re-emergence of 
reactionary attitudes toward women, their expulsion from the workplace, and the 
undervaluing of the Zhenotdel’s local initiatives, such as canteens and 
cooperatives, referred to above. Because of its commitment to NEP, and the lack 
of priority given to women’s rights, the Party leadership failed to take a stand 
against the instrumental treatment of Zhenotdel members and women workers.115 
Yet despite being consistently disregarded, the Zhenotdel continued to insist that 
it had a legitimate right to receive support as part of the Soviet project. From 
1921 it fought continuous attempts to close down sections of its organisation.116 
Wendy Goldman argues that the efforts of Zhenotdel activists to implement its 
programme of transformation “conflicted constantly with the entrenched 
prejudices of local party and union officials.”117 After the First Five Year Plan was 
announced by Stalin in late 1927, many Zhenotdel members were apparently 
relieved that the days of NEP were over and hoped that the leadership had at last 
accepted their arguments for the full and equal participation of women in the 
economy.118 Paradoxically, and most certainly unwittingly, the Zhenotdel’s 
persistence in calling for backing from the Central Committee led the Zhenotdel 
to promote the direct intervention of a profoundly dictatorial leadership in its 
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organisation.119 However, when it did become involved finally in 1927 and 1928, 
the support that activists had hoped for did not transpire. Instead, the Central 
Committee began moves to close down the Bureau. 1928 saw the steady 
liquidation of Zhenotdel branches reproached for “parallelism” – whereby the 
Zhenotdel was accused of duplicating the work of other Soviet organisations.120 
Wendy Goldman describes how “[b]y June the rationalisation committees set up 
to eradicate organisational waste had swept through wide sections of the country, 
leaving local Zhenotdels in ruins.”121 The protests by Anna Artiukhina, national 
director of the Zhenotdel, fell on deaf ears.122 
It is interesting to note that in 1928, in a period of mass repression and the purging 
of many members, a vigorous debate on the need for women’s separate 
organisation took place in Kommunistka. Russian members made clear that they 
were unhappy with the closure of Zhenotdels within trade unions and regions 
which was taking place under a “rationalisation” exercise.123 This debate was also 
reflected in Central Asia, with proposals coming forward to set up an organisation 
independent from the CPSU.124 Such criticism of the Party was not unusual in 
Kommunistka. But while previously the Zhenotdel had been so marginalised that 
these debates had gone unnoticed, they were now in full view of a Central 
Committee determined to crush all opposition. It was not coincidental that the 
Politbureau “declared frankly that the organisation interfered with the new tasks 
of the Five Year Plan.”125  
 
1.5 Action to transcend the family 
When the Zhenotdel project was approved by the party in March 1919, Kollontai 
declared to the 8th Party Congress that it was necessary to take immediate action 
“to begin the abolition of the unproductive household economy and replace it with 
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a network of communal consumer establishments.”126 Armand launched a 
campaign to begin this process, recruiting women to the civil war effort, to the 
workforce, political and social life and education. She also organised communal 
services, laundries, crèches, and public canteens to support this transition.127 She 
sent brigades to every region of the Soviet Union to recruit women, create 
delegate meetings and initiate childcare and other facilities.128 Samoilova was one 
of the best known leaders of this programme, a popular figure who “sailed up and 
down the Volga with a plea for support and a promise of liberation which she 
proclaimed from the decks of the Red Star.”129  
Armand created a flexible and democratic form of organisation for the 
Zhenotdel.130 Delegate meetings operated as representative bodies, discussion 
forums and training centres. Women were to be delegated as apprentices in 
factories, unions and government bodies for a period of six months after which 
they returned to share their new found skills with local women and allow another 
delegate to go forward. Wendy Goldman describes how it employed a two-fold 
strategy. It sought both to recruit women to the Party and Soviet organisations 
and “more fundamentally, to transform the very nature and structure of daily life 
(byt).”131 It “actively promoted a programme for women’s liberation based on the 
women’s full and equal participation in public life through the socialisation of the 
domestic sphere.”132 It aimed to improve working conditions for working women 
and issued a demand “requiring that every enterprise have at least one woman 
delegate appointed to the factory inspectorate.”133  
It is unclear to what extent the Zhenotdel’s demands took effect in this period. 
Certainly, with the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in March 1921 
activists found themselves in real difficulties. Elizabeth Wood describes how the 
Zhenotdel “faced perhaps the most difficult problem of all, trying to find a new 
identity now that the revolution and civil war were over.”134 The sense of 
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making progress receded quickly with the mass expulsion of women from 
factories to make way for returning soldiers. The Zhenotdel took initiatives to 
provide economic independence, by setting up small cooperatives, often known 
as artels, to employ women.135 Stites described an artel as an initiative which 
directly reflected the philosophy of the Nihilist movement of 1800s, which had 
sought to develop small groups of economically active women as part of its 
“consciousness raising.”136 These initiatives were significant, and provided 
models for the silk-weaving, carpet making and other co-operatives set up in 
Central Asia from 1923.  
Yet even these initiatives were hampered by cuts in funding for communal 
facilities such as childcare and public canteens.137 Lack of state subsidies meant 
that the Zhenotdel had to organise support for women through its own efforts. 
Rather than government funding, local cooperatives set up, financed and 
controlled their own services. Barbara Evans Clements states that this led to a 
strengthening of loyalty to collective provision. Clements quotes from Alexandra 
Artiukhina, director of the Zhenotdel from 1926-30, who expressed her 
opposition in 1930 to reports of investment in better household appliances for 
individual housewives instead of communal facilities: “It is better now to suffer 
with old dish mops, flat irons, frying pans, so that we have the means and 
strength to put into the construction of new social institutions – cafeterias, 
nurseries, kindergartens, laundries.”138 Again this model of self-sufficiency 
would be an important influence on the Zhenotdel’s programme in Central 
Asia.139 
When the economic drive of the Five Year Plan was announced in late 1927, many 
Zhenotdel members may have seen it as a sign that women would finally achieve 
sustainable economic independence. However, the move from small cooperatives 
to large-scale factories and collective farms would seriously undermine the 
autonomy of working and peasant women. In chapter four I will describe the 
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negative impact of the Five Year Plan on the Zhenotdel’s work in Central Asia, 
and in particular, how the safe and culturally sensitive working environments of 
clubs and shops were annihilated. 
  
1.6 The Zhenotdel leadership and the Central Committee 
The treatment meted out by the Party leadership to Zhenotdel Directors 
illustrated the problems implicit in its position as a Bureau of the Central 
Committee. The role of the Director was central in providing leadership for the 
entire organisation. Armand’s selection by the Central Committee as the first 
Director in August 1919 has been described as a clear move to control the 
ambitions for radical change articulated by Kollontai. The leadership which had 
been elected at the November 1918 Congress was replaced by an appointee who 
was under the direct control of the Central Committee. Kollontai was snubbed for 
the more trustworthy Armand, who according to her biographer, was not only “far 
less flamboyant, mercurial and unpredictable than Kollontai. [s]he also was less 
independent politically.”140 In fact, however, Armand was not the tame servant 
that she was perceived as by the Central Committee.  She held very similar views 
on women and the family and created a very democratic and assertive 
organisation.141  
With Armand’s death in September 1920, Kollontai was appointed as Director. 
Richard Stites has described her time as Director as the time when the “more 
aggressive stand in defending women’s rights reached its highpoint.”142 Kollontai 
“declared that the Zhenotdel would serve as an advocate for women within party 
and government”.143 An illustration of her ambition can be seen in her decision to 
extend the ambit of the Zhenotdel to Central Asia and other parts of the Soviet 
East. Kollontai and Samoilova put plans in place for an all-Union Non-Party Meeting 
of Eastern women in April 1921. The nature and aims of this planned event, along 
with its ultimate cancellation, are dealt with in chapter three. However, at this 
juncture it sufficient to note that, as is clear from both secondary sources and her 
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own writings, Kollontai was completely out of step with Party policy in this period. 
She battled the introduction of NEP and played a leading role in the Worker’s 
Opposition which launched a factional battle against the leadership. The defeat 
of the Worker’s Opposition at the 11th Party Congress in 1921 led to Kollontai’s 
political and personal humiliation, her removal as Zhenotdel Director and 
banishment abroad to the diplomatic corps.144 Under the direct control of the 
Central Committee, the Zhenotdel lost its most dedicated and politically 
independent leader. Her sacking, along with the deaths of Armand and then 
Samoilova is said to have “robbed the Zhenotdel of its most aggressive, influential 
and prestigious leadership.”145 Kollontai’s removal also sent out a clear warning 
that forceful criticism of the Central Committee would not be tolerated.146  
Thus, it was not unsurprising that her replacement, Sofia Smidovich, distanced 
herself from her predecessor and made clear that all discussion on radical changes 
to the form of the family was firmly in the past.147 But despite her loyalty, 
Smidovich found it virtually impossible to gain support for work among women. 
Soon after her appointment in 1922 she expressed anger about the Central 
Committee’s indifference to work among women, complaining that it “would be 
better to liquidate” the local Zhenotdels “than drag out the miserable existences 
which they are leading in the majority of the provinces.”148 She also faced direct 
discrimination. In a report in the same year, it was stated that, unlike 
representatives of other Central Committee bureaux, the Zhenotdel director “was 
told to wait in the hall” and “allowed into the meeting only when a point arose 
concerning women, and then she was sent outside to wait again.”149 That the 
Central Committee had such little respect for the Director of the Zhenotdel spoke 
volumes about its attitude to ‘the woman question’. 
During the NEP years from 1921 to 1928, Zhenotdel activists engaged in a ceaseless 
fight against liquidation. Regional and factory Party committees persistently 
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resolved to close down Zhenotdel branches.150 Smidovich finally resigned in 1924, 
no doubt demoralised by the difficulty of making progress, despite official Central 
Committee support. Her successor, Klavdiia Nikolaeva, a former supporter of 
Kollontai, suffered a similar fate to her erstwhile colleague. She became involved 
with the anti-Stalin Leningrad Opposition led by Gregory Zinoviev.151 In a purge of 
all Zinoviev supporters after 1925, Nikolaeva was removed from her position as 
Director.152 Again the Central Committee made it clear that the Zhenotdel 
Director should not criticise its leadership. 
Aleksandra Artiukhina, who later was to become the last Director of the 
Zhenotdel, demonstrated a similar commitment to effective organisation to that 
of Armand. From 1925 to 1930, she succeeded in dramatically increasing the 
Zhenotdel’s membership. Barbara Evans Clements describes how between 1926 
and 1927 “620,000 women attended the delegate conferences stretching right 
across the Soviet Union.”153 Its publications were read widely and thousands “of 
Zhenotdel workers preached the visions of Kollontai, Armand and Samoilova from 
Kiev to Omsk.”154 She is also described as being as committed as her predecessors 
to create the conditions for the emergence of an economically independent Soviet 
Woman.155 Artiukhina was also very active in developing work in Central Asia and 
she appears to have visited the region on a regular basis. Yet Artiukhina was no 
more able than her predecessors to win the backing of the Central Committee for 
the Zhenotdel programme. In 1928 she reported in Kommunistka that despite a 
large number of resolutions committing the Party to improve the conditions of 
women, “the status of work among women has not only not improved but in the 
majority of cases has become worse.”156 She expressed similarly strong criticism 
of the destruction of Zhenotdel initiatives in Central Asia by Soviet organisations 
in 1927 and 1928.157  
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Two years after the Central Committee finally to intervene in the work of the 
Zhenotdel, it decided to close it down. It was “no longer a progressive organisation 
but a hindrance.”158 Instead of a specific organisation dedicated to women’s 
rights, the entire Party would now take over these issues. In reality, this meant 
that the entire project was over, and work among women collapsed soon 
afterwards.159 Many Zhenotdel members objected and argued that the Party 
leadership was destroying work among women. However in the new conditions of 
life under Stalin there was no place for opposition to the party line.160 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have considered the ideology of the Zhenotdel and its relationship 
to Party and state. I argued that it distinguished itself from what it considered to 
be ‘bourgeois feminism’ and instead claimed that women could only be liberated 
within the struggle for socialism. This was to be a collective struggle for working 
class men and women and indeed the struggle for women’s rights implied a 
fundamental revolution in social relations which could only be to the benefit of 
both men and women. Yet the commitment of the Zhenotdel to the Soviet project 
was not reciprocated by the Communist leadership either centrally or regionally. 
While its place in the Party allowed it a voice in conditions where an autonomous 
organisation may not have survived, this came at a price. Attempts to make 
progress were hindered at every turn by apathy and hostility from Party the 
membership.  
Yet – and this is where I aim to make an original contribution – I argue that it was 
not an abject servant of the Central Committee. It had its own distinct and 
fervently held goal to liberate women from the restraints of the family. Wendy 
Goldman has illustrated how the Zhenotdel continued to fight for its programme 
within increasingly repressive conditions and in the face of constant attempts to 
close it down.161 The fact that it largely survived the constant attacks on its 
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existence illustrated that there was real support among the grassroots for this 
project. It was in the challenging context of Central Asia, where some of the most 
acute dilemmas facing the organisation in its practical and programmatic work 
were revealed most clearly, particularly around the question of women’s 
autonomy and the scope(or lack of it) for bottom-up initiatives. 
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Chapter 2 
The Zhenotdel in Soviet Central Asia 
 
In chapter one I argued that the central premise of the Zhenotdel was its 
conviction that women’s emancipation could only be achieved through a collective 
struggle for communism. I set out how this belief both distinguished it from 
orthodox feminist organisations in that period and from the Realpolitik of the 
Bolsheviks. Its leaders, in common with other prominent women revolutionaries, 
had fought a battle on two fronts before 1917; for recognition of women’s rights 
within their own movement and against self-declared feminist organisations.1 In 
post-revolutionary Russia they anticipated a momentous breakthrough for their 
programme. However, the conflict for Zhenotdel activists between their charter 
for woman-centred socialism and the realities of Soviet Russia besieged their 
project from the beginning and finally led to its dissolution in 1930.  
In this chapter I move on to consider the existing literature on the Zhenotdel’s 
role in Soviet Central Asia. I begin with a brief consideration of pre-Soviet Central 
Asia and the position of women within that society. I then consider academic 
analyses of the Zhenotdel’s ideology and attitudes towards indigenous women; the 
Hujum and the Zhenotdel’s role within it, the interplay between its programme 
and Central Asian women; and finally the relationship between the Zhenotdel and 
the Party. The majority of the literature is based on Uzbekistan, as this appears 
to have been the principal focus of Soviet political activity within Central Asia 
before 1929. It was also the Soviet Republic within which the fiercest political 
struggles took place during that period.  
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2.1 Central Asia before the revolution 
Central Asia was forcibly incorporated into the Russian empire between 1860 and 
1880 as part of the Tsarist military programme of eastern expansion. A largely 
peasant society, it has been described as having a highly diverse population. 
Massell paints it as a social order “rent by primordial attachments of tribe, clan 
and village community” and characterised by “linguistic and geographical 
separatism and localized micro-cultural lifestyle.”2 Five main ethnic groups, 
Uzbek, Turkmen, Kirghiz, Kazakh and Tajik, were spread across large agricultural 
expanses, city states (khanates) and nomadic tribal regions. Islam was the 
dominant religion and the cities of Bukhara and Samarkand were prized as holy 
sites of learning within the Islamic world.3 Central Asian Islam was profoundly 
embedded within indigenous cultural identity.  Being Muslim was a “communal 
identity…played out through the communal celebration of august ancestors, 
annual holidays and life cycle events.”4 Religious identity went hand in hand with 
being Uzbek, Tajik, Kirghiz, Kazakh or Turkmen and “for most people there simply 
could not be a distinction, let alone a contradiction, between Islam and local 
custom.”5 In the absence of a state, the Muslim clergy in pre-Soviet Central Asia 
played an essential role as educator, law enforcer and welfare provider. Islam was 
the official ideology of the khanates and deeply intertwined with local law in the 
urban, agricultural and nomadic regions.6  
Central Asia was also a society deeply segregated on grounds of gender. In the 
part of the region which was to become Uzbekistan, the majority of women lived 
in seclusion and were not allowed to interact with men who were not their 
immediate relatives. This strict partition between the lives of men and women 
has been described as specifically “designed to prevent unapproved sexual 
relations and protect family honour – that is women’s sexual purity.”7 Among the 
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nomadic Kazakh, Turkmen and Kirghiz tribes, women did not wear the veil but 
similar gender-specific cultural practices dominated their lives.8 In Uzbek towns 
and villages women wore a long cloak known as a Paranji and a face covering 
known as the Chachvon whenever they left their homes.9 Marianne Kamp describes 
how veiling became even more strictly enforced as a defensive response to the 
incursion of Russian imperialism in the middle part of the 19th century.10 The 
safeguarding of female virtue from the invader was imperative.11  
Adeeb Khalid has argued that the Tsarist occupation of Central Asia presented 
little threat to the established clergy, which “gradually accommodated itself to 
the New Order”, in return for an agreement from the Russian state not to encroach 
into its power structures, to interfere in local traditions, or pose any threat to the 
integrity of the Islamic family and the position of women.12 However hostility 
within the population towards a remote and arrogant imperial power began to 
gather momentum in the early part of the 20th century.13 The introduction of large 
scale landlordism under the Tsarist regime had resulted in the mass migration to 
towns of impoverished peasants. Those who remained on the land were either 
forced to subsist on tiny plots of land or to become part of a growing body of 
landless agricultural workers. These intolerable conditions and attempts at forced 
conscription during World War I led to a deep antagonism towards the Russian 
rulers.14  
In the midst of World War I, a nationalist movement against conscription sparked 
the creation of soviets in Bukhara, Tashkent and elsewhere in Central Asia.15 
National self-determination had been a key plank of the Bolshevik programme in 
1917.16 Calls for national self-determination made by leading Bolsheviks like 
Grigory Zinoviev at the Baku Conference of Peoples of the East in 1920 inspired 
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those in the Jadid modernist movement.17  This urban based movement had been 
initiated by Tatar intellectuals and maintained a commitment to national rights, 
radical reform of the clergy and modern scientific education. Jadidists had a 
strong commitment to the promotion and education of women within a 
modernised Islamic nation.18 Many identified the Soviet revolution as a conduit to 
the attainment to their own vision and participated in uprisings, including the 
Bukharan People’s Soviet Republic from 1920 to 1924.19 
In 1920 the Red Army was still fighting a war against Basmachi peasant forces who 
were resisting the continued presence of Russian forces in the region. This war 
which was not concluded until 1923 with the routing of the Basmachi.20 The Soviet 
government was determined not to lose the territory of Central Asia to the 
Basmachi. However it also recognised that it had to compromise with nationalist 
forces. The policy of self-determination was a key plank to the Bolshevik vision of 
global socialism and the resolution of the national question. Terry Martin describes 
the National Delimitation Programme initiated in 1923 as being the articulation of 
this policy in the aftermath of the Civil War. The creation of self-government for 
the Eastern nations of the Soviet Union would show that the Soviet government 
was the ally of the oppressed people of the world. By leading through example, 
the Soviet Union could become a beacon of hope for those seeking national rights 
against the forces of imperialism.21  
Self-determination within the wider Soviet state was perceived as an essential 
weapon against nationalism, as it would appease any sense of national grievance 
and voluntarily unite the peoples of the world in common cause.22 Gregory Massell 
has stated that Lenin and Stalin were both in agreement on the need to “make 
Central Asia into a showcase of Soviet achievements for the entire East.”23 They 
both advocated the creation of modern secular nations in the region. The Soviet 
East would show the world that humanity “could only proceed towards the 
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inevitable fusion of nations through a transitional period of the complete freedom 
of all oppressed nations.”24 With the stabilisation of Soviet rule in the region in 
1923, plans were put in place to create national republics and regions under the 
National Delimitation Programme.25 In 1924 the Uzbek and Turkmen Soviet 
Socialist Republics along with the Kirghiz Autonomous Region were created, later 
to be joined by Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.26 Francine Hirsch describes how the 
Jadid were drawn into local government and how the “’Muslim Communists’ 
supported Bolshevik claims to power, and the Bolsheviks supported their claims to 
leadership against those of traditional Muslim authorities”.27  
National Delimitation was part of a policy of ‘Indigenisation’ or ‘Korenizatsiia’ 
which aimed to co-opt the population into the Soviet regime by promoting national 
groups to positions within the soviets and Party, and thus reversing the sense of 
being ruled by a distant power.28 Terry Martin describes the programme as a 
defining moment in the implementation of a Soviet model for the peoples of the 
region.29 In practice self-determination in the Soviet Union was far more 
restrictive than the policy which the Soviet leadership advocated outside of its 
borders. Terry Martin argues that in reality, “national republics only had the same 
powers as Russian provinces” and Delimitation did not equate to “devolution of 
political or economic power.”30 The construction of Uzbek and Turkmen Soviet 
Socialist Republics and the Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast in 1924 was therefore but 
the first phase of a strategy to assuage national aspirations while retaining central 
control over the region.31 Yuri Slezkine argues that Russification remained the de 
facto policy, and the “personal (if usually unselfconscious) strategy for most 
officials.”32  
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The policy of Korenizatsiia thus aimed to satisfy the ambitions of native elites and 
resolve the tensions within a multi-nation state – while ensuring the continued 
authority of Russia. Thus what Terry Martin describes as an “Affirmative Action 
Empire” replaced the traditional Tsarist imperial power.33 In this description he 
locates a crucial contradiction at the heart of Soviet government nationalities 
policy – its attempt to connect a Russian modernisation programme to notions of 
self determination. For Central Asia this meant that the alleged “backwardness” 
of the indigenous population had to be overcome so as to transform it into a 
modern nationality which expressed Soviet ideology.34  Thus the relationbship 
between Moscow and Central Asia was from the beginning “an unequal 
marriage”.35 Loyal non-Russian national elites were never allowed any real 
autonomy. And with the turn away from Korenzatsiia toward ‘class politics’ at the 
end of the 1920s, many members of the national elite were purged.  
Nowhere was lack of genuine autonomy so appararent as on the question of 
Central Asian women. Terry Martin and Ronald Grigor Suny point to a central 
contradiction in Korenizatsiia in that while “Uzbek nationality was defined in 
terms of gender relations and customs of female seclusion that were marked as 
backward, dirty and oppressive”, at the same time these same social practices 
were to be eradicated.36 The cultural intolerance evidenced itself within the 
process of creation of republics, when indigenous Uzbek women were required to 
strip naked in front of Russian male ethnographers and anthropologists so that 
their body parts could be measured and photographed.37 Paula Michaels writes of 
similar incidents in Kazakhstan and claims that the process of modernisation 
“denigrated traditional Kazakh social, cultural and economic structures”38. The 
woman of Central Asia was viewed as “a primitive and oppressed creature of 
patriarchal despotism”. 39  She was a deeply backward individual who lived a life 
of drudgery and superstition – a life that needed fundamental transformation. 
Douglas Northrop describes how Uzbek women “served as the exemplars of their 
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people…by showing the dirt, disease and ignorance that gripped the Uzbek 
nation”.40 
However, the assuagement of national aspirations meant the promotion of those 
who would previously have been denounced as ‘petty bourgeois nationalists’ to 
positions of power within Central Asia.41 The Zhenotdel had an interesting 
relationship with the policy of Korenizatsiia in Central Asia. As this chapter shows 
there was no doubt that its Russian members believed indigenous women to be 
profoundly ignorant and backward. However, as I show in chapter four, such 
negative views did not automatically lead to an intolerant approach to all aspects 
of indigenous culture. The experience was – like Korenzatsiia itself – a 
contradictory one. Activists aimed to provide indigenous women with autonomy, 
while at the same time expecting them to adopt Russian practices in their personal 
lives. Another interesting finding in my research is the impact of the Moscow 
government’s concern not to offend the sensibilities of indigenous male elites in 
respect of the woman question before 1927. This reluctance translated into a lack 
support for the Zhenotdel, despite official pronouncements to the contrary.42 
2.2 The Debate on the Role of the Zhenotdel 
A prominent strand of academic thinking has depicted Zhenotdel activists as loyal 
supporters of Soviet policy in Central Asia, and in particular the assault on 
indigenous society in 1927, known as the Hujum. According to Douglas Northrop, 
while mass unveiling had not been practiced by the Zhenotdel before 1927, its 
perception of “Muslim women as subject to unparalleled oppression by patriarchal 
Central Asian society” precipitated it “to support the turn to gender, through the 
Hujum, as an appropriate idiom for Soviet liberation.”43 Its view of Central Asian 
women as enslaved by seclusion thus led it to support unveiling as a form of 
emancipation.  
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Douglas Northrop argues that Soviet policy on indigenous women was part of a 
modernisation strategy which was profoundly orientalist and imperialist in 
nature.44 He further argues that the National Delimitation Programme divided 
indigenous people into national groups on the basis of arbitrary and ill-informed 
views of Soviet officials. Indigenous women found themselves facing prejudice and 
ill-treatment from these officials. Adrienne Lynn Edgar contends that the 
indigenous woman in particular was characterised as “a primitive and oppressed 
creature of patriarchal despotism”- a deeply backward individual who lived a life 
of drudgery and superstition.45 Douglas Northrop argues that these stereotypes 
reflected a Soviet policy of: 
…increasingly treated indigenous women as emblematic of what was wrong 
with their nations, as symbols of what had to be changed to make Central 
Asia modern.46  
Women were perceived as the lynchpin keeping patriarchal society intact. Yet, as 
I previously argued in chapter one, the view of women as backward was not unique 
to Central Asia. In this regard, Elizabeth Wood describes how continued ties to 
village life meant that working women were perceived as backward and “more 
likely to be illiterate, superstitious, religious, and attached to older ways of doing 
things and to older kin relations” than men.47 The conception of overcoming 
backwardness in the East was therefore simply an extension of a widely held view 
among Communist Party members of working class and peasant women in general. 
Northrop contends that Zhenotdel members were enthusiastic supporters of the 
Soviet colonising strategy. He argues that they shared a view of Central Asia as a 
dark and backward corner of the USSR, with a population that was dirty, barbaric 
and even savage.48 In particular, in common with their Russian male comrades, 
they saw the veil as the exemplar of everything that was reactionary. Northrop 
describes one Zhenotdel leader, Anna Nukrat, as being especially derogatory in 
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her view of a veiled woman as a degraded imprisoned creature who “‘literally 
does not see the sun’.”49 Gregory Massell, who shared a similar analysis of the 
Zhenotdel to Northrop, referred extensively to Nukrat’s pronouncements in his 
treatment of the Hujum, including a statement that there was “no human being 
more ignorant, more downtrodden and enslaved” than the veiled woman of the 
East.”50 It should be noted however that, according to Massell, Nukhrat was 
actually not Russian, but “one of the first Turkic leaders” of the Zhenotdel. 51 Her 
antagonism to the veil may well have stemmed from a connection with the Jadid 
movement, a modernist intellectual strand within Central Asian Islam.52 Marianne 
Kamp’s study of indigenous women who joined the Communist Party in that period 
reveals an antagonism to veiling among many of them.53 A negative view of the 
veil was not unique to Russian members of the Zhenotdel. 
It is true, however, that Russian Zhenotdel leaders did consider Eastern women, 
particularly veiled women, to be the most repressed and backward of all women 
in the Soviet Union. In an article in 1920 Kommunistka entitled ‘The Last Slave’ 
Kollontai declared that an Eastern woman was “a chattel” owned “by her husband, 
who until now has been her master under law.” 54 She saw the veil as a marker of 
this repression, of the lack of human rights. Richard Stites has stated that Kollontai 
often encouraged Eastern women who had travelled to Moscow or Petrograd to 
unveil.55 She believed that it was an important dramatic gesture of emancipation.  
That this view was shared by other women activists is illustrated by the response 
to a group of Eastern women who visited Moscow in 1921. The women were taken 
to an International Meeting of Communist women, where they walked onto the 
Conference stage and unveiled: 
The applause did not fall silent. No one could speak; everyone wept with joy. 
The West opened its embrace to the working women of the East...Would 
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there be sufficient strength to tear away so many sacrifices of age-long 
oppression?56 
Northrop and Massell have argued that the repugnance expressed by Zhenotdel 
activists towards the veil, and their determination to be a civilising force in the 
East, motivated them to play a leading part in the Hujum. The Hujum was a 
campaign launched by the Sredazburo in 1927 at the behest of the Central 
Committee. It was a radical drive against all forms of what were considered to be 
reactionary vestiges of patriarchal life. In Uzbekistan, the focus was primarily on 
an authoritarian campaign against the wearing of the local form of the veil, the 
paranji. Removing the veil would apparently introduce physical and intellectual 
light into the lives of indigenous women and allow them to become part of the 
Soviet project. It would cure the many health problems said to result from wearing 
the veil, including a lack of exercise leading to toxicity, premature aging and poor 
muscle tone. It would result in healthier children and avoid problems caused by 
feeding infants with unhealthy breast milk – caused by restrictive clothing and 
darkness – and intellectual problems produced by having mothers who were mired 
in ignorance and superstition.57 In Northrop’s view, Zhenotdel members 
understood the veil to be “a ‘prison’ from which Uzbek women had to be freed.”58 
In the light of this viewpoint, it stood to reason that Zhenotdel activists would be 
passionate supporters of collective public unveiling. 
Yet a crucial flaw in this analysis is a failure to take proper account of why the 
Zhenotdel had never advocated collective unveiling before 1927. This thesis 
explores the years before 1927 and investigates the relationship between the pre-
Hujum and post-Hujum Zhenotdel. It illustrates that the initial aspiration of 
Zhenotdel leaders for indigenous women to rise up in solidarity with the Russian 
Revolution.59 When this state of affairs did not transpire, the Zhenotdel adopted 
a far more sober analysis of the possibilities of change in the region. The emphasis 
was placed on the need to draw indigenous women into safe women-only spaces 
where they could unveil and be at ease. Secluded women were to be drawn into 
initiatives which corresponded in some way with their traditional lives. Women-
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only clubs, corners and co-operatives were initiated in the Uzbek republic and 
among the Tajik population. Women only ‘red tents’ were also sent out to the 
nomadic regions, in order to recruit Turkmen and Kirghiz women. Moreover, even 
in parts of the region where women were not veiled, they were generally brought 
together within women-only spaces, It was thus crucial to Zhenotdel policy before 
1927 that work, particularly among veiled women, exclude men, including Russian 
men.60 Within women-only or female dominated spaces, cooperatives were 
created around handicraft work, spinning, silk-weaving, carpet making and 
embroidery, with the aim of providing assisting women to have some economic 
independence.61 Children’s nurseries, schools and medical consultations were set 
up within clubs and cooperatives to provide support for the women who attended. 
Women only shops were initiated in 1925 to allow women to sell their goods, to 
shop and to socialise.62  
Before 1927, veiled women marched alongside unveiled women on March 8th 
demonstrations. Indeed it was seen as a unique act of bravery for them to do so 
and photographs of Women’s Day events show veiled women stand alongside their 
unveiled sisters.63 Northrop claims that “Zhenotdel workers came to insist that 
Uzbek women publically – and sometimes at gunpoint – throw off their veils.” 64 
He argues that their attitudes toward indigenous women and support for laws 
against kalym and polygyny made it inevitable that they would support the 
Hujum.65 Such purported enthusiasm begs the question of why Kommunistka 
contained no calls for mass public unveiling before 1927. My research on 
Kommunistka over the entire decade shows the Zhenotdel policy was implicitly 
opposed to premature unveiling, as it would undermine its work with secluded 
women and put these women at risk. A number of key activists expressed 
awareness of the need to make concessions to indigenous culture, and there was 
very significant stress put on the need for indigenous women to be able to come 
to events in safety and unveil in the presence of other women. The methods 
mirrored indigenous society in a sense, by creating secluded spaces within broader 
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society. My thesis highlights that the Zhenotdel’s policy of transformation in 
Central Asia was directed toward enabling indigenous women to become 
independent, and to attain a sense of themselves as social actors in a protected 
environment. This was viewed as a step toward more direct involvement and 
integration. I argue that the Hujum in Uzbekistan was actually in direct conflict 
with Zhenotdel policy before 1927.66 
2.3 The Hujum 
It is generally accepted within the academic literature that the decision to launch 
a mass unveiling campaign did not come from the Zhenotdel, but from the Central 
Committee’s instruction to the Sredazburo to launch a campaign against the social 
fabric of indigenous life.67 In 1926 the Central Committee of the CPSU had 
solidified around Stalin’s leadership, following intense factional fighting in the 
two years after Lenin’s death. Under Stalin, a far greater prominence was given 
to rapid modernisation, which went hand in hand with a strict clampdown on inner 
Party democracy.68 Massell has described how a Central Committee resolution of 
June 18 1926 demanded “an ‘intensification’ of the struggle against residues of 
feudal-patriarchal attitudes towards women” in Central Asia.69 In response to this 
demand, the Hujum was formally launched by the Sredazburo in early 1927. The 
two men prominent in implementing this policy were Zelenskii, the Russian chair 
of the Sredazburo, and Manzhara, who was Turkic. Both of these men have been 
described by Massell as close supporters of Stalin, who were dispatched from 
Moscow for the purposes of preparing the launch of the Hujum.70 The Hujum was 
to be an aggressive attack on Central Asian traditional culture, directed at all 
traditional family practices that were perceived as backward and an impediment 
to the project of Soviet modernisation. These practices included polygamy, 
arranged marriage and kalym. In the Uzbek republic and Tajik region the Hujum 
became synonymous with an attack on the practice of veiling.71 
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Massell has argued that the hope of the central committee was that the Hujum 
“would forcefully” destroy gender segregation, “engage” and “shatter – the entire 
socio-cultural system directly, head-on.”72 He used the term “Surrogate 
Proletariat” to encapsulate the manner in which the Central Party leadership 
aimed to mobilise women against the old order. According to his analysis, in the 
imagination of the CPSU leadership indigenous women were “a potentially deviant 
and hence subversive stratum susceptible to militant appeal – in effect a surrogate 
proletariat where no proletariat in the real Marxist sense existed.”73 Women were 
at the core of the patriarchal family, and if they were mobilised to revolt against 
it, they could destroy not only the form of the family, but the entire community. 
A rebellion by indigenous women would deliver a resounding blow to Central Asian 
traditional society and provide a victory for Soviet rule.  
To begin with, local Party members were instructed that their wives and other 
family members were to take part in public unveiling events on 8 March 1927.74 
Northrop argues that “Party optimists dared to hope that they would complete 
the liberation of Central Asian women very quickly” and the practice of veiling 
would be eliminated by the tenth anniversary of the Russian revolution that 
October.75 It was expected decisively to tip the balance of forces toward the 
Soviet regime.  
On March 8th 1927 a reported 10,000 women gathered at demonstrations in cities 
throughout Uzbekistan to burn their veils. This figure was reported to have 
increased to 70,000 by the end of April, and by May the official count for 
Uzbekistan was 90,000 unveiled women.76 However, the triumph expressed at this 
apparent success was short-lived. Almost immediately the vast majority of women 
retreated back under the veil as they found themselves the target of a major 
societal backlash.77 It became apparent that the tactic had backfired. The 
Sredazburo had seriously miscalculated the balance of forces and the hostility to 
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unveiling, particularly from local Party members.78 Male communists were just as 
perturbed by clerical warnings of the divine retribution which would be unleashed 
on society because of their shameful actions in unveiling their wives.79 Declaring 
the Hujum to be “a harbinger of the end of the world”, Mullahs directed men to 
prevent any further unveiling by their wives, daughters, sisters and mothers. 
Zhenotdel activists were condemned as prostitutes who wanted to lead innocent 
Muslim women down that path to debauchery. Women who did unveil in defiance 
of their family were ostracised, attacked and even became victims of ‘honour 
killings’.80 Estimates of those murdered between 1927 and 1929 range from 
hundreds to tens of thousands.81 Uzbek women who unveiled have been described 
as been “caught most squarely in the middle of this struggle, and it was they who 
bore the brunt of social pressure.”82 Many women disappeared completely from 
public life rather than face the danger of attack and ridicule.83 It has been 
described as “a firestorm of violence against women”; a fury which lasted several 
years and cost hundreds even thousands of lives.84 This turn of events also 
seriously damaged the advances that had been made by the Zhenotdel in involving 
women in clubs and cooperatives before 1927.85 
Northrop reports that from the beginning men were encouraged to unveil their 
female relatives, rather than allow women to make that choice themselves. If the 
man was a Communist Party member he was ordered to do so. This led to 
circumstances where “husbands threatened divorce (which could leave a woman 
penniless living in the street), others used beatings, and others ripped Paranjis off 
by force, provoking shrieks, tears, and sometimes injuries.”86 Women had no 
agency and Massell argues that the Party leadership turned a blind eye to the 
bullying of veiled women. There were reports of paranjis being pulled from 
women’s heads in meetings, of women being surrounded by armed soviet militia 
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and ordered to unveil, of being held in groups and forced to unveil.87 Furthermore, 
a rather imperialist mind-set has been said to exist among Soviet officials toward 
unveiled women who asked for alternative clothing. For an Uzbek woman with no 
access to European clothing, going out without a paranji and chachvon (which 
covered the face), meant going out in underdresses which were the  
…sociocultural equivalents of a Russian woman’s brassiere, panties and slip.” 
European clothing was promised but not provided. Instead women were told 
to forget about their vanity or social discomfort and go out in their 
underdresses.”88  
Marianne Kamp describes how unveiled women were very susceptible to ridicule 
and attack when appearing in public without the paranji.89 Northrop points to the 
almost complete lack of support for unveiled women, who were ostracised by their 
communities because of their involvement.90  
Previous studies provide fascinating insights into a regime which was prepared to 
cynically manipulate women as part of its clampdown on indigenous society. 
Shoshanna Keller’s research deals with the targeting by the CPSU of the Islamic 
clergy and its enduring sway over the population. She believes that the elimination 
of organised religion in Central Asia was the central motivation of the Central 
Committee in 1926 and went hand in hand with the development of militant 
atheism in that period.91 Adrienne Lynn Edgar has pointed to Soviet disquiet about 
its vulnerability to foreign threats because of the existence of a largely devout 
and ‘untrustworthy’ Muslim population on its border. It also feared that Turkey, 
Iran and Afghanistan might overtake the Soviet project in their secularising 
campaigns and it would suffer a serious diminution in status.92 It may well be in 
fact that all of these factors played a part in this crusade to transform indigenous 
women overnight into “true modern Soviet citizens.”93  
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In his and Massell’s view the Zhenotdel was either a willing collaborator or a 
compliant servant of the Party. As I have shown in chapter one, other studies of 
the Bureau have shown that it did not fit into either of these categories. There is 
no reason to suppose that the conflicts which dominated its relationship with the 
Party in European parts of the Soviet Union would be any less germane to Central 
Asia. In my analysis, therefore, the role played by the Zhenotdel in the Hujum and 
any other aspect of similar Soviet activity in Central Asia needs to be understood 
by scrutinising the debates within the Zhenotdel itself, rather than simply 
assuming its collaboration with Party policies - a Party with which it was often in 
conflict.94 
 
2.4 The Zhenotdel and the Hujum 
While Northrop acknowledges that the impetus behind the Hujum did not come 
from local Zhenotdel members but from “high in the Bolshevik hierarchy”, he 
believes that the majority of Zhenotdel members, acting as the troops on the 
ground, were very supportive of the unveiling campaign.95 He also acknowledges 
that they did not abandon existing club and cooperative work for the Hujum.96 
However existing projects would be very difficult to maintain in the course of such 
a major assault on indigenous society and on women’s autonomy. Zhenotdel 
activists who worked in clubs and co-operatives in the Uzbek region would have 
been well aware of the potential problems. It is interesting to note that Gregory 
Massell has claimed that the Central Committee’s resolution to call for “an 
‘intensification’ of the struggles against the residues of feudal-patriarchal 
attitudes towards women” was taken following a report given by Liubimova to it 
in 1926.97 His suggestion was that she was supportive of this decision. Shoshanna 
Keller supports this analysis and contends that the report given by Liubimova to 
the Executive Committee of the Soviets in Moscow where she gave a report “on 
Party work concerning the liberation of women of Central Asia, which provided 
                                                          
94 E. A. Wood, The Baba & the Comrade: Gender & Politics in Revolutionary Russia (Indiana University Press 
1997) for a discussion of the derogatory manner the Zhenotdel was treated and also see Chapter one of this 
thesis 
95 D. Northrop, Veiled Empire, pg. 82-90 
96 D. Northrop, Veiled Empire, pg. 83 
97 G. Massell, The Surrogate Proletariat, pg. 226-227 
62 
 
the basis for the launch of the Hujum, in which “Liubimova and her deputies 
organised large demonstrations against the veil.”98  
While it was undoubtedly the case the Liubimova gave a very strongly worded 
report about the depth of oppression that she believed existed for Central Asian 
women, the implication that she both called for and led the Hujum conflicts with 
both reports from Marianne Kamp and my own research. Kamp writes that when 
Zhenotdel leaders first discussed the Hujum at a meeting in Moscow in June 1926, 
Serafima Liubimova, then Head of the Central Asian Zhenotdel voiced her strong 
opposition to unveiling. She argued it could ‘play into the hands of the basmachis 
[peasant anti Soviet insurgents]’.”99 Her reference to the Basmachi, who had been 
the peasant insurgent fighters of the Civil War, shows that she thought unveiling 
would produce a bloody conflict. It also does not tie in with the fact that 
Liubimova was removed from her position as head of the Central Asian Zhenotdel 
in late 1926. If Liubimova was a genuine supporter of the Hujum she surely would 
have remained in position, especially as she had hitherto been the driving force 
behind the Zhenotdel’s work in Central Asia and the most experienced leader in 
the region.100 Liubimova’s removal from her post in late 1926 actually indicates 
the marginalisation of opposition to the Hujum.101 At later regional meetings to 
promote the new turn, including the event “where Zelenskii announced the 
Hujum, as well as the follow-up meetings there was disagreement about unveiling 
within the Women’s Division.”102 Some of the activists, who Liubimova had led, 
remained unhappy about the campaign that they were being ordered to lead. They 
may have been concerned about the impact of a backlash on existing work with 
indigenous women. Kommunistka reports from 1927 which I consider later in this 
thesis reflect a belief among a layer of activists that unveiling was premature.103  
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However, despite the expression of disquiet from the Central Asian Zhenotdel, the 
Hujum Commission pressed on with the launch of the campaign. Anna Nukrat 
appears to have replaced Liubimova as Head of the Central Asian Zhenotdel. 
Nukrat became the dominant voice from then up until the Zhenotdel’s closure in 
March 1930. Zinaida Prishchepchik was reportedly appointed by Moscow to take 
over leadership of the Uzbek Zhenotdel.104 Prishchepchik was one of only two 
women appointed to the seven member Hujum Commission, the other being 
Tojixon Shodieva, an Uzbek woman editor of Yangi Yo’l.105 
The work of the Zhenotdel suffered very serious setbacks in 1927, particularly in 
the latter part of the year. In the midst of the communal violence which ensued 
in the aftermath of the mass unveilings, indigenous women were either forbidden 
from leaving the home or were terrified to do so. Fear of association with the 
Zhenotdel resulted in a dwindling of numbers at its events.106 Zhenotdel members 
faced harassment, including even from male Communist Party members. Kamp 
describes how in the area of Shahrixon, the Zhenotdel director who persuaded 
eighteen women to unveil was herself murdered the following week. When 
questioned about the murder by a news reporter, Party members replied “that all 
unveiled women were prostitutes and that respectable women would not unveil”. 
Clearly fearing for their own lives, all eighteen women reveiled.107 My research 
confirms that Zhenotdel activists reported incidents of forcible unveiling by Soviet 
officials, a cause of concern even for supporters of the Hujum.108  
It is important to analyse the fallout within the Zhenotdel following the Hujum 
campaign, something that has received less attention in the scholarship. The 
period immediately following the Hujum saw wide-ranging discussions among 
Zhenotdel members. Massell drew heavily on articles from Kommunistka in setting 
out what he described as a period of “re-assessment and retrenchment” which 
followed the Hujum’s failure.109 Unfortunately, in doing so, he did not make a 
distinction between the comments of Zhenotdel members and those of prominent 
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male Party members. He also did not perceive of the debate in Kommunistka in 
1928 as being in its nature different from discussions within the Sredazburo and 
Central Committee.  Massell’s belief that there was a strong united Communist 
Party led him to see the Zhenotdel as its frontline defenders, as “one of the prime 
component parts of the Central Committee Secretariat, [which] had been assigned 
a crucial role in initiating and supervising all aspects of the campaign.” 
Furthermore he believed that the Zhenotdel “played (or tried to play) this role 
vigorously at all levels of command.”110 The Zhenotdel was intrinsic to a “highly 
developed, radical, determined authoritarian” force which was engaged in a well-
orchestrated war with the indigenous people of Uzbekistan.”111  
This incorrect interpretation led Massell to misunderstand the context of 
Krupskaya’s speech to the All Union Meeting of Activists among Women of the East 
in December 1928. Krupskaya set out her opposition to the Hujum in quite 
unambiguous terms in that speech. Massell specifically points to her condemnation 
of attempts to “impose a dead level” on Central Asian society.112 He makes clear 
this speech was very significant – and very brave in a period where all opposition 
to the Central Committee was dangerous. However, he does not recognise that it 
was no coincidence that this speech was at a Zhenotdel meeting in a discussion 
on its work in the Soviet East. In fact, Zhenotdel members had been engaged in a 
discussion which had been highly critical of the Party throughout 1928.113 
Krupskaya was editor of Kommunistka and had played a lead in promoting that 
debate, as I will show in chapters 3 and 6 below. Massell’s belief that Kommunistka 
was the mouthpiece of the Central Committee of the Communist Party led him to 
view its contributors as simply dutiful Party activists. This means that his analysis, 
while providing extremely important insights into the policy of the Party 
leadership, misses out on the many contradictions between views expressed in the 
journal and that policy. Also his and Northrop’s failure to see the contradiction 
between the Zhenotdel’s activity before 1927 and the demands of the Hujum 
mean that its earlier work is not given proper consideration in defining the 
Bureau’s relationship to the Party leadership.  
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2.5 Interaction with Indigenous Women 
Another critical aspect of this debate which is absent in the analyses of Massell 
and Northrop is the role played by indigenous women within the Central Asian 
Zhenotdel. Kamp’s research shows that this section of indigenous women exerted 
an important influence on the Central Asian Zhenotdel. Moreover, that many of 
the Zhenotdel’s policies on the law, education and economic initiatives resonated 
with the vision of modernisation held by this layer of indigenous women.  
According to Kamp’s research into Uzbek language materials from the time, 
including the Zhenotdel journal Yangi Yo’l, and her interviews with women who 
had taken part in the unveiling demonstrations, the project to modernise Uzbek 
society was not simply a top down experience.114 Although there was force exerted 
by the Soviet authorities, the indigenous women who became involved in activity 
in the 1920s already aspired to a very different life to that of their mothers. Kamp 
claims that the majority of these women were from the modernist Jadid wing of 
Islam and joined the Zhenotdel because they believed that their vision of change 
could be achieved within its programme.  
As discussed above, Jadidism was a movement of young intellectuals which had 
developed under the influence of Tatar Muslims. Its supporters stood for a radical 
reform of the clergy, modern scientific education, the introduction of civic 
institutions and the education of women.115 Its leading members were most 
important for introducing ‘new method’ schools, where literacy, science and 
modern history replaced the memorisation and recitation of religious texts.116 
Despite differences with some aspects of Soviet national policies, most Jadids are 
reported to have supported the Soviet project until the latter part of the 1920s.117 
Many Jadids joined the Communist Party after 1917.118 They were part of a literate 
and predominantly urban group, small in number but enormously influential, 
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particularly as they were the section of society which joined the Soviet project 
and sought to shape it according to their agenda. For many Jadids it was a 
convergence of modernist projects.119 Events such as the Congress of the Peoples 
of the East in 1920 saw calls for democracy which were bound to resonate with 
Jadid hopes for national autonomy.120 Marianne Kamp describes how many 
indigenous women who joined the Zhenotdel were educated in Jadid schools or by 
Otins (women home tutors).121 These women were part of a literate progressive 
and predominantly urban group, small in number but enormously influential. It 
was common for a Communist Party member to describe him or herself as both 
Muslim and Communist. Leading Jadids such as Mirsaid Sultan Galiev and Abdalrauf 
Fitrat became prominent members and writers.  
Similarly to their male counterparts, Jadid women believed that the post-
revolutionary conditions gave them a unique opportunity to articulate “their own 
identities” within the boundaries of the Soviet project. In doing so they used 
“veiling and unveiling as well as many other strategies to define what being Uzbek 
would mean.”122 These women, although only a couple of hundred in number, 
were educated and determined. Many of those who joined the Zhenotdel were 
educated in Jadid schools or by otins (women home tutors).123 Kamp argues that 
“the ideas for changing women’s roles that most profoundly shaped Uzbek 
activists, whether men or women, expressed continuity with Jadid thought far 
more than a deep reflection of Bolshevik agendas.”124 They believed that they 
were putting their own mark on society. Thus she sees incidents such as the 
unveiling of Uzbek women at the Communist International Women’s Conference 
in Moscow in 1921 as part of a journey of self-liberation for these women. It was 
“a pilgrimage of transformation” for women who believed themselves to be at the 
heart of shaping society on their own terms, and not as servants in the cause of 
Russian women.125 Just as male Jadid members immersed themselves in the 
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National Delimitation programme, in an attempt to achieve their goal of building 
a modern Muslim nation, so too did female Jadid members enter into activity 
around their own vision, of forging a population of educated independent Muslim 
women. This vision included the view that veiling was a relic of the past, 
unsuitable in a modern Muslim nation. Tatar women, who had been at the 
forefront of the spread of Jadid ideas to Uzbek women, were unveiled and far 
more educated than others in that part of the world. These women provided an 
example of how indigenous women could progress, while retaining their identity 
as Muslim women.126 
By 1927, the participation of indigenous women in the Zhenotdel, according to 
Marianne Kamp, had increased significantly.127 This would have coincided with the 
increased involvement of Jadid intellectuals in Soviet institutions at that time, as 
part of the formation of Uzbek state bodies as part of national delimitation. Also, 
this increased participation was assisted by the launch by the Zhenotdel of a 
programme to recruit indigenous women and train them as organisers.128 Other 
methods of work were introduced that year, including the setting up of women 
only shops in Uzbekistan, described in Kommunistka as the most successful 
initiative of the Zhenotdel in the region.129 Also, an Uzbek language women’s 
journal, Yangi Yo’l, was established by the Uzbek Zhenotdel in 1925, promoting 
the involvement of indigenous women in co-operatives, clubs, education and 
provision of childcare. Kamp states that this journal presented the Zhenotdel as 
“a positive progressive organisation and directed its criticism toward other Party 
organisations for providing inadequate support and toward all enemies of progress 
for women.”130 Yangi Yo’l was clearly a vital means of communication with the 
indigenous female population and gave the Zhenotdel a major advantage in its 
strategy in the region. Yangi Yo’l’s editorial board is reported by Kamp as 
originating largely from within the Jadid intelligentsia.131  
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The Zhenotdel attracted thousands of native women to its meetings and clubs, 
and to taking part in its work in shops and cooperatives. Many of those women 
were no doubt attracted by the fact that the leadership of the Uzbek Zhenotdel 
included Tatar and Uzbek women and also that a growing number of local Russian 
women who spoke the native language were involved.132 An Uzbek woman, Tojixon 
Shodieva, editor of Yangi Yo’l was promoted to the local Communist Party 
leadership in 1925 and made a member of the Hujum Commission in late 1926. In 
common with a significant number of young Uzbek women she believed that she 
had a vested interest in promoting unveiling in order to bring about her modernist 
ideals.133 Shodieva’s role on the Hujum Commission and as editor of Yangi Yo’l 
was undoubtedly a crucial factor in events which followed.  
On March 8th 1927, reportedly thousands of “tempestuous female demonstrations” 
took place in Uzbek cities.134 There were dramatic accounts of women throwing 
off and burning their paranjis at official launches, described as “the first great 
marches of female crowds in public.”135 Rahbar-oi Olimova, one of the women 
activists who formed part of Kamp’s study, recounted her role in the 
demonstration in Tashkent where she made a speech declaring an “end to slavery, 
an end to the paranji, long live freedom”. Throwing her paranji on a fire, she 
declared her commitment to Uzbek President Yo’ldosh Oxunboboev.136 Kamp 
argues that the surge in support provides evidence that an audience for unveiling 
existed among a section of young Uzbek women who wanted liberation from their 
traditional roles. These protests were accompanied by a significant upturn in the 
number of young indigenous women participating in Soviet organisations in this 
period.137 The Hujum presented not only an opportunity to unveil, but also to link 
unveiling with their ideals of freedom. It was therefore not simply the case, as 
Massell argues, that unveiling was entirely coerced. He is correct that the “entire 
male aktiv of the Uzbek apparatus and their wives and other female relatives were 
ordered to appear at special convocations to mark Soviet Woman’s Day.”138 
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However, alongside coercion, many women were also led to the demonstrations 
by indigenous Zhenotdel activists. At the core of this group were indigenous 
female Party members, who represented approximately 200 out of a total 
indigenous membership of 25,000.139 Marianne Kamp argues that, despite their 
small number, these women played a highly significant role. Their participation 
showed that the transformation project was greeted with enthusiasm and 
commitment by Uzbek women intellectuals.140 The Uzbek President, Yo’ldosh 
Oxunboboev, Party secretary Akmal Ikramov and Uzbek Soviet leader, Faizulla 
Xo’jaev of the Hujum commission also attended some of the demonstrations.141 
Thus these events can be seen also in the context of a nation building exercise. 
In the debates which followed the Hujum, both Russian and Uzbek Zhenotdel 
members called for a state ban on the veil. Serafima Liubimova was one prominent 
advocate of such a ban. She believed that it would provide the protection of the 
Soviet state for indigenous women. It would give women “an argument to convince 
their husbands, who wanted them to maintain social standards, and Islamic clergy 
who claimed that women would go to hell for unveiling.”142 Kamp suggests that 
Liubimova showed a great deal of insight into indigenous protocols by arguing that 
“a decree would make unveiling significantly easier for women who might want to 
unveil.”143 She argues that indigenous women felt that they had formal permission 
to unveil with the benefit of a state decree. Kamp describes how Yangi Yo’l 
conducted a tenacious campaign for a decree until 1929, with various marches 
organised in support. It was finally evident that the Uzbek state would not be 
permitted to pass any such decree. Under the leadership of Stalin, the Third 
Congress of Soviets in April 1929 made it clear that there would be no legal 
prohibition on the veil.144  
 
2.6 The Zhenotdel relationship with Party and State in Central Asia 
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While expressing opposition to mass public unveiling, Liubimova had no such 
difficulty with direct legal intervention against indigenous family practices. Both 
Massell and Northrop have made important points in their studies on legalistic 
attitudes within the Zhenotdel. I examine in detail how this tendency was 
expressed in Kommunistka in chapter five of this thesis.145 For the moment, I 
consider points which have been made in the secondary literature about the 
Zhenotdel’s orientation toward state-led transformation. 
Up until 1923 Central Asia continued to reflect the dominance of the patriarchal 
family through Sharia and Adat legal codes and practices.146 Initially the Zhenotdel 
represented women in Sharia and Adat (customary) courts as well as the newly 
formed Soviet People’s courts.147 There was a significant shift in this situation in 
1924 with National Delimitation. This process included the drafting of Soviet 
legislation for the new republics. Under Liubimova’s leadership, the Zhenotdel 
lobbied for existing Soviet law to be adapted to conditions in Central Asia and 
specifically to ban practices such as polygyny, kalym, under-age marriage and 
abduction of women, the latter being a practice in nomadic regions. She also 
fought for the right of indigenous women to obtain divorces and live 
independently. In 1926 the Sharia and Adat courts were abolished completely by 
the Uzbek government.148 In the same year the Uzbek Criminal Code banned kalym 
and polygamy. Northrop argues that the criminalisation of indigenous practices 
was a major act of oppression. Furthermore, he suggests that some Zhenotdel 
members were “willing to employ coercion, duress, even, if necessary violence in 
pursuit of the overarching goal of women’s liberation, without being unduly 
slowed by attention to legal niceties.”149 Yet, while it was undoubtedly repressive 
to utilise criminal law to deal with established norms, the Zhenotdel, at least up 
to 1926 had not advocated jailing or other punitive measures against indigenous 
men. Instead, as my thesis argues, law was seen as providing a model of social 
behaviour which could be enforced through the People’s Courts. 
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Thus, the continued practice of polygyny, kalym and child-marriage among native 
Communist Party members was perceived by Zhenotdel activists as a major 
obstacle to winning over the general population. My research reveals persistent 
attempts by the Central Asian Zhenotdel to win support from the Party leadership 
in addressing this question. But, reflecting the problems already described in 
chapter one, Zhenotdel demands were largely ignored or dismissed. Activists 
experienced great difficulty making progress in the face of opposition from, it 
appears, virtually all male Party members.150 The deeply gendered nature of that 
society exacerbated its isolation, as the Zhenotdel was initially very dependent 
on male comrades to convince indigenous men of the importance of women’s 
rights. On some occasions – as will be seen – Party members were described as far 
worse than other workers.151 
The fundamental problem was that the Zhenotdel was demanding intervention 
from a state that had become extremely authoritarian, and whose real socio-
cultural impact on the population had been exposed as limited. Its demands were 
either ignored, or used as a justification for an attack on indigenous society and a 
major purge of Communist Party members. Northrop describes how the local 
Communist leadership conducted loyalty tests based on how the indigenous 
membership lived. Those who refused to comply were considered enemies and 
criminally prosecuted or expelled. The Central Committee deemed “supposed 
misdeeds such as polygyny, underage marriage and the payment of bride-price” 
as “incompatible with party or Soviet membership, and taken to reveal an ‘anti-
Soviet’ character.”152 At the same time official attitudes towards moderate and 
even secular Muslims changed very radically during 1926. Determined to deal with 
the question of religion in an ever more confrontational way, the Central 
Committee held a conference on anti-religious policy that year, out of which 
emerged the League of the Militant Godless. This was an organisation with an 
agenda to aggressively destroy all manifestations of religion and to promote 
atheism throughout the Soviet Union.153 Along with this call to battle, came the 
criminalisation of Islamic traditional practices such as kalym and child marriage 
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together with a purge of those Party members who continued to practice these 
traditions.154 The Hujum, therefore, converged with a general attack on religious 
practices throughout the Soviet Union. The focus of the Central Committee was 
on Islam in Central Asia and on the Russian Orthodox Church in European parts of 
the Soviet Union. The deep roots of religion within Soviet society were perceived 
as a major threat to the revolution from above in the form of the Five Year Plan.155 
All critical voices or autonomous forces were to be quelled and the Party made 
into an atheist combative fighting force, with no room for discussion or questions 
about the way forward. The Zhenotdel, with its culture of debate and tendencies 
towards autonomy, became a victim of this authoritarian clampdown. 
2.7 The Zhenotdel leadership in Soviet Central Asia 
As discussed previously, those who formed the core of the Russian speaking 
leadership in Central Asia did not come from the region itself. Serafima Liubimova, 
the most prominent figure until 1927, was 25 when she arrived in Tashkent in 
1923. The daughter of a state functionary, Liubimova was born in Saransk in the 
Mordovia region of Russia. She had joined the Communist Party in 1919, and 
became a journalist and Zhenotdel organiser, attending lectures given by Kollontai 
in Sverdlov Communist University in 1921, and working in the national office under 
Kollontai’s leadership in 1922. I have already referred in chapter one to the strong 
impression made on Liubimova by Kollontai and will deal later in the thesis with 
the manifestation of that influence in the policies she adopted as Head of the 
Central Asian Zhenotdel, a post she held from September 1923 to November 
1926.156 Following her removal from the leadership of the Central Asian Zhenotdel 
in 1926, Liubimova was relocated to the Eastern section. In late 1928 she was 
again moved to Kaluga in Russia and then to Moscow in 1929, where she worked 
in various relatively minor positions in the Moscow Soviet administration until her 
retirement.157 
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The woman who took over effective leadership from Liubimova in 1927 fitted a 
similar profile to her predecessor except in terms of ethnicity. Antonina Nukhrat 
was of Chuvash Turkic origin and was from the Bashkiria region of Russia, where 
her father was an Orthodox Church sexton. Nukhrat had initially worked as a 
teacher and joined the Communist Party in 1920. She became active in the 
Chuvash Zhenotdel and was then moved to the Central Zhenotdel in Moscow. From 
here she was sent to Central Asia when she was 26, with special responsibility to 
report directly to the Communist Party Central Committee. She remained in 
position in the region until 1930 with the closure of the Zhenotdel. She then went 
on to become the deputy editor of a journal, Revoliutsiia i Natsional’nosti. 
Nukhrat was arrested in 1938 in the political purges orchestrated by Stalin, but 
survived the gulags and was released in 1945. 158 
The third principal figure in the Russian speaking Central Asian Zhenotdel was 
Zinaida Prishchepchik. Prishchepchik was born in Minsk, in the Belarus region of 
the Empire, in 1899. She joined the Communist Party in 1917 and, like Liubimova, 
attended lectures at Sverdlov Communist University in 1921. She worked in various 
Party positions in Moscow and Viatskoi and was sent to Uzbekistan in 1925 to 
become the Head of the Uzbek Zhenotdel. Like Nukhrat, she remained in position 
until the closure of the Zhenotdel in March 1930. From then she continued to be 
dispatched to various district committees, and in 1937 was the secretary of the 
Yegorvevsk district of the Moscow region. Prishchepchik also fell victim to Stalin’s 
purges and was arrested in 1937 and charged with involvement in anti-Soviet 
terrorist activities. Prishchepchik was convicted and executed on 9th October 
1937.159 
These women were talented and ambitious activists. Like their sisters in Russia, 
they appear to have worked tirelessly to create momentum around the 
Zhenotdel’s programme in Central Asia. They dedicated their lives to the 
Zhenotdel and must have been deeply disappointed to see it closed down in 1930. 
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Little did Nukhrat and Prischepchik know that an even worse fate awaited them 
in the decade to come. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
In 1930 the Zhenotdel was closed down on the basis that Soviet women had 
achieved their emancipation and any further struggles for women’s rights were 
required to be conducted by the Party as a whole. Anna Artiukhina, the Zhenotdel 
Director at the time, was given no choice except to state that her commitment to 
the struggle for women’s equality would go on in other forms. A form of women’s 
organisation was permitted to continue in Central Asia, due to the special 
conditions which were described as continuing to exist there. But these 
‘Zhensektory’, as they were called, were simply technical units of the Party, 
possessing no room to develop their own policies.160 Indeed, I argue that, from 
1929, all semblance of autonomy is missing from discussions within 
Kommunistka.161 Under Nukrat’s leadership in Central Asia, Zhenotdel activists 
were told that the only option was to concentrate on obtaining the best possible 
results for the Five Year Plan. They were required to promote the unveiling of 
women as a precondition for their transmission into the industrial plants and 
collective farms. 
In the context of Stalinist collectivisation of the 1930s, women found themselves 
without an organised voice. There were no advocates for women, who were forced 
to work long hours in the most demeaning and dirty jobs, generally reserved for 
them. The entry of women on mass into the workforce was no liberating 
experience. They were ghettoised in the worst sections of production and 
agriculture – not unlike how the working women of pre-revolutionary Russia had 
been forced to work in the abysmal conditions of the textile factories.162 It must 
have seemed to some that little had changed. Women were declared as equal but 
in reality they had to shoulder a double burden of labour and enjoyed few rights. 
The banning of abortion and the ‘Cult of Motherhood’ introduced by Stalin were 
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indications of just how repressed women had become. Although over time the 
majority of Central Asian women unveiled, became educated and entered 
production, it appears that the process was dictated by the needs of Soviet 
industrialisation rather than by a deeper commitment to women’s 
emancipation.163 
The experience of the Zhenotdel in Central Asia reflected its programme in a way 
that was specific to that region. Isolated from local and Central Party structures 
from 1920 to 1926, its policy diverged very significantly from that of the Party 
leadership. Its incremental approach, and the commitment of activists, allowed it 
to survive and even to make slow progress in those early years. The work it carried 
out, largely on the basis of its own resources, from 1920 to 1927, was directed at 
the slow and patient drawing in of indigenous women into society. It was perceived 
as crucial for women-only initiatives to develop that the relationship of the 
Zhenotdel with wider society was a harmonious one. Indigenous women should not 
be put at any risk and the ability to go to a club or shop should fit in with everyday 
life. Activists believed that change would come about through the slow 
transmission of ideas into the family. 
1925 marked a turning point in the fortunes of the Central Asian Zhenotdel, with 
the publication of an Uzbek language journal, Yangi Yo’l and the consequent 
involvement of many more indigenous women in its meetings, clubs and shops. 
This was the highpoint of Zhenotdel policy and showed that, with the direct 
involvement of a layer of indigenous women, a real connection could be made 
between the Zhenotdel and the indigenous female population. Central Asian 
women came with their own views, experiences and had an important impact on 
the Zhenotdel. This meant that the Zhenotdel could no longer be just described 
solely as a Russian organisation.  
Another feature of this process was the strengthening in identification among 
indigenous women with the Soviet project. Their involvement in the Zhenotdel 
laid the basis for their recruitment to the Hujum. Thus, the participation of a layer 
of Uzbek women in the unveiling marches reflected a genuine impulse. An impulse 
which was manipulated by a Central Committee, intent on crushing local culture 
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and religion. Criticisms made by women, such as Liubimova, suggest that some 
Russian Zhenotdel leaders were fearful for their Central Asian sisters and believed 
that the Hujum would be a damaging experience. However, the co-option of 
Shodieva, editor of Yangi Yo’l onto the Hujum Commission sent an important signal 
out to those indigenous women who were seeking change. They undeniably 
believed that the mass unveiling marches would prompt a profound transformation 
in their lives. It was not afterwards that they saw that it had been a completely 
counter-productive exercise from the point of view of their own autonomy. The 
backlash against unveiled women and the closure of women-only initiatives 
created deep resentment and fear among those who have previously been 
confident and enthusiastic.  
In 1926, for the first time, the Central Asian Zhenotdel became of some interest 
to the Central Committee and the Sredazburo. But this did not signal an 
enhancement in the Bureau’s prestige. It was relegated the task of organising 
women to unveil, but provided with no economic or social investment to provide 
any practical assistance to unveiled women.164 It was ordered to conduct a 
campaign designed to throw Central Asian society into upheaval; to assault the 
roots of that society and eliminate the hold of religion over it. In the meantime, 
its own projects were abandoned or closed down without its knowledge or 
agreement. The position of the Zhenotdel within the Party lay at the heart of the 
problem. As I have argued in chapter one, it was in a contradictory position from 
the outset. Despite its determination to be a strong voice for women, the 
Zhenotdel was ultimately under the firm control of the Central Committee. My 
research demonstrates that the struggle for indigenous women in Central Asia 
went on until 1929. It was only then that all critical voices were silenced. 
Its attempt to combine semi-autonomous separate organisation for indigenous 
women with utilisation of the law as an instrument of change illustrated a 
profound contradiction at the heart of the Zhenotdel. This belief reflected a belief 
in the possibility of state-led radical change inherited from Alexandra Kollontai. 
In Central Asia it meant using the Soviet state as a weapon against customary 
family practices. Intolerance toward indigenous norms also led to complicity in a 
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mass purge of Party members in 1928 described by Northrop, and also reflected 
in my research.165 In her speech to the Congress of Women of the East in December 
1928, Krupskaya not only railed against those “who want to impose a dead level 
on society” but she also criticised Zhenotdel members who believed that the law 
could be an instrument of change without the support of the population and the 
necessary social and economic measures to make it a reality.166 She warned that 
attempts to confront the population in this way would only lead to defeat for the 
Zhenotdel and suffering for indigenous women. Her views harked back to an 
earlier debate between Lenin and Kollontai on the risks of upsetting traditional 
culture in a quest for institutional revolution.167 
My detailed review of the secondary literature clearly demonstrates that the 
Zhenotdel cannot easily be described as a loyal servant of the dictates of the 
Central Committee. Ultimately, as Hayden has remarked, the conflict between 
the needs of the Party and those of women resulted in women losing out. Yet the 
struggle for the Zhenotdel’s programme to change the lives of indigenous women 
continued to be expressed in Kommunistka right up until 1929, when it became 
clear that no further debate was allowed. The Zhenotdel in Central Asia became 
the antithesis of what those who had founded the organisation had aspired to. 
Indigenous women came to be seen not in any sense as the agents of their own 
liberation, but as a tool of the Stalinist regime. 
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Chapter Three 
 
The Zhenotdel Programme in Central Asia 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the main themes and 
arguments that emerge from Kommunistka on the Zhenotdel’s programme for 
socio-cultural transformation in Central Asia. I begin by elaborating the views 
expressed by Alexandra Kollontai on pioneering new forms of the family under 
socialism. I then proceed to consider the views of Zhenotdel activists on the 
position of women in Central Asian society, the family forms and the strategies 
proposed to supersede this society. I will map the shifts in views and strategies in 
the context of the changing economic and political conditions of the Soviet Union, 
in order to consider how the Zhenotdel programme diverged from that of the 
Communist Party and how the Zhenotdel fought to carve out an autonomous space 
in ideological and programmatic terms. 
 
3.1 The Zhenotdel’s views on the Family 
 
As discussed in chapter one, the first leaders of the Zhenotdel subscribed to a 
strand of Marxism which originated in views expressed by Friedrich Engels and 
August Bebel on the family under communism. A central goal that flowed from 
their ideology was the involvement of women as equals in the workforce. Kollontai 
believed the transition of Russian women from the peasant homestead to the 
factory in pre-revolutionary times had stimulated a “radical change within family 
life.”1 Yet while women had gained more financial and social independence, they 
had struggled to cope with childcare, domestic labour and paid work – “a triple 
burden.”2 They had broken free of the confines of domestic life but not achieved 
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real equality. Such equality could only be won through the elimination of 
“commodity production and the institution of private property.”3  
The coming to power of the Bolsheviks in October 1917 was seized on by Kollontai 
as an unprecedented opportunity to implement that vision. Now Russia could begin 
the transition to a society within which all “production of commodities will be 
socialised; it will become a production for and by society.”4 In 1919 the newly 
formed Zhenotdel set out not only to facilitate women’s entry into the workplace, 
but also to provide them with communal childcare and domestic labour support 
to liberate them from these burdens. All tasks carried out previously by a woman 
within the domestic sphere would become the collective responsibility of society. 
By 1920, Kollontai claimed in Kommunistka that these initiatives were already 
taking effect and the conventional form of the family was being replaced with 
communal forms, including public canteens and laundries. Also childcare was 
being communalised as “the task of bringing up the children [was] passing more 
and more into the hands of the collective.”5 Kollontai claimed that already the 
Soviet was providing “hospitals and health spas for sick children, restaurants, free 
lunches at school and free distribution of text books, warm clothing and shoes for 
schoolchildren.”6 And alongside practical measures to liberate women from 
domestic drudgery, women could now easily bring an end to an unhappy marriage.  
Kollontai declared that Soviet society was so liberalised that divorce “by mutual 
agreement now takes no longer than a week or two to obtain.”7 All of these 
innovative measures, along with the legal and economic equality of women, 
allowed the previous form of the family to be supplanted by “a union of affection 
and comradeship, a union of two equal members of communist society, both of 
them free, both of them independent and both of them workers.”8  
Kollontai had only recently succeeded Armand as Director of the Zhenotdel when 
she wrote this article, and it should be interpreted as her charter for radical and 
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interventionist social change.9 The article evinces points made by Richard Stites 
on the extremely challenging and pro-active nature of Kollontai’s leadership.10 
Yet she was not willing to limit her project to these measures and contended that 
socialised forms of domestic labour and childcare would, on their own, be 
insufficient to facilitate the necessary revolution in the family. Addressing 
Zhenotdel activists in October 1920, Kollontai argued that “our job is to decide 
which aspects of our family system are outdated and to determine what relations 
between the men and women of the working and peasant classes and which rights 
and duties would best harmonise with the conditions of life in the new workers’ 
Russia.”11 The Bureau would play a pioneering role in creating a society where in 
“place of the individual and egoistic family, a great universal family of workers 
will develop, in which all the workers, men and women, will above all be 
comrades.”12 
 
3.2 Attitudes to the Family in Central Asia 
Kollontai’s programme appears extremely ambitious, if not virtually impossible, 
in impoverished conditions of Civil War Russia, particularly given the vast swathes 
of the Soviet Union which were still dominated by peasant agriculture. And while 
Kollontai acknowledged that the peasant family diverged significantly from her 
idealised proletarian model, neither Kollontai nor any other Zhenotdel leader 
appear to have developed a theory of how a peasant woman could be liberated 
from her position within the family in the absence of even the limited economic 
and social opportunities which existed in urban Russia. 
It is clear, however, that Kollontai saw the peasant family as even more repressive 
than the family under capitalism. And, in her view, the position of women within 
the Muslim population of the Soviet East was the most oppressed of all. She 
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declared in a further article in the same issue of Kommunistka that the woman of 
the East was “a mere chattel owned by her husband who until now has been her 
master under traditional law.”13 The Eastern woman was burdened by domestic 
duties, childcare and farm-work while also providing income for the family 
through producing “handicraft work, spinning, silk-weaving, carpet making and 
embroidery.”14 And central to this oppression was “the prohibition of female 
equality within Sharia law, and the strong influence of tradition and religion in 
everyday life.”15 Kollontai directed her strongest criticism at the practice of 
seclusion, which she argued made a prisoner of a woman. She was forced to remain 
hidden “behind the stifling folds of the veil, behind the solid walls of the harem.”16 
This pejorative view of seclusion was echoed by other Kommunistka contributors, 
including a Putilovskaya who described the secluded woman as an “eternal 
slave…isolated from the world within the stuffy life of the harem, her face covered 
by the veil”, an “utterly dependent creature.”17 Nomadic women of Central Asia 
were also considered to be profoundly repressed. Konkordiia Samoilova, who was 
at the forefront of work in the East in 1920, claimed that in the vast nomadic 
regions women remained “to this day completely without rights.”18  
These views persisted and in 1923 a comrade Kislova described nomadic Turkmen 
women as immeasurably more backward, subjugated and uneducated than the 
working woman of Russia.19 She had hitherto been treated as less than human; a 
lowly creature who “receives less attention than her husband’s horse and lives in 
worse circumstances than that horse.”20 This woman who “has no rights, no 
property and no control over any aspect of her life” needed strong guidance and 
leadership in order to learn to understand her own oppression.21 Such views were 
certainly very crude and paternalistic. They exhibited a tendency to see family 
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relations in very simplistic terms and a failure to appreciate the allegiance women 
would feel to their families and communities. As I have highlighted in previous 
chapters, the perception of women as backward was not unique to Central Asia. 
As shown by Elizabeth Wood, working and peasant women were seen as “more 
likely to be illiterate, superstitious, religious, and attached to older ways of doing 
things and to older kin relations” than men.22 In Central Asia this backwardness 
had an additional dimension because of the lack of formal rights for women within 
existing family relations. Thus, Liubimova expressed her horror that “the custom 
of buying and selling a wife even extends to a widow being transferred along with 
other family possessions to the nearest relative” usually a brother or cousin of the 
deceased.23  
Thus, from the commencement of Zhenotdel’s work in the East, its leaders saw 
indigenous women as prisoners of their own culture and community. Kommunistka 
writers displayed extreme disapproval family norms which they considered to be 
mere vestiges of a backward society that needed supersession. These views 
reflected their own prejudice toward indigenous life, betraying an insensitivity 
toward the deeply imbedded cultural forms within that society. Tineva described 
in 1924 how the aim of the Zhenotdel continued to be enable an indigenous woman 
“to raise her voice loudly in demanding freedom and equality.”24 This terms on 
which equality and freedom were to be achieved shifted in line with the political 
and economic conditions in Central Asia and will be examined in the next section. 
 
3.3 The Language of Transformation 
 
Tracing the language of transformation within the journal over the decade of the 
Zhenotdel’s involvement in Central Asia aids a fuller understanding of the tensions 
in its programme. Initially Kollontai believed that indigenous women would be 
“awoken” from their slavery to liberation. In announcing a programme to bring 
about that awakening in November 1920, she stated that the Russian Revolution 
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would be taken to these women by the Zhenotdel and would “rouse the masses of 
the East in bright and brilliant numbers.”25 It would bring them news of liberation 
from slavery: 
[she], who has been a semi-human, treated like a household object, 
submissive and mute, a helpless drudge, is now summoned by the power of 
the working class, by the red banner of communism, called to equal work 
and equal property rights and to the gains of the revolution.26  
Thus, the struggle was one of consciousness-raising. Konkordiia Samoilova 
concurred with this approach. In her view indigenous women who were still mired 
within oppression and religious fanaticism needed to “be raised to an 
understanding of their own mission”, as “the revolutionary fighters for their own 
liberation.”27  
The development of revolutionary consciousness would be facilitated by drawing 
women toward experiences of life outside the home. The creation of opportunities 
for work, social and political engagement and education outside the home would 
mean that “life itself will provide the impetus for their awakening.”28 Effective 
methods had to be found to draw indigenous women toward the Zhenotdel, 
through cooperatives, “women’s schools, clubs and other forms of agitation” 
being “the best way to attract Eastern women to the struggle for communism.”29 
As a highly respected and popular leader, Samoilova’s demand that “the liberation 
of the women of the East must be the work of their own hands” would have carried 
considerable weight among activists.30 In 1920, Samoilova argued that all 
education was to be targeted at enabling “the women of the East to come to an 
understanding of their own tasks.”31 In 1921, Putilovskaya described “cultural 
education” for indigenous women as including basic literacy, professional skills 
training and an introduction to world affairs. The “Zhenotdel must educate [an 
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indigenous woman] in the spirit of the common interests and goals which unite 
her with the international working class.”32 She needed to be made aware of the 
world that lay outside the village and of her place in a global struggle for socialism. 
This promotion of internationalism accorded with a general view within the CPSU 
that the project was still going forward despite the hardships of the Civil War. 
This optimism was still apparent in 1922 with one activist announcing in January 
that the birth of a new woman” was in progress in the East.33 Another report 
described nomadic women as ecstatic at “the news that the Soviet government 
cares about them and wants to create a new life for them, like all other working 
women.”34 There was thus a belief that the women of Central Asia were part of a 
global project of liberation. 
With the fading sense of revolutionary potential, however, Zhenotdel leaders 
began to accept that indigenous women were not about to flood into struggle. The 
initial buoyancy of 1920 gave way to frustration with the “accursed legacy of the 
Tsarist past, with poverty, illiteracy and economic backwardness.”35 Instead of 
acting as a catalyst for indigenous women to escape their oppression, Zhenotdel 
activists now appeared to see themselves as their liberators. This shift in focus is 
reflected in claims that indigenous women needed to be rescued from “centuries 
of darkness and religious prejudices.”36 They had to be “released from a life 
shrouded in religious fanaticism and an uncivilised culture” and directed toward 
Soviet organisations.37 They were trapped within the patriarchal family and “vile 
conditions” of life which had led to “profound ignorance and religious prejudices” 
among indigenous women.38 The clergy too were blamed for keeping women 
“hidden in the harem and wrapped in the veil.”39 There was a subtle shift here, 
in that such statements suggest a belief that indigenous women had not managed 
to break out of their chains of bondage and needed their Russian sisters to 
emancipate them. This language illustrates a deeply negative attitude toward 
indigenous culture, in particular aspects of that culture that were perceived as 
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key obstacles to women’s liberation – the patriarchal family and the clergy. The 
cities of Uzbekistan were the primary focus of the Zhenotdel’s organisational 
initiatives, where many women were veiled and lived in seclusion. Yet nomadic 
women were also seen as very backward, with women from the Kirghiz, Turkmen 
and Kalmuck regions needing to be “freed” from a “profoundly uncivilised life.”40 
Yet in 1924 a definite optimism began to creep back into the language of 
Kommunistka writers. In June that year a comrade Tineva wrote of how “in the 
past the Eastern woman was a non-person but now she raises her voice and 
demands freedom and equality”. The “slave of yesterday, today this woman 
speaks out against the powers that oppress her and breaks her ties with those men 
who do not agree to her demands for change.”41 There were reports of the “brave 
women who have taken action against their enslavement” and left their families 
to attend training courses organised by the Zhenotdel.42 In February 1925 it was 
reported that indigenous women were becoming increasingly involved in 
Zhenotdel activities, with “peasant women in many villages enthusiastically 
attending meetings, discussions and readings.”43 In March 1925 Kasparova argued 
that “the first period of awakening of Eastern women is now complete.”44 By June 
1926 Zavaryan was describing with pride the success of women only shops and 
clubs and the “drawing in of even broader sections of the female population.”45 
She proclaimed that “yesterday’s voiceless slaves are now striving for knowledge 
and an independent life.”46 These reports of greater participation of indigenous 
women confirms the trends described by Marianne Kamp and discussed in chapter 
two. 
Despite the apparent breakthrough in recruiting indigenous women based on the 
twin strategy of broad education and practical training, a more instrumental 
approach emerged in 1927. Some writers, in particular Anna Nukhrat, who had 
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begun to write on Central Asia late in 1926 was extremely disparaging about the 
ability of indigenous women to dictate their own lives and be involved in debates 
about the general direction of the Soviet East. She complained in July of 1926 that 
the work of the Zhenotdel was too focused on intellectual education and argued 
that “no native woman can be stuffed full of knowledge on issues of world 
significance”. Her primitive nature had to be acknowledged and it had “to be 
remembered that she is in the habit of thinking in certain ways” and “might not 
be able to understand the concept of dictatorship of the proletariat and class 
struggle.”47 For Nukrat there should be no attempt to educate such women while 
they apparently remained mired in filth and backwardness. 
Nukrat welcomed the announcement of the Five Year Plan as an important 
opportunity for the Zhenotdel, and demanded that activists step up to play “a 
decisive role in the necessary re-education of the mass of enslaved and culturally 
backward women of the East.”48 She warned that conservative attitudes to this 
task would not be tolerated.49 The term ‘emancipation’ was now deployed in a 
drive to mobilise women into factories and collective farms. In an article in June 
1928 on the Five Year Plan, Nukrat stated that “it is necessary to train the woman 
of the East to properly become a builder of socialism”. This meant “raising her up 
from a deeply indoctrinated native life” to be able to operate within industry.50 A 
comrade Sachudri complained of “the low cultural level of native women and their 
failure to understand industrial discipline.”51 We “need to eliminate the 
disparities in cultural levels between European and native women workers in the 
shortest possible time.”52 There was a need to immediately eradicate “backward 
practices such as sitting on the floor of factories and talking” and the “tendency 
not to go to work when the weather is bad.”53 Central Asian peasant and nomadic 
women were expected to transform themselves into a Soviet working class and to 
adopt habits in keeping with the new industrial programme. By 1929 the litmus 
test for an indigenous woman was “not only if she has unveiled but if she is taking 
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part in all aspects of building a cultured society.”54 Women were expected to 
“learn how to deal with dirt in the home, with superstition, with illness and with 
ridding themselves of the darkness of their past lives.”55 They were to be perfect 
housewives and perfect workers. The concept of self-liberation had given way to 
a demand for conformity. 
My research illustrates that while it is true that Central Asian women were viewed 
by the Zhenotdel as uniquely backward, the policy of transformation aimed to 
overcome that backwardness was not inevitably repressive. Instead, it was 
believed that through voluntary participation in social and economic activities in 
women-only facilities, indigenous women would achieve the confidence to take 
action on their own behalf. It was hoped that once women experienced a different 
environment to their domestic life, and had been educated about the world 
outside and the achievements of the Russian Revolution, they would begin to 
become conscious of their own oppression. As put by Dryzhinina in 1922, this 
“voiceless slave who has been nearly beaten to death by her husband will want to 
break free of her economic dependence on him and begin her road to self-
liberation.”56 But in 1927 this policy was overridden by the demands from the 
Central Committee and Sredazburo that indigenous women be coerced into 
adapting to the plan for mass industrialisation. Previous notions of liberating 
indigenous women to fulfil their own potential were absent in the new political 
conditions of Soviet Central Asia. 
 
3.4 The Programme of transformation in Central Asia 
 
Despite the negative perception of Central Asian indigenous life, the practical 
work of the Zhenotdel from 1920 until 1927 appears from Kommunistka to have 
been conducted in a culturally sensitive environment and aimed at promoting self-
activity among indigenous women. In 1920, a number of non-Party meetings were 
held across the Soviet East, with an All Union Non-Party Meeting of Eastern Women 
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planned to take place during the following February in Moscow. Samoilova 
predicted that this event would be unprecedented and would “play a crucial role 
in the world history of the liberation movement.”57 Its significance would be in 
the fact that the “delegates who will attend this meeting come from that section 
of humanity which has for centuries been kept in a position as the lowest slave of 
all.”58 Now the Eastern woman at last had an opportunity to “learn to use the new 
political rights achieved through the revolution” and “to find her own way towards 
a fully rounded emancipation.”59 Putilovskaya wrote that significant preparations 
had been made in the region for the meeting, including “elections at non-party 
meetings to select delegates to go to the meeting on behalf of native women.”60 
Zhenotdel activists had visited the homes of indigenous women informing them of 
the changed political environment and “calling them forth from centuries of 
dispossession to a conscious life.”61 A draft agenda was drawn up by Kollontai 
which included discussion of the legal position of Eastern women, organisation of 
handicraft work, maternity and education. The meeting also intended to debate 
“the current period” and “Soviet power and Eastern women.”62 Kollontai hoped 
the meeting would “stimulate the interest of women in becoming involved in 
Soviet work and in building the Soviets…”63 Although the Zhenotdel had a 
framework for organisation and political ideas that it believed indigenous women 
should adopt, it wanted to win them over to these views through the activation of 
an autonomous movement. 
However following over six months of planning and organising and the selection of 
delegates from right across the region, the event was suddenly halted. After an 
initial postponement to June, the event was finally cancelled on the basis that it 
was impossible due to food rationing in Moscow. Of note the Third International 
women’s events were not abandoned and took place in the same period.64 A great 
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deal of confusion was reported around the cancellation of the All-Union Non-Party 
Meeting of Eastern Women and many local groups were not informed. Thus a group 
of delegates, mainly Uzbek, Kirghiz, Turkmen and Tatar women, arrived in Moscow 
from Central Asia in June 1921.65 On arrival the delegates were paraded around 
to meetings of the Comintern and met with Lenin briefly and then with Kollontai. 
Rosanova, the report writer, describes in very patronising terms how impressed 
these delegates were to be present. How they “cried at the sight of Lenin as their 
hearts were so full of joy they could not speak.”66 How one delegate “thanked the 
Red Army for the liberation of the women of the East.” 67 How they caused a great 
stir when they unveiled in front of a Comintern Women’s Conference. Those 
present “could not hold back tears, and in keeping with the general mood, the 
Red Army orchestra began to play the Internationale and all rose to their feet to 
welcome the women with unstoppable applause.”68 
The cancellation of the All Union Non-Party Meeting of Eastern Women was a 
serious setback for the programme of autonomous organisation among women in 
Central Asia. It coincided with a shift toward greater centralism that year, with 
the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the subsequent clampdown 
on inner Party democracy. Kollontai herself was at the centre of the battle against 
NEP and, as noted earlier, would be removed in disgrace from her position as 
Director of the Zhenotdel in early 1922. Samoilova’s death in June from cholera, 
following that of Inessa Armand in October 1920, had left the national leadership 
without its most confident and experienced leaders. The absence of these key 
figures was undoubtedly a major factor allowing the cancellation of the meeting.69 
It was not re-scheduled and indigenous women would never again given this type 
of opportunity to come together nationally.  
In advance of the planned All Union Non-Party Meeting, in April 1921 a Meeting 
for Activists among Women of the East was held in Moscow, presided over by 
Alexandra Kollontai. She put a resolution to that meeting which proposed a 
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different way of organisation for indigenous women in the East to that in Russia. 
Women involved in the Russian Zhenotdel were organised through delegate 
meetings, based themselves primarily around workplaces. The circumstances of 
women in the Soviet East were acknowledged to be very different and it was 
agreed that women-only clubs would be set up instead.70 These would be “schools 
where women become involved in Soviet work through their own self-activity and 
begin to develop communism within themselves.”71 Above all the clubs were to 
seek connections with women handicraft workers and begin the organisation of 
workshops, “while assisting alongside this the development of class consciousness 
among women handicraft workers.”72 It is worthwhile noting that the April 
meeting would still have expected the broad Non-party Meeting to take place and 
therefore that indigenous women themselves take a lead in this work.73 As with 
the proposals for the Non-Party Meeting, the aim was self-organisation among 
indigenous women.  
In the aftermath of Kollontai’s removal as Director, little headway was made for 
the next two years in Central Asia. On her appointment as head of the Central 
Asian Zhenotdel in April 1923, Serafima Liubimova wrote of the difficult struggles 
to retain some presence in the region between 1921 and 1923.74 Activists had 
worked hard to make links with women who had attended the non-party meetings 
in 1920 and 1921. Liubimova also blamed NEP for the lack of staffing and support 
for organisation. In 1923 she re-launched the Zhenotdel in Central Asia with a call 
for action to implement the project begun in 1921.  
It was agreed that the method of organisation in Russia was not suitable for the 
East “where the majority of poor women are completely uninvolved in social and 
political life and have not been drawn into the building of communism.”75 Clubs 
were initiated in sedentary Uzbek regions and also among the nomadic Kazakh and 
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Turkmen peoples, with the latter having the form of travelling tents, known as 
Red Yurts. It had been agreed at the April 1921 Meeting for Activists among Women 
of the East that these clubs needed to “include a range of measures to assist 
women, including crèches, facilities for older children, public laundries and 
schools for women and girls.”76 The Ali Bairamova club in Baku, one of the first 
clubs to be created, was held up as the model for other Zhenotdel branches to 
aspire to. An official visit to the Ali Bairamova by the Zhenotdel Central leadership 
in 1922 reported that it had a wide range of facilities, including a medical clinic, 
sewing and wool spinning workshops, literacy classes, a drama club, a choir and a 
dance group. Crèche and other childcare facilities were provided to the club 
membership which in 1922 numbered just over 400.77 A number of clubs were set 
up in urban areas of Uzbekistan in 1924 which tried to emulate the Baku example. 
Where no resources existed to set up a club, women’s groups called Red Corners 
were set up.78 In chapter four I will examine the details around the formation of 
women-only organisations in Central Asia, and particularly in Uzbekistan. These 
initiatives lasted until 1928 when shops and then clubs collapsed in the course of 
the mass unveiling campaign. While they continued, the clubs offered economic 
and education opportunities, medical consultations, childcare, political education 
and cultural activities. They were supplemented from 1926 with women-only 
shops in Uzbekistan which offered some of the same facilities, while providing 
women with opportunities to buy and sell their goods in a safe and culturally 
appropriate environment.79  
Clubs struggled from the outset because of lack of financial assistance from the 
Soviet state, despite official Central Committee support. Liubimova complained 
that the lack of available funding under NEP had “completely knocked the Eastern 
department off course.”80 For her “the only reason the clubs are not better is lack 
of finance.”81 The Bureau was dependent on government funding to set up 
cooperatives, purchase equipment and train local women. Areas which apparently 
could have been financially successful, such as in traditional carpet making among 
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Turkmen women, were stymied by lack of funds. They also faced isolation. One 
activist complained that the “joint regional traders cooperatives which should be 
assisting us are providing no support at all.”82 
In 1926 proposals emerged which directly challenged the existing strategy of work 
and demanded that Zhenotdel work be brought under the authority of the local 
Party. The rise of these views coincided with the Sredazburo’s decision to put the 
woman question at the centre of the forthcoming Hujum. In July 1926, Zavaryan 
complained of “a tendency to confine all our work to clubs and corners.”83 This 
view was in complete contrast with the views of a number of Zhenotdel activists, 
who continued to support Liubimova’s strategy. In March 1925 Kasparova had 
claimed that the Zhenotdel leadership fully supported the current strategy and 
believed that “club work [had] proven itself in practice.”84 Kasparova also 
contended that women-only organisation had been successfully extended “with 
the opening of women-only shops.”85 She had called on activists to build on the 
successes “by holding meetings, lectures, festivals and training courses” for 
indigenous women.86 Despite these apparent successes, however, Zavaryan, was 
adamant in her opposition to the continuance of club work and demanded that 
“we must eliminate this completely incorrect approach to organisation and begin 
setting up delegate meetings in Central Asia.”87 Yet advocates of clubs and 
women-only shops refused to make concessions to these demands and defended 
their policy. In May 1927, Bolshakov pointed to the crucial role of the women-only 
shops as co-operatives for women who wanted to sell their vegetables, food stuffs 
and handicrafts. She argued that not only should women-only spaces not be closed 
down, but they should be extended. Furthermore she contended that the 
Zhenotdel must “find better methods to facilitate women playing a full part in 
these cooperatives, holding meetings among members and non-members of 
cooperatives to discuss various questions, holding conferences and literature and 
to increase the number of members in the governing bodies of cooperatives.”88 
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The view of Liubimova and other supporters of clubs and women-only shops was 
that they provided a unique way of allowing women to become involved in 
economic and social life, without endangering their physical safety. Kasparova 
argued that they showed flexibility as it was important “not to be rigid in our 
approach to a woman’s traditional life, as it leads to a malevolent attitude from 
men towards our work and even more difficulties for the woman.”89 Incremental 
change was the priority and nothing should damage the successes which had been 
achieved. This view conflicted sharply with the demands of the Hujum, and it took 
courage for these leading Zhenotdel activists to take such a stand in a time of 
intensifying authoritarianism. They were prepared to openly defend their 
strategy, as opposed to extolling the virtues of the Hujum and following the 
dictates of the Sredazburo. Such independent-minded positions contrast with 
Massell and Northrop’s depiction of all Zhenotdel activists as loyal servants of the 
Party leadership which I discussed in chapter two.  
In late 1926 Liubimova was removed as head of the Central Asian Zhenotdel. It 
appears from Kommunistka that Anna Nukrat replaced her. From the beginning, it 
was clear that Nukrat was opposed to the semi-autonomous clubs and women-only 
shops. She made it clear that the focus of activists had to change away from the 
previous strategy and to ensuring direct Party control and involvement in the 
Zhenotdel’s work. Nukrat counter-posed delegate meetings to clubs precisely 
because they could provide a more direct link with the Party. She insisted that 
“delegate meetings must be set up where there are Party members” and the local 
Party “must provide leadership within these forums.”90 She also wanted a move 
away from what she saw as abstract political discussion and towards a campaign 
“for cleanliness, the improvement of nutrition and so on…”91 Nukrat wanted no 
further debates and cultural activities. Her view was that indigenous women were 
ignorant child-like creatures who had to be taught in a very simple fashion about 
how to live modern Soviet lives. She needed to be “taken by the hand” and 
“trained to understand dirt, illiteracy and infectious diseases.”92After training her 
to be a better wife and mother she could then be taught about other issues and 
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“every question in her village can be linked with general tasks of government.”93 
Although Nukrat was herself from the indigenous Turkic population, her attitude 
toward other Central Asian women was more derogatory than that of many Russian 
activists. 
By the end of 1927 the women-only shops had closed and many clubs had 
collapsed. The project of women-only spaces was superseded by the setting up of 
delegate meetings as a method of electing women to the Soviets. Nukrat wrote in 
July 1928 that “the debate over the last year about the necessity of delegate 
meetings has now been supplanted with the reality of their successful 
implementation.”94 Instead of women-only clubs and shops “delegate meetings 
are involved in a large number of general campaigns.”95 Now delegate meetings 
had become the main form of organisation in Central Asia, and were designed to 
send women to work alongside men in factories and collective farms. Nukrat 
conceded that those women who were delegated to workplaces to work with me 
were treated badly and “given difficult and dirty work or, in many cases, they 
were not provided with any work at all.”96 Nevertheless Nukrat agreed that the 
process of economic development could not be set at the pace of the ‘backward’ 
Central Asian peasant. As Sachudri argued “even in the most deeply peasant 
region, where there are only a few workers and factories, we must not postpone 
our ambitious plans to draw native women into industry.”97 Now the work of the 
Zhenotdel had to shift to “train native women for industry” and “to make them 
into a female working class.”98 The Bureau now had to act under the direct 
authority of the Five Year Plan and there would be no more autonomy. 
 
3.5 Impact of the Zhenotdel Programme on indigenous women 
 
The contradictory position of the Zhenotdel as a Bureau of the Central Committee 
and its commitment to Soviet legislation led to a number of problems for 
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indigenous women who became involved in its initiatives. One of these was the 
lack of support from the local Party membership. Liubimova reported in 1923 that 
the “Zhenotdel sections shoulder enormous responsibility for work at the present 
time.”99 This burden did not alleviate, despite numerous calls for assistance from 
the Party leadership. There were also protests about lack of funding, isolation and 
apathy as well as opposition and sabotage of its work by local Party and soviet 
activists100. In these circumstances, indigenous women who responded to the 
Soviet project often found themselves isolated. In February 1923 activists 
discussed the “urgent need to help women who are now beginning to leave the 
family home looking for work”. They agreed that action had to be taken “to 
improve the living conditions of working women.”101 Indigenous women were 
facing poverty and social alienation.102 
Kommunistka writers also acknowledged the negative impact on indigenous 
society of peasant women leaving the home. Divorce appears to have had far more 
impact among the Kirghiz and Turkmen populations than in Uzbekistan. A report 
in February 1925 claimed with alarm that “divorce is reaching epidemic 
proportions” in Kirghiz as “everywhere second and third wives are escaping 
alongside young girls running away from arranged marriages.”103 Seifi saw it as the 
“beginning of the end for the Kirghizi clan family.”104 Men were “being left without 
the benefit of a woman’s labour within the home” and this was causing social and 
economic difficulties for a family dependent on her work.105 Seifi was confused as 
to the best way to resolve the problem without undermining women’s rights. She 
hoped that where the desertion was as a result of women’s frustration at living 
impoverished lives then it should be “solved with financial measures and mutual 
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support.”106 She further speculated that women could be persuaded to stay -“if 
the economic situation of the Kirghiz family improved then perhaps women would 
not leave.”107 
These reports illustrate the contradictory and unintended consequences of 
attempting to transcend the traditional family structures in the absence of viable 
social and economic structures. Thus, when policies to extricate women from their 
position within the family began to have some purchase on reality, they brought 
with them all manner of social and economic problems. Awareness of these issues 
was of little use in a situation where there was very little room to manoeuvre. 
There was a sense that the project had to go forward against the odds. The 
Zhenotdel was unable to provide support for the mass of the female population. 
Confusion and frustration led it to seek solutions within Soviet law and to demand 
legal action against indigenous men who refused to comply with the ban on kalym 
and polygyny. This meant an immediate confrontation with local Party members 
and a struggle which lasted for its entire existence. I deal with these issues in 
detail in chapters five and six. 
 
3.6 The experience of the Hujum 
 
The Hujum, known as ‘Nastuplenie’ in Russian, has already been discussed in 
chapter two. Nikolaeva described its launch as the declaration of “a resolute 
battle against anti-party behaviour exhibited in the continued practice of local 
customs such as kalym, wearing of the veil and so on which prevent liberation 
from those elements antagonistic to the party and to its building, alongside the 
building of the soviets and the economy.”108 The cutting edge of the campaign 
was of course the mass unveiling of indigenous women of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan 
and Azerbaijan on International Women’s Day on March 8th 1927.  
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Although Northrop and Massell both argue that the Hujum was enthusiastically 
supported by the Zhenotdel, it is interesting to note that there is no mention of 
the campaign in Kommunistka until August 1927.109 And then, in an extremely 
revealing article, Klavdiia Nikolaeva launched a scathingly attack on the Eastern 
Zhenotdel. As I noted in chapter one, Nikolaeva had been a national Director of 
the Zhenotdel in 1925 for a short period before her removal for factional 
activities. She had been a one-time supporter of Kollontai and a strong women’s 
rights activist. By 1927 Nikolaeva had left her oppositional past behind, and 
become a loyal voice of the Sredazburo and advocate for the Hujum. In her article 
Nikolaeva was sharply critical of the Uzbek Zhenotdel for what she claimed was a 
deeply disappointing performance in the unveiling campaign. The alleged failure 
of activists to engage with unveiled women was, for Nikolaeva, a substantial cause 
for the fact that 90% of those who had taken part in the events of March and May 
had consequently re-veiled.110 The Zhenotdel’s “failure to recruit unveiled women 
into its organisation had left and argued that activists had failed to engage with 
unveiled women had left them powerless in the face of the counter-attack by the 
clergy.”111  
As already highlighted in my discussion of the findings of Marianne Kamp in chapter 
two, Liubimova had in fact expressed resistance to the Hujum in 1926.112 The 
decision to launch the unveiling campaign was contrary to her wishes and those of 
other activists. As will be seen in chapter four, the launch of the Hujum had a 
seriously detrimental effect on the work of the Zhenotdel. In particular the 
backlash and repression against indigenous women from the local male population, 
resulted in the closure and abandonment of clubs and shops. As I have already 
mentioned in chapter two, notwithstanding the fact that Zhenotdel members had 
always been critical of the veil, they had never actively advocated its removal, 
and certainly never called for public mass defiance of local culture. On the 
contrary, Kommunistka had published reports of the participation of veiled women 
in March 8 demonstrations, along with pictures of both veiled and unveiled women 
at these events. Niurina had reported in 1925 how that year “tens of thousands of 
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veiled and unveiled women had broken with tradition and attended 
meetings.”113They had taken to the streets and “marched beneath red banners 
awakened to calls for a new life.”114 Liubimova was anxious to maintain the safety 
of veiled women travelling to and from women-only shops and clubs, which were 
a major preoccupation for her in late 1926 and 1927. Inside these buildings, safe 
from the prying eyes of men, indigenous women could unveil. The aim was for 
them to feel as safe as they did within the secluded walls of their own homes.115 
Also the women-only shops meant that “women could overcome their fear of men 
and go freely into a safe public environment.”116 This was considered to be a very 
important psychological issue for veiled women. Despite a retreat from the early 
ideas of ‘self-liberation’ towards more interventionist forms of work, the majority 
of Zhenotdel activists in the East still wanted to encourage self-activity among 
indigenous women and wanted them to feel, and be, safe.  
The Hujum was ostensibly aimed at indigenous women but in reality it was male 
Party members who were ordered in the first instance to unveil their female 
relatives. The campaign, thus, should be read first and foremost as a conflict 
engaging men and competing patriarchal systems, competing for control over 
women as the bearers of local culture and tradition. Nikolaeva described the 
successful organisation of “social evenings involving workers and their wives where 
up to 100 women were unveiled.”117 In another article in August 1927, Anisimova 
complained that “in many enterprises non-Party members stated that they 
unveiled their wives before party members and thus introduced their wives to 
Soviet society.”118 It is noteworthy that women were the object, not the subject 
of change. Male members of the Communist Party were being pressurised to 
abandon deeply ingrained cultural and religious practices and use their patriarchal 
authority to unveil their female relatives. In January 1929 that year Artiukhina 
reported that the Central Committee in Moscow had issued “a call to all Party 
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members to unveil their wives immediately” with strict action to be taken against 
those “who hinder unveiling.”119 
The conflict over the Hujum was reflected in a year-long discussion of Eastern 
work which followed in the pages of the journal. As editor, Krupskaya promoted 
discussion from June 1928 up until the All Union Meeting of Activists among Women 
of the East in December 1928. She urged “local activists to take part in discussions 
about important questions” which included a proposal for a legal ban on the 
veil.120 Liubimova was at the forefront of arguing for a decree, believing that 
failure to issue one “would hand the Mullahs a weapons to use against unveiling” 
as they would wield the authority of Islamic law which prohibited it.121 A decree 
would mean that “the Eastern woman would not stand alone in the struggle with 
the remnants of past slavery”. She would have “the full support of Soviet power” 
against the Mullahs and their influence. Liubimova believed in Soviet law both as 
an instrument of change and also a protective force within society. Krupskaya 
countered her views in her speech to the meeting where she argued that “we 
cannot approach liberation as though it is simply a legal issue.”122 The wearing of 
the veil, in line with other traditional customs, was “deeply rooted in economic 
relations.”123 A consensus developed at the meeting, no doubt under Krupskaya’s 
influence, for a campaign of persuasion among the population for the decree. In 
the meantime nothing should be done to provoke the kind of crisis which the 
Hujum had elicited.124 
Krupskaya also took on other aspects of the state-led transformation projects 
which had emerged since 1926. She strongly argued against the anti-religious 
crusade that was launched by Stalin in December 1927 as part of the launch of the 
Five Year Plan. In his speech to the 15th Congress of the CPSU, Stalin had demanded 
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the “overcoming of terrible cultural backwardness” and the strengthening of the 
battle against religion.125 A year later Krupskaya responded that: 
…we cannot be simply anti-religious”. Direct “confrontation with religion will 
produce nothing good. If we see this struggle as a war then we need to 
conduct a step by step battle rather than an all-out war.126  
She further argued that there should be “no bans on christenings and religious 
weddings”, as such “bans will only encourage fanaticism.”127 Krupskaya’s speech 
is noteworthy because of her courage both in confronting the Hujum and the war 
on religion being rolled out across the Soviet Union. It is also important in 
reflecting her continued adherence to views first argued by Lenin in 1921.128 
In the aftermath of the December 1928 All Union Meeting of Activists among 
Women of the East, the coverage of the Zhenotdel’s activities in Central Asia 
changed markedly. There was no more debate within the journal, which went 
from monthly to fortnightly publication. The director of the national Zhenotdel, 
Alexandra Artiukhina, demanded that there was to be no more prevarication over 
Party policy. In relation to the calls for a legal ban on the veil, she denounced 
those who demanded state protection and asserted that “we need brave 
revolutionaries to fight against the wearing of the veil.”129 With the 
implementation of mass collectivisation, the wearing of a veil was now described 
as a serious barrier to the successful implementation of the Five Year Plan, as it 
prevented the recruitment of indigenous women in Uzbekistan to the collective 
farms. There was to be no more talk of incremental change – instead now “we 
need to take a leap forward from these current conditions of backwardness.”130 
Nukrat wrote in glowing terms of the “earnest fresh-faced unveiled Turkmen 
women” who could readily join the workforce. 131 The drive to recruit to the Plan 
took precedence over the views and wishes of women, and indeed their safety. 
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She argued it had been “an interesting and forceful form of work”, which had 
“resulted in great success in its first days with an unprecedented number of 
demonstrations with many thousands of women taking part who – seized with 
energy – removed their paranjis and threw them on bonfires”. However, because 
of the Zhenotdel’s negligence, insufficient education of the masses and lack of 
solid action, the “enemies of soviet power were able to raise their heads.”132 The 
tactic of mass unveiling itself was beyond question. Now the job was to get on 
with a systematic “cultural revolution” which meant “putting the question of the 
personal example of communists at the forefront.”133 Krupskaya’s warnings were 
disregarded and an “attack against all old forms of life” was declared to drive 
forward the construction and mobilisation of a Central Asian proletariat134.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have sought to illustrate the contradictory nature of the 
Zhenotdel project to transform the Eastern family. Central to this was the absence 
of a theory on the nature of this institution and the role it played within peasant 
society. Efforts to change it were bound to cause conflicts and dangers without a 
clear understanding of what the aims were and with the lack of any social or 
economic safety net outside the family. The Zhenotdel was not capable of 
providing long-term alternatives for indigenous women, in particular as it faced 
major opposition and lacked funding. It was attempting to create a socialist 
alternative in a society which had never experienced capitalism and therefore 
lacked a working class. The initiative which had the most success, the woman-
only shops, were never accepted as a legitimate part of the co-operative 
movement, and the leadership of this movement, with the apparent backing of 
the Sredazburo, took the opportunity to close down the women-only shops in 1927.  
The question of agency was also a contradictory concept from the beginning as a 
view of indigenous women as enslaved by their own cultural norms meant that the 
issue of their empowerment would always be problematic. Kollontai and 
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Samoilova called for the empowerment of indigenous women while, 
simultaneously, in particular in Samoilova’s case, actively persuading them to 
adopt idealised Soviet forms of the family and to take legal action against their 
families for breaches of laws on kalym and polygyny. In the absence of a mass 
movement of Central Asian women, it was inevitable that they would become the 
object, rather than the subject of transformation. Interestingly the surge in 
support for the Zhenotdel from indigenous women from 1925 did start to reflect 
real autonomy, with women-only shops being the most important example. In 
chapter four I will show how the Zhenotdel was forced to abandon this work in the 
midst of the unveiling campaign. Without the Hujum, significant progress may well 
have been made in urban areas of Central Asia. 
A problem which would nonetheless have needed to be addressed was the legalism 
of the Zhenotdel. In her speech to the December 1928 meeting, Krupskaya 
proposed a different approach to the law. She encouraged activists to understand 
that “polygyny and kalym are disguises for economic exploitation” and needed to 
be addressed in a way that undermined that system. One example was through 
land reforms – by “granting more land to families where the women are allowed 
to unveil.”135 She also argued for an intensive education programme aimed at male 
Communist Party members. Soviet law should serve as a model for society, rather 
than a tool to prosecute those who failed to comply with it. Winning the 
population over, rather than estranging women from their families, would also 
provide more security for those who wanted change.  
However, while being deeply critical of the Zhenotdel’s approach to the Eastern 
family, I would argue that there were many positive aspects in their attempt to 
provide independence for women and to educate them both in practical ideas and 
theoretical debates. A number of activists, under Liubimova’s leadership, did not 
want to engage in any strategy which would harm these women and were always 
very mindful of the fate of the woman returning to the family after school or work. 
This was in stark contrast to the attitude of the Party leadership, which, up to 
1927, had failed to acknowledge or support its efforts. Liubimova had illusions 
regarding the progressive role of Soviet law and institutions, and it can be argued 
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that her insistence on waging a legal battle against polygyny and kalym led to a 
bureaucratic intrusive attitude to the Eastern family. However, in spite of these 
bureaucratic tendencies, it should not be concluded that there was a direct link 
between the ambitions of those activists who followed Liubimova and those of the 
Central Committee. She was committed to the amelioration of the position of 
Eastern women and to introducing them to the benefits of work and modernity.  
The experience of organisation in Central Asia shows that the Zhenotdel did have 
a commitment to autonomy and self-organisation. Unlike Russia, where it appears 
that the Zhenotdel was fighting liquidation from 1921, the Bureau in Central Asia 
was largely isolated from the Party until 1926. This gave it a longer period in which 
to develop its project. In the following chapters I will consider this state of affairs 
in the context of the economic and social initiatives, the legal policy and the 
relationship of the Zhenotdel to the Party.  
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Chapter 4 
Economic and Cultural Policies in Central Asia 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I set out the various strategies utilised by the Zhenotdel activists 
to support, as they saw it, the entry of indigenous women into the more formal 
spheres of economic and social life. In particular, I examine the aims and 
experiences of women’s clubs and local cooperatives and the manner in which 
they attempted to intersect with the practical needs of indigenous women and 
provide a conducive environment for Soviet education and propaganda. I look 
separately at the role of women-only shops, introduced from late 1925 and their 
reported success in achieving the aims previously envisaged for clubs. I consider 
the commitment of both Russian and indigenous activists to women-only shops, 
despite the antagonism of the local and Central Party leadership. I look briefly at 
the calls to set up delegate meetings from 1926 by activists, who in contrast to 
supporters of clubs and shops, demanded direct Party supervision over the 
Zhenotdel’s work and a more confrontational approach to indigenous society. I 
then proceed to consider the practical implications of the unveiling campaign for 
work among women before looking at the Five Year Plan and the abandonment of 
the Zhenotdel’s original strategy. 
 
4.2 The Central Asian Women-Only Clubs 
 
As discussed in chapter three, the major challenge confronting Zhenotdel activists 
in 1920 was the difficulty of gaining access to indigenous women. Following reports 
from Konkordiia Samoilova and others who had visited the region in 1920, it was 
acknowledged that the main form of organisation in Russia – the delegate meeting 
– was an unsuitable method for beginning work among secluded and nomadic 
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women.1 In April 1921, the All-Russian Meeting of Organisers among Women of the 
East announced a decision to re-orientate its work and agreed that the “best way 
to bring together isolated women is through the creation of women’s clubs.”2 
Women’s clubs would afford a protected space for indigenous women to engage 
in social and economic activity and provide them with positive experiences of 
“how Soviet power can emancipate them in all aspects of their lives once they 
engage with it.”3 Clubs were to be “schools where women are drawn to the Soviet 
project through their own self-activity and begin to cultivate the spirit of 
communism within themselves.”4 They were set up mainly in urban areas of 
Uzbekistan and orientated towards the secluded female population. As noted in 
chapter three, the nomadic Turkman and Kirgiz tribes, a travelling tent, known as 
a Red Yurt, was to perform a similar role. In general, the initiative was aimed at 
encouraging self-activity among indigenous women, which was considered by 
Zhenotdel leaders to be a crucial aspect of building socialism. The vision of a 
woman developing herself on her own terms, of being “the conscious creator of 
her own life” was extremely popular among activists.5 
In Central Asia that vision meant more autonomy from Party and Soviet structures 
than existed in Russia. Women’s clubs would not delegate women to work within 
Soviet organisations, because of the cultural barriers that prevented men and 
women working together, in particular the seclusion of veiled women. Instead 
Central Asian women would engage in collectivised forms of economic activity, 
education and cultural activities within the shelter of the club, with childcare 
facilities and other supports attached to these clubs. The April 1921 Zhenotdel All 
Union Meeting of Activists among Women of the East decided that the department 
itself would provide the connection with local and central Party organisations and 
in so doing would “raise the issues and demands which flowed from the task of 
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liberating Eastern women.”6 It would lead a campaign within the Party “to 
strengthen the struggle against prejudice toward women which has deep roots 
among men in the population.” The meeting pledged to “assist the Party in 
cultivating the spirit of communism and an understanding of the shared interests 
of men and women among the male proletariat and peasantry.”7 
The strategy was thus to initiate a network of semi-autonomous women’s clubs 
in Central Asia and other parts of the Soviet East. Zhenotdel members would 
have a dual role – as the representative of the Party within clubs and the voice 
of indigenous women within the Party. The fact that this policy was adopted at a 
time when Kollontai was Director of the Bureau and that she had taken a leading 
role in developing work in the Soviet East meant that it strongly reflected her 
vision of the Zhenotdel “as an advocate for women within the Party and 
government.”8 The policy of self-organisation conflicted with the perspective of 
the Central Committee, which, by deciding to bring work among women under 
its authority, was almost certainly anxious to inhibit excessive autonomy. The 
Zhenotdel was perceived by the Central leadership as an instrument to ensure 
the authority of the Party over the mass of women.9 It most definitely was not 
understood as a lobby for women within the Party. The manner in which these 
conflicts expressed itself in Central Asia will be dealt with in detail in chapter 
six of this study.10  
It was agreed from the start that one of the central characteristics of the women-
only clubs was that they would be of practical assistance to indigenous women. 
They needed “to include within it services, including a crèche, a public laundry, 
and a school” which would “encourage interest among indigenous women in 
attending the clubs and thus assist the Soviet project.”11 Clubs would be a site for 
the education of indigenous women both practically and politically. The model 
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put forward for the Central Asian Zhenotdel to adopt was based on the Ali 
Bairamova Club in Baku.  According to a report from June 1922, this establishment 
provided a wide range of facilities for indigenous women, including medical 
consultations with a female doctor, a canteen, a crèche and kindergarten. Women 
were employed as trainees in book binding, weaving, sewing, shoe making and 
wool spinning workshops on site. A school within the club offered classes in 
literacy and elementary education, as well as political propaganda. Finally there 
were social activities, including a drama group, a choir and dance classes. Apart 
from two male workshop managers who had yet to be replaced by suitably 
qualified women, all personnel and attendees were female. The writer insisted 
that this women-only establishment was “not in any sense sowing feminist 
tendencies among Muslim women” but was a practical and “essential way for the 
slow and patient drawing in of indigenous women to society and public life.”12  
Despite the enthusiasm among activists regarding the possibilities that lay ahead, 
the Zhenotdel’s organisational strategy made little headway in Central Asia 
between 1921 and 1923. There was initial confusion and demoralisation within the 
Bureau, following the deaths of Armand and Samoilova, and the removal of 
Kollontai from her position as director and expulsion abroad, which I referred to 
in chapter one.13 The individual who had personified the Zhenotdel’s campaign for 
radical change more powerfully than any other had been dispatched to Norway in 
disgrace.14 For those activists who wanted to continue the programme of work 
announced in 1921, a central obstacle to doing so was the negative impact of the 
New Economic Policy (NEP). In 1923, Liubimova described how the cuts in staffing 
were “especially painful in the East, where almost all responsibility for work lies 
with the Zhenotdel and where it is very difficult to make use of the wider Party 
apparatus.” This was seen as a specific problem because the “organisation is 
scattered over a huge expanse and requires a large number of Zhenotdel 
organisers.”15 According to Liubimova, the drop in funding had “knocked the 
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Zhenotdel off course.”16 The advent of NEP is described by Barbara Evans Clements 
as a defining moment for the Zhenotdel in that it revealed the incongruity 
between its programme and that of the Central Committee. She argues that during 
the Civil War: 
The party leadership was occupied with military matters and the atmosphere 
of war communism encouraged utopians to believe that they were riding a 
revolutionary tide that was sweeping away old Russia. The Zhenotdel was 
free to champion all the elements in female emancipation- that had been 
laid clown by the founders of Marxism: Zhenotdel publications openly 
endorsed the radical restructuring of the family and sexual liberation, and 
prophesied the imminent creation of a new woman.17  
NEP dealt a very serious blow to this self-confidence. Cuts to state funding for the 
Bureau resulted in the loss of 19 of its 42 fulltime staff, and many of its regional 
organisers. It is surprising that the Zhenotdel actually survived in this period, 
particularly in Central Asia where it had a very fragile presence.18 Its members 
fought to retain some influence in the region by holding large scale meetings and 
congresses, where they gave speeches “on the protection of motherhood, the 
achievements of the Russian Zhenotdel and the way forward for Eastern 
women.”19  
In 1923 in relaunching the Zhenotdel in Central Asia, Liubimova congratulated 
activists on their tenacity throughout that difficult. She pledged to “preserve 
those links made with women who attended congresses and meetings during.”20 
Liubimova announced that action would be taken to “consolidate and advance the 
achievements of these earlier agitation campaigns by drawing these women into 
clubs, schools and soviets.”21 At the second Meeting of Workers among Women in 
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the East in March 1923 Liubimova had made clear that she would use her position 
to ”continue to press forward with the liberation of Eastern women by setting up 
clubs within which Artels22, trade schools, elementary schools, libraries, crèches 
and other facilities would operate.”23 In the aftermath of the meeting she 
demanded support from the Central Committee, reporting that Zhenotdel 
members “urgently needed equipment and funds to establish women’s clubs in 
the region.”24 She took charge of the Central Asian Zhenotdel, with a 
determination to realise the decisions made three years earlier, in the belief that 
the only things which were necessary were an improvement in organisational 
methods and proper support from the Central Committee and local Party. 
It is clear that Liubimova was a very determined individual.25 A Russian member 
of the Communist Party, in 1921 she had attended lectures given by Kollontai at 
the Sverdlov University in Petrograd.26 She displayed a strong affinity with 
Kollontai’s views, describing how deeply she had been inspired by her as a political 
leader in 1921.27 In 1923, in a period when Kollontai’s successor, secretary Sofia 
Smidovich, was at pains to disassociate the Zhenotdel from any connection with 
Kollontai, Liubimova made it clear that she retained a commitment to the 
methods of organisation proposed by a woman she still called “comrade 
Kollontai.”28 Liubimova retained her position as head of the Central Asian Bureau 
until 1926 when she was removed and apparently replaced by Anna Nukrat. It is 
no coincidence that Liubimova’s removal was in the midst of arrangements for the 
launch of the unveiling campaign, about which she herself had expressed serious 
disquiet.29 
Liubimova’s efforts to create women-only clubs began to pay off in 1924, with the 
opening early that year of a club in Tashkent by Nadia Krupskaya editor of the 
journal Kommunistka. The club, named after Krupskaya, was reported to have an 
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initial membership of 500.30 It was situated in the indigenous old quarter of the 
city and the Zhenotdel claimed that it was popular with indigenous women – 
“every day hundreds of Muslim women stream into the club, to attend the medical 
consultations, the schools, the reading library and the children’s nursery.”31 There 
was “a drama club with Muslim women rehearsing a play to perform at the next 
regional Zhenotdel meeting.”32 Otmar Stein congratulated activists for their 
commitment “to open clubs based on the model of the Krupskaya club in all parts 
of the region.”33 She asserted that “the creation of Muslim women’s clubs needs 
to be a central part of the work in liberating women of the East.”34 By April 1925, 
the reported number of women-only clubs in Central Asia had increased to 13 and 
by September to 15, with the vast majority of these in urban parts of Uzbekistan.35  
These clubs were described by one writer as “a seedbed on which to develop 
Soviet culture.”36 The provision of practical support was proving to be very 
valuable in attracting women, who “go to the club for assistance in their lives, 
and when there, they can become educated.”37 Measures that were used to 
enlighten indigenous women included reading groups and professional skills 
training. Illiteracy proved to be a major challenge, and Liubimova reported in 1923 
that in Bukhara, one of the main cities in the region, the level of literacy among 
indigenous women was only 3%. This figure was also reflected among male Party 
members, with “the level of illiteracy among all Party members standing at 
between 90-95%.”38 It was agreed that schools would also be set up within clubs 
to educate women in literacy and other skills. Where there were insufficient 
resources to set up a designated club, women-only ‘red corners’ and ‘Lenin 
corners’ were created.39 By 1926 it was reported that the number of women-only 
clubs in Central Asia had risen to 34 and the number of red corners in Uzbekistan 
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to 90 - with far fewer in the nomadic region of Turkmenistan.40 Club work 
continued to be described as “our most important and principle method of 
work.”41 The ability of the clubs to provide services to women was said by 
Liubimova to have improved significantly. In a report on the Meeting of Women-
only Clubs held in November 1926, she stated that in “Uzbekistan alone over the 
last six months 71,000 women attended medical consultations in clubs.”42 
A decision taken in 1924 to recruit indigenous women to positions of paid 
organisers in Uzbekistan was reportedly an important step forward.43 The “number 
of Zhenotdel organisers in Central Asia rose from 50 to 103” and “the number of 
indigenous women involved in work increased from 6% to 30%, drawn from Uzbek, 
Kirghiz and Turkmen women”. The capacity to reach out to indigenous women was 
improved significantly because “45% of organisers can now speak a native 
language”.44 Liubimova commended the activity of 50 indigenous women members 
of the Chinese club in Uzbekistan who, once stimulated into action, “put 
themselves at the forefront of every campaign in the village”, including during 
the land reforms of 1925 when they “went with their red banner to villagers and 
to surrounding villages informing Uzbek women of their equal rights to water and 
land under the Soviet administration.”45  
The active involvement of indigenous women was a major boost to the Central 
Asian Zhenotdel. In chapter two I referred to Marianne Kamp’s analysis of their 
participation in the Zhenotdel as a symbol of their shared agenda on women’s 
rights. Their participation also reflected the policies of Korenizatsiia within the 
National Delimitation process, which promoted the involvement of the indigenous 
intelligentsia in the CPSU and Soviet establishment.46 The importance of clubs for 
secluded women was often stressed in articles up to 1927. In 1924, Liubimova 
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claimed that “the work to establish clubs in the East has proved itself in practice. 
Through them the Zhenotdel can reach out to Muslim women and involve them in 
education.”47 Their importance was evident in the fact that they: 
…can facilitate women firstly moving from an enclosed way of life into social 
and economic life within the club, and then, through their experience in the 
club, to make connections with other establishments, including co-
operatives, trade unions and soviets.48 
Thus clubs were specially designed to “answer the aspiration of Eastern women 
who are now awakening to the fact that the Russian revolution has taken place. It 
allows them to become educated, to take up economic activity outside the home, 
and become involved in social activities while at the same time not putting her on 
a collision course with the local customs and way of life.”49 This latter point was 
crucial for the Zhenotdel. Indigenous women would not be willing or able to attend 
clubs unless they could do so in safety. 
The work of clubs had suffered from the outset from lack of funding. Terry Martin 
describes a fierce battle between 1924 and 1926 for investment from the “cultural 
fund” for areas such as Central Asia.50 It appears from the numerous complaints 
of Zhenotdel members that they received very little, if anything, from this fund. 
The financial situation of the Central Zhenotdel was also extremely precarious and 
it appears that it was unable to provide the Central Asian Zhenotdel with anything 
more than limited human resources.51 Yet, despite the many obstacles, Liubimova 
was adamant in a report of the All-Union Meeting of Women’s Clubs in November 
1926, that “it is beyond question that women’s clubs are an essential and unique 
form of Party work among women.”52 They “are vital above all in that they 
organise Eastern women through providing practical assistance to them and by 
closing entry to men. They provide the possibility for a secluded woman to go 
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freely to the club, to uncover her face and to feel as comfortable as she would in 
the women’s quarter.”53  
 
4.3 Nomadic Women 
 
In addition to their ambition to draw secluded women into social and economic 
activity in Uzbek and Tajik sedentary areas, the Zhenotdel resolved to organise 
among women in the nomadic regions. In chapter three I have described how the 
1921 All-Union Meeting of Activists among Women of the East had resolved to 
create travelling clubs, known as Red Yurts, as the main form of work in these 
regions and how these Red Yurts were to include “literacy classes, medical 
consultations, obstetrics units, trading stations and legal advice.”54 Activists 
reported that they often had to approach husbands and fathers before they could 
access women, who were described as very frightened by these European 
strangers. One report stated that “At first we even began to educate men in 
literacy within the yurt. Then 40 women – their wives – registered with the 
school.” After that “public health advice corners, economic assistance corners 
and Lenin corners opened.”55 Also “an adobe hut was built for a children’s 
nursery” which was visited by medical practitioners.56 One question which 
dominated articles on work in nomadic regions was what was described as the 
battle “with dirt which is extremely bad and threatens the survival of the 
population.” Putilovskaya argued in 1921 for bathhouses to be set up among the 
Kirghiz population along with “model kitchens” to teach women the importance 
of cleanliness and good diet. There had “to be a serious struggle with TB and 
venereal disease and to educate nomadic women in ways of predicting, preventing 
and treating these diseases.”57 This view of nomadic women as profoundly 
regressive and surrounded by filth and disease persisted throughout the decade. 
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It also dictated the priorities of work among village women in these regions. 
Liubimova reported in 1927 on an initiative, known as a “Dekhan women’s house”, 
in Turkmenistan which catered for 20 peasant women from nearby villages. She 
proudly announced that the peasant woman “could stay in the house for two 
weeks, where she would be provided with her own bed linen and European clothes 
if she chose to wear them”. She would “become familiar with the idea of using 
soap, attend the bathhouse and see the doctor at the Dekhan house.”58  
Although there was some work done to bring Turkmen and Kirghiz women into 
cooperatives, the Zhenotdel found it even more difficult to relate to nomadic and 
semi-nomadic women and took an extremely negative view of their culture and 
life-style. Paradoxically it wanted to make them into good housewives rather than 
seeking to liberate them from domestic drudgery.  
 
4.4 Co-operatives and economic work 
Konkordiia Samoilova expressed a central premise of the Zhenotdel in 1920 when 
she argued that economic independence outside the home was crucial in 
transforming the lives of Eastern women.59 This commitment was articulated in a 
resolution to the Women’s Secretariat of Comintern in 1921 on work among 
Eastern women which asserted that through participation in artels “working 
women will be become aware their own experiences of the oppressive nature of 
work in the household economy. They will be able to contrast it to work in the 
public sphere which will emancipate them.”60 It was considered that experience 
of work outside the home would be positive and rewarding, both financially and 
socially. The April 1921 All-Union Meeting of Activists among Women of the East 
adopted a strategy to facilitate this empowerment. It was agreed to:  
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[b]egin work by approaching women already making handicraft goods and 
create artels among them, while at the same time encouraging the 
development of their class consciousness. Among peasant and nomadic 
women, Zhenotdel branches must begin to work with the poorest elements 
of the population. In those parts where there are no farm workers and no 
handicraft women workers the Zhenotdel must concentrate on organising 
housewives using methods of agitation within the home.61  
The Zhenotdel planned to create collectives among women who were already 
producing handicraft goods within the home. It would build this tiny workforce by 
drawing previously isolated housewives into clubs where they could be educated 
and given the possibility of becoming economically independent of their families. 
The aim was for the construction of a Central Asian female proletariat liberated 
from the repression of patriarchal family life, educated, skilled and class 
conscious. 
There were reports that initial efforts to set up cooperatives had met with success. 
Liubimova reported in 1923 that the “Central Asian Zhenotdel had organised 4,000 
handicraft women workers by 1921” and had set up technical courses “for 35 
Uzbek and Kirghiz female students in Tashkent”. However the introduction of NEP 
had led to “a loss of working capital and raw materials and the subsequent 
collapse of many existing artels.”62 She complained that NEP had not just been 
disastrous for the Zhenotdel, but for working women themselves: “Even as 
compared to the reduction in the number of women involved in production in 
Russia, the participation of proletarian women in the workplace within the Soviet 
East, already very small, is now virtually non-existent.”63 Other writers criticised 
the lack of financial support, including from Soviet cooperative organisations. A 
comrade Kislova pointed to the obstacles which the Bureau encountered in 
nomadic Turkmen regions where: 
[d]espite the desire of Turkmen women to organise artels the resources do 
not exist to set them up. We need funds to purchase raw materials for artels 
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in carpet making and spinning. The Joint Producers’ Cooperatives in the 
region which should help are refusing to do so. Materials can only be bought 
upfront for cash and there are no preferential terms or credit. This is no good 
as neither we nor indigenous Turkmen women themselves have any money.64  
Kislova argued that the refusal to assist the development of a carpet making 
industry had closed off a promising avenue for economic development. She 
complained that despite evident opportunities, there was a stubborn refusal 
among local Party members and co-operatives to accept that women could be of 
benefit to the economy. Liubimova returned to the subject in January 1924, 
complaining about the downward trend in production among indigenous women. 
She noted that “in the period of war communism we had a reasonably good 
network of artels in Eastern areas. But with NEP these were damaged to the point 
where now we do not even have a single economically productive artel.”65 The 
withdrawal of state funding meant that there was little training available for 
women. Liubimova observed that “the government’s point of view women’s artels 
do not justify themselves as they need financing. This means that the organisation 
of handicraft women workers is not considered supportable.”66 She argued that 
this narrow short-termism had to be overcome through recognising the long-term 
benefits of involving and training women in the economy.67 For indigenous women 
to make a positive contribution to the Central Asian economy there needed to be 
substantial financial and organisational backing from the Central Committee and 
Soviet organisations.  
Notwithstanding these problems, the Central Asian Zhenotdel pushed on to 
implement the decisions of the second All Union Meeting of Activists among 
Women of the East in March 1923. These included a commitment to “redouble our 
efforts to bring Eastern women into productive work, through artels and technical 
courses. At the end of the debate we passed a resolution committing delegates to 
bring Eastern women into all forms of cooperative building.”68 At a Central Asian 
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meeting the following year delegates pledged “to set up an artel in every uyzed 
(district) over the summer period.”69 Plans were made to focus on carpet making 
in Turkmenistan, cattle herding in Kazakhstan, silk production and market 
gardening in Uzbekistan. There were also efforts to set up farming cooperatives 
in 1925.70 Because artels were almost completely women-only environments, 
often within or connected to women’s clubs, women were isolated from general 
cooperatives and they did “not have the right to go to the market to sell their 
goods.”71The Zhenotdel tried to establish links “with the General Cooperative 
Bank, the Department of Trade and trade unions” to overcome these obstacles. 
Kommunistka writers pleaded with the general co-operative movement to 
recognise that women’s participation was an essential ingredient in a strong 
economy. Hence “drawing women into work and providing them with wages is of 
social and political importance because they will then consider themselves equal 
members of society and put their efforts into developing the economy.”72 Without 
raw materials and the ability to sell their products this could not be achieved. 
Despite continuous requests for assistance, in September 1925 Seifi complained 
bitterly that, “still practically nothing has been done to organise women 
handicraft workers. We have to put this work on a systematic footing or it will 
fail.”73  
Articles written in advance of annual International Women’s Day commemorations 
on March 8 called for the collectivisation of women handicraft workers to be a 
priority for all communists. In 1927, Liubimova requested that “questions of 
‘results and tasks’ of work among women must be placed before all Party cells 
and meetings, the Komsomol, trade unions and peasant meetings.”74 This would 
facilitate the “cooperation of women in silk weaving, dairy farming and market 
gardening with which women are already familiar”. However, by May of that year, 
Bolshakov complained that “there has been no real attempt by the general 
cooperatives to do work with women. The situation is very bad despite there being 
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a clear foundation on which to develop this work.”75 She pointed to a number of 
problems including “a lack of professional organisers to set up and run women’s 
handicraft artels, an absence of available credit and virtually non-existent links 
between handicraft artels and general markets. She also highlighted the 
conservatism of the male population which does not recognise the importance of 
bringing women together in cooperatives.”76 All responsibility for work amongst 
women was left to the Zhenotdel which was bogged down with underfunding, 
disorganisation, a lack of skilled workers and isolation. The inability of the Artels 
to become financially viable meant that women were unlikely to become involved. 
The vision of emancipation through work could never become a reality in such a 
hostile environment. In fact the perception of handicraft work as an inferior form 
of production plagued the Zhenotdel. Kasparova complained that “there is a view 
that handicraft work is not equal to men’s work, as it is seen as merely the normal 
duties of a woman within the home.”77 The lack of respect for this type of 
production was compounded by the fact that “women are not allowed to go to the 
market and sell their goods.”78 This situation was, of course, a key obstacle to the 
project. Without an income from sales, both the women themselves and the artels 
remained penniless. 
There were attempts to create farming cooperatives among women who had been 
granted land during the land reforms of 1925. A woman was required to be the 
head of the household to receive land and, therefore, widows and single women 
were the only ones to qualify. Because of the isolation of such women from family 
support systems and the general antipathy of the male population toward them, 
it was vital for them to pool their resources, share equipment and assist each 
other with planting and harvesting. The Zhenotdel had been making efforts from 
1925 to encourage women to demand land from their local Soviets and to organise 
together.79 Writing in May 1927, Liubimova reported some success with this 
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project, in that “more than 1,500 single women in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
[had] received land.”80 The Zhenotdel had also began “to encourage women in 
cattle breeding regions of Kirgizia and Kazakhstan to form co-operatives.”81 
Liubimova argued that success in creating farming cooperatives would “improve 
the prestige of collectivisation among women” because of the low prestige of 
handicraft work.82 This attitude contrasted with the high status accorded to large-
scale agricultural work within Soviet policy which Liubimova clearly wanted to 
reconcile. Barbara Evans Clements identifies this as a central difference between 
the small-scale co-operative model of the Zhenotdel and the monopolistic 
industrial approach of the Party leadership. She argues that for the Zhenotdel “the 
essence of communism was not technology and social organization, but a 
transformed individual.”83 By 1927 the Zhenotdel was under a great deal of 
pressure to defend its strategy of handicraft cooperatives, which would shortly 
fall victim to the Five Year Plan. 
 
4.5 Women Only Shops 
 
In the context of the difficult struggle to make progress with economic work 
among indigenous women, the launch of the first women-only shop in Uzbekistan 
in late 1925 was an important breakthrough. Opened in Tashkent, it reportedly 
drew in 400 Uzbek women in its first weeks of operation, with a further eight 
shops being opened in the Tashkent district in the following weeks.84 Liubimova 
contended that the crucial reason behind the success of the initiative lay in the 
exclusion of men from the shops: 
The absence of men means that a woman can remove her veil and talk with 
the staff, while at the same time selecting the goods she needs.85  
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Formally part of the general consumer cooperative, the Zhenotdel was able to 
announce in June 1926 that there were then 1,500 Uzbek women organised in 
cooperatives.86 Liubimova pointed to a notable increase in the numbers joining 
cooperatives since the creation of women-only shops, with the number of Uzbek 
women in cooperatives rising from 225 in October 1925 to 1,500 in October 1926.87  
The majority of shops were set up between 1925 and 1926, and by May 1927 there 
were a reported 27 shops in operation. The venture was described as having 
proven to be a “very successful commercial initiative.”88 The women-only shops 
were formally located within the consumer co-operatives and could connect with 
handicraft and other artels, as women producing goods within their homes. The 
success of this project was clearly a boost to the Zhenotdel members. Indeed it 
was claimed by one activist, Butusova in September 1927, that the women’s shops 
were proving to be far more commercially viable than general shops: 
Not a single one of the women’s shops within the consumer co-operative is 
running at a loss. On the contrary the average profit in the women’s shops is 
higher than in the general shops.89  
In the Kokand district of Uzbekistan it was reported that “the women’s shop had 
recruited 328 women between 1st October 1926 and 1st January 1927, whereas in 
contrast the total number of men recruited to similar cooperatives in that district 
during the same period was only 128.”90 The shops were claimed to provide a very 
valuable service in supplying scarce goods to women cooperative members. One 
example given was “the distribution among shareholders of the scarce ‘kok tea’ 
which is a green tea used by the local population.”91 Shops also provided credit 
facilities to peasant women on favourable terms with long term instalment 
repayment schemes. They provided an income to those who sold goods within 
them and a profit to shareholders who invested. Butusova claimed that in Kokand 
“the bonuses which were due to shareholders in the sum of 14-17 roubles were 
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reinvested voluntarily by the shareholders in order to strengthen their shares”, 
and that “the average size of a share in a woman’s shop is higher than that in a 
man’s shop.”92 
There also appears to have been some advance in creating broader organisation 
around the shops. A report in 1927 stated that a “special meeting of women’s shop 
managers has been held, with participation from managers, representatives of 
shop committees and cooperative workers.”93 It was claimed that monthly 
meetings were “held within the shops to discuss cooperative methods, with 
literature available to provide guidance to participants on this issue.”94 A 5% 
contribution was made by the cooperative members to allow the setting up of 
“mother and baby corners.”95  
Reports in Kommunistka claimed that the project of women only shops was making 
enormous progress within indigenous society. In September 1927 Butusova argued 
that the shops were successful precisely because they accorded with the patterns 
of indigenous life and met the needs and aspirations of women for more freedom.  
Uzbek women could now shop alone, uninhibited by a veil or the overbearing 
presence of husbands or fathers. With their faces uncovered it was far easier for 
them to inspect the condition of the items for sale. In July 1926, Liubimova wrote 
of her visit to a Tashkent shop where “women freely removed their veils, sold 
their own produce and selected the goods they wanted to buy.”96 Women’s shops 
presented no immediate threat to indigenous norms, as husbands had little 
difficulty with their wives going out to shop in a woman-only environment, 
especially as they were relieved of the burden of having to go to the market 
themselves.97 Because of this “the Uzbek man looks on women-only shops 
approvingly. He can freely allow his wife to go there as it does not interfere with 
his traditions and he is not afraid that she will meet men.”98 Thus in 1927 when 
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the Sredazburo was leading a campaign to destroy the fabric of indigenous society, 
a section of Zhenotdel activists were, in contrast, seeking ways to work within 
that same society. The fact that they continued to pursue this strategy in the face 
of demands to build the unveiling campaign reflected a firm resolve among some 
activists to resist the Communist Party leadership, both nationally and regionally. 
Zhenotdel activists insisted that shops provided a unique environment to access 
and recruit indigenous women to the Soviet project. There were “readings and 
discussions of the journal Yangi Yol” – the Turkic language journal of the 
Zhenotdel. Shops were described as “providing a means through which the Party 
can enlighten women who are otherwise completely secluded.”99 This was a 
reflection of the arguments used in support of setting up clubs in 1921 – that a 
form of organisation which was of practical use to indigenous women would also 
facilitate their recruitment to the Soviet project. Liubimova was so enthusiastic 
that she called for the initiative to be extended to Turkmenistan where “women 
only markets could be held where women can bring their produce to sell and buy 
the goods they want for themselves.”100 In May 1927 Tunik claimed that “the social 
and political role of the shops is very great”, with crèches, cafes, and various 
forms of meetings taking place.101 The social role was represented in that “we 
have mother and baby corners in ten shops, where Uzbek women can receive basic 
items for the care of children, with medical consultations and medication also 
provided.”102 The active participation of indigenous Zhenotdel activists in running 
the shops meant that staff members spoke Uzbek. According to reports, activists 
were so dedicated to the project that they worked long hours for low pay.103 
 According to Zhenotdel reports, women’s shops were able to fulfil the functions 
that clubs were originally designed for. They could “involve Uzbek women in 
cooperatives, train them in skills, raise cultural levels among them, engage in 
education on everyday issues, and provide political education.”104 Women’s shops 
provided a setting that indigenous women could feel at ease within, which met 
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their needs and facilitated the Zhenotdel’s transformation project. One report 
stated that following a reading of Yangi Yol there were “group discussions among 
customers, usually initiated by the customers asking a manager about a particular 
question. When she answers there is then a discussion involving all those 
present.”105 Butusova described a “sense in which Uzbek women are finding their 
own answers to questions about their own lives which they could never obtain 
within their home environment.” 106  
However, while the shops apparently provoked no antagonism from indigenous 
men, the same was not true of the attitude of male Party members. It is unclear 
whether the disapproval emanated from Russian or indigenous Party members, but 
one report stated that activists had been warned by their male comrades that 
“women’s shops would lead to the creation of a separate women’s cooperative 
and undermine the recruitment of working Uzbek women into the general 
cooperative movement. They would lead to a feminist organisation, resembling 
the women’s cooperatives in western class society.”107 These claims were made 
despite Liubimova’s insistence that the shops were a formal part of the general 
shop cooperative organisation; “The shops do not have their own governing body 
but operate under the leadership of the consumer cooperative’s governing body. 
The full system of accounts, the supply of goods and the management of money 
reflects the connections with the general system of cooperatives.”108 Moreover 
“every shop manager is a member of the Communist Party with close links with 
local party committees. And shop staff work under the leadership of the party.”109 
However it appears that these assurances did not suffice. Anna Artiukhina 
reported in January 1928 that the number of “shops had increased to 43 by 
October 1927 bringing together 5,946 indigenous women and were clearly a 
success.”110 Despite this “a directive was issued by the cooperative leadership and 
without the knowledge of the Zhenotdel, for women-only shops to be turned into 
general shops”. The reason given by the cooperative leadership, according to 
Artiukhina was “that it was unnecessary to have separate shops for women when 
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they had unveiled.”111 Artiukhina expressed particular anger that this decision had 
been taken in circumstances where the majority of women had re-veiled.112  
The liquidation of women-only shops was undoubtedly perceived as a major 
setback for the Zhenotdel’s work in Central Asia. Marianne Kamp describes how 
some activists considered the shops “to be a stroke of genius.”113 She describes 
the publication of a story in Yangi Yo’l which portrayed the many benefits of the 
women-only shops and encouraged indigenous women to join what would be a life-
changing experience, allowing them to be “released from oppression” and obtain 
work and education.114 This strong support from Yangi Yo’l suggests that shops 
were a grassroots initiative which reflected the aspirations of indigenous activists. 
It also shows that a significant section of Zhenotdel activists, both Russian and 
Uzbek, were pursuing a very different policy toward indigenous society than the 
Party leadership. The Central Committee had hitherto done little but issue formal 
calls for support of the Zhenotdel. In its call for an assault on indigenous society 
in 1926 and its support for the Sredazburo’s unveiling campaign, the Central 
Committee had shown that it had little interest in culturally sensitive forms of 
transformation. The continued existence of women-only protected spaces was in 
fact an impediment to the Central Committee strategy. Instead of safeguarding 
their welfare, it demanded that indigenous women place themselves at the 
frontline of highly dangerous unveiling campaign.  
 
4.6 Delegate Meetings versus Clubs 
 
The 1921 the Zhenotdel Meeting of Activists among Women of the East agreed that 
delegate meetings were not an appropriate method of organisation at that time 
in the region. Kollontai described her hope that women would be drawn “into 
clubs and then progress to delegate meetings and after that to membership of the 
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Communist Party.”115 Clubs remained the main form of organisation until late 
1925, after which they were supplemented by women-only shops. Delegate 
meetings would have required women being sent to work in male dominated 
environments, and Liubimova and her supporters believed that Central Asian 
women were still a long way from taking that step.116As the section on women’s 
clubs illustrated, Liubimova retained a strong commitment to building local 
women-only organisational forms. 
However, from 1926, clear moves were initiated to implement a policy which was 
counter-posed to the prevailing strategy. These came initially from Zavaryan, who 
appeared to be a supporter of Anna Nukrat, herself a staunch Party loyalist, and 
soon to become the leading voice of the Central Committee and Sredazburo in 
Central Asia. Zavaryan complained in July 1926 that “there is a tendency for 
activists to concentrate all their work in clubs and red corners.”117 She claimed 
that efforts to set up delegate meetings in Uzbekistan had failed only because of 
lack of support from the Zhenotdel. And while not demanding that delegate 
meetings completely replace clubs, she demanded that they at least partially 
supersede clubs as a key form of work among indigenous Uzbek women. She called 
for activists to “lose their negative attitudes toward delegate meetings in the 
coming year” and “begin to place some value on this method of work.”118 She 
criticised those Zhenotdel activists who believed “delegate meetings to be an 
inappropriate form of work in Central Asia and hence put no effort into building 
them.”119 In contrast, Zavaryan insisted that they were essential in order to 
“consolidate Party influence over indigenous women.”120 For this to be achieved 
they needed to be set up only where there was local Party organisation, “as 
experience has shown that we cannot achieve any success in remote areas where 
there is a great deal of backwardness.”121 She and others also believed that, 
without direct Party involvement, the Zhenotdel could be taken over by anti-
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Soviet elements.122 It is interesting that Zavaryan’s demands emerged in a period 
when work among indigenous women appeared to be achieving some success. She 
reflected a strand of thinking which wanted the Party to dominate indigenous 
society, not to work alongside it in the manner attempted by the Zhenotdel up to 
that time.  
In the same issue of Kommunistka, Liubimova countered that clubs continued to 
be invaluable precisely because they “assisted the spread of the influence of the 
Party.”123 However, perhaps surrendering to pressure to show more Party loyalty 
in September that year, she conceded that “delegate meetings could be set up 
among students to connect them to the Party and Komsomol.”124 Yet she 
continued to disregard them as a method of organising among working and peasant 
women. Zinaida Prishepchik who was appointed head of the Uzbek Zhenotdel that 
year supported Liubimova and insisted that “women’s clubs remain the central 
form of work in Central Asia” and were proving indispensable in organising 
teachers and conducting education.125 She claimed that the number of clubs had 
risen to 34 at that stage, although only 16 clubs had their own premises.  
Although there is no report in Kommunistka of Liubimova being removed from her 
position as head of the Central Asian Zhenotdel, and she continued to write in the 
journal up to late 1928, it is clear that opposition to her leadership was developing 
from June 1926, as indicated in Zavaryan’s criticism of the strategy of the 
Zhenotdel under her leadership. Interestingly Richard Stites reported that the 
Central Committee issued a circular letter in 1927 to local Party organisations 
“noting their failure to make sufficient use of the delegate meetings to mobilise 
women around pressing tasks of the Party.”126 Anna Nukrat, by then the key voice 
if not the formal leader of the Central Asian Zhenotdel, took up the leadership’s 
call for delegate meetings in July 1927. She complained that “up to now our 
members have not valued delegate meetings as a method of organisation.”127 In 
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common with Zavaryan, she argued that delegate meetings were to be established 
only where the Party had a base, and that “every delegate meeting must have 
clear practical tasks connected with the local needs of the region.” They should 
also take on work previously done by clubs to develop “the dairy, and market 
gardening collectives, handicraft artels, silk-worm nurseries as well as setting up 
crèches within these collectives.”128 She believed that delegate meetings would 
“play a central role in the struggle with obstinate problem of kulaks, the Muslim 
clergy and the clan system of family.”129 She saw them as a weapon in fighting 
against indigenous society. 
As part of this strategy delegate meetings were now to aim at drawing indigenous 
women into elections to the Soviets. By June 1929, Artiukhina boasted that, in 
relation to the recruitment of women to delegate meetings organised for elections 
“we have made a huge step forward” and “can now report that 25% of the 
membership of Eastern soviets are women.”130 There were demands for the ambit 
of delegate meetings to be extended to organise events like March 8th in order to 
“win the battle with vestiges of prejudice” and ensure the “continued activity of 
working women.”131 In 1929 Prishepchik, head of the Uzbek Zhenotdel, Nukrat and 
others boasted of the superior nature of delegate meetings in electing women to 
the Soviets and in providing support for mass collectivisation. By this point in time, 
the Zhenotdel leadership had shifted away completely from self-organisation to 
bringing groups of indigenous women together to hear speeches and vote in 
elections.132 Delegate meetings clearly appear to have operated as an instrument 
of the Central Committee and Sredazburo. 
There is no evidence in Kommunistka of any direct action or decision was taken 
by the Zhenotdel to close down existing clubs. Instead voices like Nukrat and 
Zavaryan led a campaign to undermine them by shifting the focus of work away 
from them. Delegate meetings were superior in their view because they worked 
directly with and were under the control of the Party. In their view, delegate 
meetings could provide more effective Party leadership and avoid the isolation 
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experienced by Zhenotdel activists within clubs. In 1927 delegate meetings 
remained generally women-only environments, but there was a shift in 1929 
towards involving men also.133 Liubimova continued her battle against the 
liquidation of clubs against these pressures to close them down, stating in January 
1927 that “it is vital for local Party organisations to support clubs.”134 However, 
by December of that year, because of the disruptive impact of the Hujum, many 
clubs had become extremely neglected and some were completely abandoned.135 
The strategy of women-only organisation had aimed at creating culturally sensitive 
avenues to social and economic independence from the family. The Hujum 
demanded the opposite. It confronted indigenous society with the aim to destroy 
it. Although club work continued to be mentioned sporadically in Kommunistka 
after 1927, it is clear that the nature of the project had changed. Now delegate 
meetings had become the main method of organising indigenous women for the 
purposes of the Five Year Plan.136 
 
4.7 The impact of the Hujum 
 
As discussed above, the core principle of women-only organisation in Uzbekistan 
had been a belief that a culturally appropriate environment was a prerequisite to 
engage with indigenous women. Secluded women could go to clubs and shops 
wearing the paranji and chachvon and remove them in safety in a male free 
environment.137 In the absence of a mass revolution against seclusion, the only 
way to tackle it was by encouraging indigenous women to take gradual steps 
forward. This approach represented a complete contradiction with the Hujum 
and, as described in chapter 2 and 3, the issue of women’s safety became an 
immediate concern for many Zhenotdel activists once the unveiling campaign was 
announced. 
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In August 1927, Anisimova, a supporter of the Hujum, took to task “those who had 
argued that it was necessary to educate first and then unveil.”138 Instead, she 
claimed, the Hujum had coincided with “a massive influx of women into schools 
clubs and Soviet organisations.”139 Unveiled women had “an enormous hunger for 
knowledge, education and work within society.”140 She also denied that there had 
been any negative response to the unveiling campaign and argued that in fact 
there had been “a very supportive response from male workers. Frequently non-
Party workers announce that they have unveiled their wives, in many 
circumstances before Party members.”141 But Anisimova’s enthusiastic report was 
deeply misleading. In the same issue of the journal, Konkordiia Nikolaeva admitted 
that after “the great success on March 8th the pace of the unveiling campaign 
slackened and women started to veil again.”142 She then proceeded to describe 
various attacks on unveiled women, including “the rape of an Uzbek woman in 
Tashkent” and “the killing of two women in the Yangi-Yulsk district” in the 
aftermath of March 8th.143 It does not appear that there had been arrests were 
made but she believed that these killings were the work of indigenous men. She 
was very critical of male members of the Uzbek Communist Party and Komsomol 
for refusing to unveil their wives or support the Hujum. Nikolaeva blamed the 
clergy for inciting the hostile mood toward unveiling. She also held the Zhenotdel 
responsible for the failure to provide support and security for those women who 
answered the call to unveil. According to Nikolaeva, the Zhenotdel had “failed in 
not acting to immediately consolidate work with unveiled women and to draw 
them into its orbit.”144  
Nikolaeva’s claim that the Zhenotdel had not absorbed unveiled women into its 
structures is highly convincing, in particular given the lack of coverage of the 
Hujum in Kommunistka. It seems that Zhenotdel activists had done little more 
than take part in the demonstrations on March 8th and May 1st. And even these 
were not reported in Kommunistka at the time of the demonstrations. From 
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Marianne Kamp’s reports, it appears that, unlike Kommunistka, Yangi Yo’l did 
campaign for the Hujum from February 1927. It is also clear that indigenous 
women activists around the Zhenotdel responded positively to Yangi Yo’l. Tojixon 
Shodieva, editor of Yangi Yo’l, had been promoted to the Central Committee of 
the Uzbek Party and was the deputy leader of the Hujum Commission.145 However, 
the Russian leader of the Uzbek Zhenotdel at the time, Prishchepchik, did not 
write anything in Kommunistka on the campaign. The key article on March 8th, 
entitled March 8th in the East, was penned by Liubimova, who was now Head of 
the All-Union Eastern Zhenotdel, who wrote at length about Uzbekistan but 
completely ignored the unveiling campaign.146 
In January 1928, Aleksandra Artiukhina admitted that the Hujum had been a 
failure. She stated: 
…although more than 90,000 women removed their veils from March to May 
1927, now between 80-90% of those women have re-veiled”. The problem as 
she saw it was that the campaign “treated the fight with the vestiges of 
patriarchy as a short term project, within which it was only necessary to 
direct the energies of the Party to March 8th and May 1st.147  
While “clubs and red corners were expected to turn their energies to consolidate 
the recruitment of unveiled women”, in reality “not only did they fail to respond 
to do this, but existing club work was discarded”. Artiukhina complained that 
“now every club is empty and neglected, and no women attend meetings.”148 She 
reported that a recent inspection revealed that “the women’s shops which had 
been wholly successful both politically and economically” were “without the 
knowledge of the Zhenotdel leadership turned into general shops on the orders of 
the co-operative organs”. She reported that these closures had been justified with 
the claim that there was no longer any need for separate shops in circumstances 
where women no longer wore a veil. Paradoxically, as Artiukhina points out, “the 
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liquidation of women-only shops took place during the period of re-veiling after 
May 1927.”149 The collapse of the clubs and the closure of the shops were clearly 
major losses for the Bureau and for the indigenous women who had participated 
in them.  Artiukhina pointed out that many indigenous women no longer felt able 
to go out in the streets for fear of attack and many now harboured a deep distrust 
of Soviet authorities.150  
The debate in Kommunistka in the run-up to the December 1928 All-Union Meeting 
of Workers among Women of the East reveals an organisation in crisis. While there 
was no direct challenge to the rationale behind the Hujum, there were plenty of 
criticisms of the way in which the campaign had been run. In particular, it was 
argued that unveiling had to be seen as a longer-term aim and that women needed 
to be protected from attacks.151 Along with reports of the demise of shops and 
clubs, attempts to enrol girls in education also suffered.  In August 1928, Smirnova 
wrote with alarm at the collapse in the number of girls attending school because 
of “attempts to forcibly introduce co-education, including the introduction of boys 
to girl’s schools in Uzbekistan, all of which ended in failure and a significant drop 
in the attendance of young girls.”152 The view that separate education for women 
and girls was essential was shared by other activists. Khairova argued that gender 
segregated schools “have been proven to work in practice and have been very 
important.”153 The sense that women and girls were being seriously let down by 
local Party organisations abandoning this work was palpable. Both Russian and 
indigenous Zhenotdel activists watched as all of their efforts at developing 
women-centred education and economic independence were destroyed.  
As activists grasped at ways to rescue the situation two main themes emerged in 
the 1928 debate. The first was the proposal for the Uzbek government to issue a 
legal ban on the veil. The second was a call to disconnect the Zhenotdel’s work 
among women from Party authority. In chapter five I will consider the discussion 
around a proposal to issue a legal ban on the veil, which was supported by 
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Liubimova and a significant number of indigenous Zhenotdel activists. In chapter 
six I will consider the crisis provoked by the Hujum and the arguments for work 
among women to become independent from the Party. 
 
4.8 The First Five year Plan 
 
In December 1927, at the 15th Party Congress, Stalin announced a major change 
in economic policy. Terry Martin describes the First Five Year Plan as an offensive 
aimed “at rapid industrialisation, the abolition of private trade, collectivisation 
of agriculture, dekulakisation, and a greatly intensified and centralised 
dictatorship.”154 ‘Dekulakisation’ was a policy aimed at cleansing the Soviet 
project of so-called alien better-off elements within the peasantry.155 In January 
1928, Anna Nukrat told Zhenotdel activists that they needed to completely shift 
the focus of their work away from cities, and go to the countryside to enforce the 
Five Year Plan. Activists had “to ensure that all cooperatives, clubs and artels 
fulfilled the targets set by the 15th Congress.”156 Nukrat was at pains to reassure 
these activists that the Central Committee was finally fully supportive of 
developing economic work among indigenous women. At last there would be 
financial provision for cooperatives. Even more importantly, “in line with the 
decisions of Congress, the cooperative organs are now compelled to support the 
Zhenotdel in every way.” From now on there was to be “systematic support from 
cooperatives and collective farms, from those who previously saw Zhenotdel work 
as simply women’s nonsense and a waste of time.”157 This news may have been 
welcomed by Zhenotdel activists frustrated at the closure of the women’s shops 
and the collapse of clubs and cooperatives during 1927. Yet there was a major 
difference between the previous strategy of small cooperatives in the form of 
artels and the new tasks of mass production. Stalin had demanded that all industry 
be nationalised “at an accelerated rate” and that “the small and scattered 
peasant farms transform into large united farms based on cultivation of the land 
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in common, and transfer to collective cultivation on the basis of a new and higher 
technique.”158 
It is difficult to judge if this contradiction was immediately apparent to all 
Zhenotdel leaders. In February 1928, Liubimova argued that compliance with the 
Five Year Plan meant “setting up productive cooperatives in villages throughout 
the region.”159 Sachudri, a new contributor to discussions on the East, made clear 
that there had to be an acceleration of efforts to create a mass female proletariat 
for the factories and plants soon to be built in Central Asia. This author 
complained in very derogatory terms about the “low cultural level” and 
“ignorance” among local women.160 According to Sachudri, indigenous women had 
“no discipline and often did not turn up for work.”161 The Zhenotdel was now 
directed to teach these women “industrial discipline and proper habits of 
work.”162 Central Asian women had to conform to the requirements of an intensive 
plan of production. There would be no vacillation on these questions. Further 
directions to the Zhenotdel on “building the village economy” and “drawing 
peasant women onto large-scale agricultural courses” were published throughout 
the year and Zhenotdel activists were informed that “special funds had been 
allocated to set up Kolkhozy (collective farms).”163 Women were to be sent on 
special courses to be taught farming methods in dairy, poultry and cultivation and 
to ensure that they “fully understand the importance of large-scale 
agriculture.”164 
In an article in January 1929, Nukrat made clear that veiling remained “the main 
obstacle to women becoming part of the workforce.165 It meant that they were 
“unable to work in factories or workshops, be part of collectives or undertake 
technical courses”. She proposed special measures be taken to physically protect 
unveiled women. Komsomol members, Party members, workers, Pioneers and 
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Soviet members “all need to be drawn into the task of defending ‘courageous’ 
unveiled women.”166 Also, “special groups of men should be selected from the 
youth”, who could police districts, factories and other establishments to prevent 
any attacks on women on their way to and from work.167 Conservative attitudes 
among indigenous men within cooperatives and trade unions and the “hostility and 
victimisation towards women entering factories” had to be overcome through 
compulsion; “the Central Committee must put pressure on general cooperatives 
and trade unions and call them to order for their attitudes.”168 
By July 1929 there were claims that success had been achieved through the 
mobilisation of women in the creation of collective farms. Amosov, who it would 
seem was a Central Committee member, claimed that “the Party has 
demonstrated better leadership recently in the battle for unveiling.”169 Stalin had 
announced a war on religious practice as part of the Five Year Plan, issuing a 
command to Party members to desist from all participation in religious practices 
and festivals. The Zhenotdel was tasked with assisting women who had refused to 
comply with the demands of the clergy.170 Traditional society was to be 
transformed by attacking its cultural roots.171 Intensive training of indigenous 
women became a central arena of activity for the Zhenotdel. Nukrat reported on 
the results of this work in an article in October 1929 where she argued for an even 
greater intensification of efforts – “special training courses must become a mass 
phenomenon. Courses must draw in hundreds of thousands of poor women, women 
agricultural workers and middle peasants.”172 Instead of clubs or artels, indigenous 
women were now being prepared for collective farms, factories and plants which 
were being established all over Central Asia. Society was transformed intensely 
and abruptly, and all manner of tradition and culture which was not conducive to 
that strategy had to be confronted and destroyed. In March 1930 the final issue of 
Kommunistka featured an article on Women’s Day in the Soviet East, in which a 
comrade Sokolova wrote in strong terms of the major socio-economic 
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transformation of Central Asia. She described how the “People’s economy is 
uprooting the remnants of capitalism and feudalism.”173 For the East this meant 
“increasing the tempo of our battle with the remnants of clan society”, and with 
the practices of veiling, kalym, and seclusion of women. She announced that 
“workers’ brigades [were] being sent out to villages to assist with the liberation 
of women.” All of this was necessary in order to prepare for the “rolling out of a 
manufacturing economy in the Soviet East.” The 8th March celebrations had to be 
focused on the mass mobilisation of peasant and nomadic women in the various 
initiatives of the Five Year Plan. Women’s ‘brigades of model workers’ were to be 
sent out to inspect trade unions, factories and collective farms, in order to ensure 
that women were participating in all levels of collectivisation. The “broad masses 
of working men must take a direct part in the work of liberating women.”174 The 
Zhenotdel was now liquidated, with Zhensektory – groups under the direct control 
of the Party – to continue the unveiling and mobilisation of Eastern women under 
the Five Year Plan. 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has mapped the trajectory of the Central Asian Zhenotdel, from semi-
autonomous forms of work to mass mobilisation under a centralised and 
authoritarian plan. The initial policy sought to bring indigenous women into the 
wider society in a manner which did not put them into direct conflict with their 
families and communities. It was hoped that some degree of financial 
independence and the experience of working outside the home would be a 
transformative experience. However, the success of this strategy demanded on 
financial, moral and political investment. In a climate dominated by NEP and a 
steady retreat from progressive and democratic principles, the Zhenotdel’s 
projects struggled to survive.  
Besides the lack of support from Party organisations, the Zhenotdel initially faced 
serious obstacles of access to indigenous women. The first activists in the region 
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were Russian and did not speak the local languages. The decision in 1925 to 
promote indigenous women within the Zhenotdel contributed greatly to 
overcoming its isolation from the general population. Kommunistka reports a 
doubling in the number of activists almost overnight. The setting up of an Uzbek 
women’s journal Yangi Yo’l and the involvement of a group of indigenous 
intellectuals around that project was important as was the opening of women-
only shops which grew substantially in popularity and number over the course of 
two years. For a short period, it appeared that life for the female inhabitants of 
Uzbek cities was transforming in an incremental way which was in keeping with 
their own cultural experiences. 
Ironically, 1926 and early 1927 appear to have been the highpoint of what we may 
term the policy of gradual, bottom-up change, as indigenous women began to 
make the project their own. It appears that there was an awareness within the 
Party – perhaps due to reports from the Zhenotdel to the Central Committee - of 
a growing mood of self-confidence among indigenous women in urban areas that 
prompted in turn the launch of the Hujum. Marianne Kamp has shown through her 
research on women who took part in the unveiling demonstrations that many of 
them had aspired to some form of emancipation.175 One major problem for those 
who participated in the unveiling campaign was the lack of any real economic and 
social opportunities for them as unveiled women to be educated, work and live 
independently within wider society.  The Zhenotdel’s women-only economic and 
social initiatives were undermined by the Hujum and closed off that pathway to 
independence. There seems to have been was no option for them but to return to 
their old way of life. 
In the central Asian context, the launch of the Hujum was undoubtedly, 
consciously or subconsciously, a pre-cursor to the Five Year Plan. It used moral 
and social compulsion to bring indigenous society under control. For the reasons 
that have been discussed by other writers, the Central Committee was determined 
that Central Asia would become an example of Soviet modernism. Until 1926 the 
oppression of Central Asian women was of no interest to the male leadership of 
the Party, nationally or locally. The Hujum allowed the Central Committee to 
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begin policing its members and to create a Party which appeared to be highly 
disciplined and militant. It also allowed it to launch a campaign against religion 
and peasant family life. When the First Five Year Plan was announced the process 
of softening up the population in that region had begun. The Zhenotdel leadership 
which developed around Anna Nukrat in 1927 believed firmly in the Party. They 
wanted indigenous women to break free of seclusion and to be employed in the 
general workforce. Any concept of autonomy was dismissed as either vacillation 
or bourgeois deviance. Despite the attempts of many activists to continue with 
their policy of incremental change, or to protest at the autocratic measures being 
taken, the Bureau had no power to prevent the changes which were to come. 
Central Asian simply had to fit in with the new order. 
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Chapter 5 
The Legal Strategy of the Zhenotdel in Central Asia 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I focus on the Zhenotdel’s legal programme in Central Asia. Efforts 
to ensure that Soviet family codes were properly implemented within the distinct 
social and cultural context of Central Asia became a major preoccupation for the 
Zhenotdel from 1923. In examining the various aspects its legal strategy, I locate 
this strategy within the Zhenotdel’s overall programme of transformation and 
illustrate how it diverged from that of the Central Committee and Sredazburo. 
Firstly, I consider the background to the Zhenotdel’s utilisation of Soviet law to 
transform the Central Asian family, and the influence of Alexandra Kollontai on 
Serafima Liubimova, the principal proponent of this strategy. Kommunistka 
writers considered that Sharia and Adat laws codified the oppression of indigenous 
women. They were committed to the supersession of these laws as part of a 
programme “to untie the bonds which delay the economic and cultural 
development of the people.”176 This necessitated identifying effective ways to 
eradicate family practices such as polygyny, kalym, forced marriage, and child 
marriage, all of which were valid under Sharia and Adat law.177 It also required 
that women be encouraged to seek to enforce their rights under Soviet law, 
including their right to divorce.  
In contrast to its policy on economic and social transformation, the Zhenotdel’s 
legal strategy presented a direct challenge to the indigenous family, at times 
betraying an insensitivity to the ramifications for women of bringing their 
husbands or fathers before the Soviet People’s Courts. Success in persuading 
women over to exercise their legal rights could have terrible consequences, with 
few economic and social opportunities for women outside their traditional lives. I 
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examine the debates among activists about the consequences of the legal strategy 
and the problems with obtaining the support of the local Party organisation.  
In contrast to the Zhenotdel, the Central Committee and Sredazburo were very 
reluctant to enforce Soviet family law in Central Asia. The main source of concern 
for the CPSU appears to be the negative consequences for its own project of 
stirring up resentment among male supporters. Even after the aftermath of the 
Hujum, when a call for a decree against the veil emerged from the Zhenotdel, the 
Central Committee was very reluctant to take a legal route. It appears that it 
preferred to enforce compliance with required Soviet standards of behaviour 
through the Party apparatus at this stage, rather than utilising the formal 
structures of the state. 
 
5.2 The Zhenotdel and Legal Change 
Between 1917 and 1920 a number of decrees were issued by the Soviet government 
which fundamentally changed the legal status of women in the Soviet Union. These 
included the ending of religious sanction of marriage, the introduction of civil 
marriage, and divorce on request for both women and men. Women were declared 
equal under law and guaranteed equal pay for equal work as well as other 
protections in the workplace. New Family Codes set the minimum marriage age at 
18 for males and 16 for females, and demanded the consent of both parties to 
marriage.178 The concept of illegitimacy was abolished and abortion was legalised.  
I have already illustrated Kollontai’s continuing influence on the strategy of the 
Central Asian Zhenotdel both before and after her removal from Directorship of 
the Zhenotdel in 1922. As well as initiating distinct forms of social and economic 
organisation, Kollontai had a crucial role in extending Soviet family law to Central 
Asia. Furthermore, Liubimova, who played a central part in developing the legal 
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strategy, as Head of the Central Asian Zhenotdel, had been a student of 
Kollontai’s. She had attended lectures given by Kollontai in 1921 at Sverdlov 
University, and been impressed by the latter’s advocacy of the necessity to 
profoundly restructure the family to bring it into line with socialism. Sverdlov 
University was seen at the time as “a hotbed of radicalism” and Kollontai’s 
lectures as the “most complete attempts to go beyond the traditional socialist 
analysis of women’s oppression as simply coterminous with capitalism”.179 
Liubimova subsequently wrote of how “Alexandra Mikhailovna was a lofty example 
of how a revolutionary should be and we all wanted to be like her.”180  
The main elements of Kollontai’s lectures were subsequently set out in a 
pamphlet, The Labour of Women in the Evolution of the Economy, where she 
argued for the state to take over the functions of the family.181 Linked with this 
was her call for the state to take a lead in refashioning the family, which I have 
already discussed in chapter one. One of her biographers, Cathy Porter, argues 
that “there is a confusion” in Kollontai’s thinking “between the state and the 
collective; between actual conditions in Russia and her vision of better times.”182 
In other words, Kollontai believed that the Soviet state represented the workers’ 
collective, and wanted it to impose a socialist moral code. In an article in 
Kommunistka in September 1920, she argued that: 
…the workers’ collective has to establish its attitude not simply to economic 
relationships but to the form of relationships between the sexes. What kind 
of relations between the sexes are in the best interests of the workers’ 
collective? What form of relations would strengthen not weaken the 
collective in the transitional stage between capitalism and communism and 
would thus assist the construction of the new society?183  
Kollontai thus believed that the Soviet state should play an active role in 
determining relationships between people, and that the private life of an 
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individual came second to the needs of society – “Communist morality demands 
all for the needs the collective.”184 
Advocacy of state intervention in family life was problematic, particularly when 
that state was becoming increasingly autocratic. By 1920, the Soviet Union was a 
one-party state under the leadership of the Communist Party.185 Kollontai was in 
fact one of the sharpest critics of the Communist Party leadership at that time for 
what she saw as its unforgiveable retreat from key democratic principles, in 
particular the removal of workers’ control over the economy.186 A profound 
contradiction is evident in her argument that a Party leadership, which she saw 
as excessively centralist, should simultaneously play an interventionist role in the 
private lives of Soviet citizens. Moreover, there was a disparity between her views 
on this question and those of Friedrich Engels, who, as I demonstrated in chapter 
one, was a central inspiration for her theories on the family. Engels had written 
of a future socialist society as one where the “government of persons is replaced 
by the administration of things and the direction of the processes of production. 
The state is not ‘abolished’ it withers away.”187 In writing on the woman question 
and the family, Engels argued that the future state should have no involvement in 
the private lives of its citizens. His vision clearly presupposed the retreat of the 
state from family life, not an intensification of its role.188 But Kollontai saw herself 
as a trailblazer.189 She rejected what she considered to be Engels’ passive belief 
that “male chauvinism would automatically disappear once people were freed 
from property relations.”190 Thus the state needed to play a central role in setting 
down rules for the new society. 
As discussed in chapter one, Kollontai and Lenin conflicted sharply on these 
questions, and he criticised her for what he saw as a tendency toward dangerous 
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utopianism. He contended that demands for radical change of the family were 
premature and would provoke a backlash from more conservative sections of 
society. In a speech to the 1918 All Russian Congress of Working Women he argued 
that, by giving “too sharp an edge to the struggle we may only arouse popular 
resentment; such methods of struggle tend to perpetuate the division of the 
people along religious lines, whereas our strength lies in unity.”191 In an interview 
with Klara Zetkin in 1920 he objected to what he saw as the “obsession” of 
Kollontai and her supporters with redefining relations between men and women. 
The “relations of the sexes to each other are not simply an expression of the play 
of forces between the economics of society and a physical need, isolated in 
thought, by study, from the physiological aspect.”192 Such revolutionaries, he 
thought, were harming the interests of the revolution by interfering in complex 
human relationships and creating discord through a reckless imposition of their 
beliefs. However, Kollontai defied Lenin’s call for restraint and persisted in 
demanding the immediate re-articulation of relationships between men and 
women.  
Kollontai had solid grounds for being critical of the Party’s passivity and 
conservatism on the question of women’s rights. Lenin had admitted that the male 
membership were very prejudiced towards women.193 Within a Party with a male 
chauvinist culture, it was inevitable that there would be major obstacles to real 
change within broader society. In such a situation, activists paradoxically became 
more reliant on attaining legislative change as a measure of success, and looked 
more and more to the Soviet state as an instrument of change. 
 
5.3 Kollontai’s view of legal tactics in the East 
Kollontai considered that Central Asian women needed guidance from the 
Zhenotdel, so as to enable them to insist on their rights to equality under the 
Soviet Constitution. According to Kollontai, before the Russian Revolution, these 
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women had lived lives of darkness and despair, with “no guiding star, no ray of 
light and no hope for a free and equal existence.”194 Their oppression had been 
systemised under customary law, with “equality prohibited under Sharia law, the 
authority of customs and religious norms.”195 Now finally their situation was 
transformed, and Kollontai believed in 1920 that indigenous women would take 
action once they became aware of their rights to do so. In the absence of Soviet 
People’s Courts, she argued that they should begin to “assert their rights as full 
citizens under the law” and in particular demand their right to divorce under 
Soviet law within the customary Sharia and Adat court system.196 In this way, they 
could begin to transform their position within the family by challenging the system 
which underpinned their oppression. However, the Central Committee was not 
inclined to take such a radical stance. Indeed, according to Gregory Massell, little 
action was taken by the Soviet leadership to extend Soviet family law to Central 
Asia before 1924. Soviet People’s Courts appear not to have been established in 
the region until 1921. From this point in time until 1926, the Soviet People’s Courts 
operated alongside the Sharia and Adat court system.197 There was a fear of 
provoking a hostile reaction from the peasant armies of the Basmachi and a 
concern that the Soviet regime should not appear to be imperialist.198 Adrienne 
Lynn Edgar describes the manifestation of this hesitancy in Turkmenistan where 
“Soviet officials were inclined to tread cautiously in attempts to undermine the 
patriarchal social system, for fear of alienating what they saw as the regime’s true 
basis of support – poor and landless male peasants.”199 Turkmenistan had no Hujum 
and the “shift from legislation to direct action never took place.”200 
As with other aspects of Zhenotdel policy, Kollontai was not prepared to wait for 
the Central Committee to act. In a resolution to the first All Union Meeting of 
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Activists among Eastern Women in April 1921, she called on Zhenotdel activists to 
educate indigenous women how to use their new legal rights. In “order to liberate 
women from the torments of family and marriage, the Zhenotdel must introduce 
them to the Soviet People’s Courts.”201 It was crucial that a Soviet court system 
be established to encourage women to seek their legal rights and to create an 
identification with the state. In the words of her comrade and supporter, 
Konkordiia Samoilova, the “laws which liberate an Eastern woman politically and 
economically remain a dead letter until she learns how to use these revolutionary 
gains. The liberation of the women of the East must be the work of their own 
hands.”202 Another writer, Putilovskaya, agreed that it was up to indigenous 
women themselves who “as a group who have previously suffered the worst 
repression would become a force in their own right for liberation.”203 Thus Soviet 
law was a weapon to be put into the hands of indigenous women to enable them 
to obtain freedom from the constraints of kalym and other customary forms. The 
Zhenotdel would facilitate their journey from repressed slaves to liberated human 
beings.  
 
5.4 The Central Asian legal programme 
As, with other aspects of the Zhenotdel’s activity in Central Asia, little progress 
was made with the legal strategy before 1923. Although kalym (bride-price) had 
been declared illegal in 1921, there had been few attempts to enforce the ban. 
The second of Activists among Eastern Women in 1923 discussed for the first time 
action to ensure “the abolition of polygamy, kalym, punishment for abduction of 
women for arranged and under-age marriage along with a number of property 
rights.”204 Liubimova adopted a fervent approach to developing the legal 
programme, reflecting her continued adherence to Kollontai’s views. Douglas 
Northrop has argued that the commitment of the Zhenotdel to a forceful legal 
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strategy stemmed from a negative colonialist attitude towards indigenous 
culture.205 However, while undoubtedly prejudices toward Central Asian society 
were rife among Russian activists, many indigenous women also supported the 
legal strategy, particularly when it addressed the wearing of the veil.206 I consider 
that a better explanation is to be found in the Zhenotdel’s commitment to state 
led transformation of family life, first advocated by Kollontai. This connects with 
what Barbara Clements Evans has described as the “utopianism of the Zhenotdel”, 
where she argues that the vision which motivated its activists “was the creation 
of a ‘new woman’ whose defining features were independence and activism.”207 
Thus, the birth of a ‘new Central Asian woman’ was to be accelerated through a 
decisive legal programme. 
This legalistic utopianism led to impatience with the persistence of traditional 
cultural practices and religious influences. This zeal was reflected in Liubimova’s 
first article as Head of the Central Asian Zhenotdel, where she declared her 
complete animosity toward the role of Islam in family life.208 She contended that 
Islam was more insidious than any other religion because of its legalistic and 
normative role in society – it was an all-encompassing phenomenon. Thus it was 
“the Koran which has been instrumental in shaping all aspects of family life.”209 
It was “religious practices and beliefs which perpetuate kalym, polygamy, the 
wearing of the veil, child-marriage, the transfer of a widow to the nearest 
relative, and a whole range of customs which result in the absolute subjugation 
of a woman.”210 She proclaimed her commitment to utilising Soviet law in a battle 
against the hold of Islam. By “introducing Soviet legislation into this region we are 
instigating a battle against religious fanaticism and to destroy the hold of the 
Mullahs and the Koran.”211 She was also very antagonistic to the Adat and Sharia 
courts “where a woman’s testimony is worth only half that of a man”. The 
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necessity to overcome institutional inequality was thus for Liubimova, “a key issue 
in all our work in Turkestan [Central Asia].”212 
Liubimova’s lack of cultural sensitivity to the role of religious laws and customs 
contrasts sharply with her highly nuanced approach to social and economic 
change. She displayed an ethnocentric refusal to acknowledge the importance of 
historically rooted cultural practices. Islam had a history in Central Asia stretching 
back to the 10th century and was deeply immersed in all aspects of life.213 Because 
it was so much part of daily life, a legal offensive against it was both dangerously 
premature and intrusive. In common with Kollontai, Liubimova had an intolerant 
attitude to what she considered to be repressive institutions. And, like Kollontai, 
she also had a belief that the new institutions of the Soviet state could take the 
lead in superseding the old. 
She had support from other Central Asian activists.  Writing also in 1923, Kasparova 
reported that activists were at that time developing proposals to bring before the 
Party “to eradicate existing tribal family attitudes and religious fanaticism which 
exist within Sharia and Adat law, all of which deprive women of the most 
elementary human rights.”214 She underscored the importance of achieving legal 
change, as without such change indigenous women could not make any progress 
toward economic independence. In particular, she argued that without a ban on 
kalym and polygamy, women could not own their own property.215 At the second 
Meeting of Activists among Eastern Women in February 1923, activists adopted a 
resolution which committed them to “representing women in the courts and 
providing them with legal advice”. They also acknowledged that “these measures 
are vital to win influence and popularity among indigenous women.”216 Zhenotdel 
activists put forward their proposals for legislation within legal commissions that 
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had been set up as part of the National Delimitation process.217 The commissions 
sent proposals to the executive bodies of the new republics calling on them “to 
establish legal codes to regulate practices within the family and property rights 
for Eastern women.”218 By 1924, Liubimova reported that the ban on kalym had 
been passed into law in the new republics but that there was continuing opposition 
to enforcing bans on underage marriage and polygamy.219 Tineva complained that 
“the strong hold of tradition along with the selfishness of the male population has 
meant that even when decisions are taken by the republics on kalym, polygamy 
and child-marriage they only remain on paper.”220 Another activist wrote that 
despite “a growing awareness among indigenous women that Soviet laws have 
liberated them, with some attending meetings and learning about their legal 
rights, their day to day existences and their low status within the family continue 
to prevent their full involvement in social and economic life.”221 From the 
perspective of these activists, Soviet law was a vital weapon in the battle for the 
emancipation of indigenous women as it challenged their existing repression under 
Sharia and Adat law.  
Yet making Soviet law a reality in Central Asia was easier said than done. At the 
end of 1924 Liubimova expressed frustration that, despite the formal situation, 
“women remain slaves within their families”, with “Uzbek women in an even 
worse position than other indigenous women because they remain repressed by 
the terrible laws of seclusion and are forced to wear the heavy veil.”222 She argued 
that efforts to develop laws to ‘liberate’ indigenous women were completely 
meaningless without economic and social prospects for women. Zhenotdel 
activists understood this but were often unable to assist divorced and homeless 
women and there were continuing complaints about the dearth of economic and 
social opportunities. Liubimova acknowledged that “achieving results necessitates 
economic growth.”223 Women who responded positively to the Soviet legal model 
and took action to gain some independence often found themselves isolated and 
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impoverished.224 The lack of support from the Central Committee in the 
development of cooperatives for indigenous women meant that the Zhenotdel was 
undermined in its efforts to address this problem. 
 
5.5 The Court System 
Reports indicate that attempts to represent women in the traditional Sharia and 
Adat courts foundered almost immediately.225 As well as the difficulties of 
representing women in those forums, the Zhenotdel also encountered opposition 
from their local male comrades. Kislova reported that the Turkestan (Central 
Asian) Party Central Committee had issued a circular in 1922 calling on the 
Zhenotdel “to desist from involvement in family legal disputes and instead to 
restrict itself to education.”226 This demand provoked angry responses from 
activists and Kislova wrote that the Turkmen Zhenotdel had refused to comply 
with the direction, as “we considered to do so would deprive us of our entire 
purpose as an organisation.”227 She reported that activists had complained to the 
Turkestan Central Committee about this instruction but, “having received no 
response, we decided to carry on our legal work as before.”228 Yet she then states 
that “soon afterwards, we decided to abandon our role as defenders of native 
women in the traditional courts”. Instead Zhenotdel activists in Turkmenistan 
would “provide advice to women prior to their attendance at Court.”229 At the 
subsequent All Union Meeting of Activists among Eastern Women in February 1923, 
the decision of the Turkmen Zhenotdel was endorsed and adopted by activists 
across the Soviet East. It was stated that that no progress was possible within the 
traditional court system because it “operated according to the tenets of the 
Koran” and consequently, “a woman cannot get a fair hearing either as a citizen 
or a human being.”230 In future, therefore the meeting agreed that, “no Zhenotdel 
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activists will under any circumstances be sent to represent women in these 
courts.”231  
This decision signalled a shift of the majority of legal activity to the Soviet 
People’s Courts. A resolution passed by the Communist International in 1921 had 
called on the Zhenotdel “to drive forward the implementation of Soviet legislation 
to put women on an equal basis to men” and to “promote the recruitment of 
women who are capable of becoming judges and serving on juries within the 
People’s Courts.”232 This call was taken up with enthusiasm by activists who 
agreed at the 1923 All Union Meeting to use their “best efforts to draw indigenous 
women into the Soviet People’s Courts at all levels.”233 At this state the Ali 
Bairamova club in Baku, the model for Central Asian women’s clubs, had already 
set up three-month training courses. The meeting agreed to begin to train their 
court activists in “how to relate Soviet law to issues of concern for Muslim 
women.”234 Liubimova was no doubt relieved that Adat and Sharia courts were to 
be abandoned in favour of the Soviet model of family justice. However, it did not 
take long for problems to emerge within this strategy. Instead of becoming models 
of socialist decision making, the prejudice that Zhenotdel activists objected to in 
the traditional court system re-emerged quickly within the People’s Courts.235 In 
a report from Kislova in June 1923 she protested that “customary law continues 
to dominate attitudes” and “to have a negative influence on the operation of the 
People’s Courts.”236 
 In 1926, the Sharia and Adat courts were completely abolished by the Uzbek 
government.237 In the same year Zavaryan complained that despite the efforts of 
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the Zhenotdel, “work to legally protect women is still seen as irrelevant.”238 The 
low status attached to this work meant that “those who work in the People’s 
Courts are poorly trained and under the influence of old ideas and prejudices, 
particularly in areas where the clan system is strong.”239 There was little respect 
for women and very few female advocates who might have been more sympathetic 
to the situation for women bringing cases. In February 1927 Liubimova lamented 
the fact that “problems persist within the People’s courts and “cases brought by 
women are not dealt with for months and even years.” The “ZAGs (Family 
Registration Offices), militia and criminal investigation unit often do not 
understand that their function is to protect women. Instead of dealing with 
complaints themselves there is a tendency to send all matters to the 
Zhenotdel.”240  
In a continuing effort to improve the People’s Courts, Liubimova demanded in 
February 1928 that an effort be made to recruit indigenous women to positions of 
judges and advocates within them. She argued for “an inspection to be carried 
out into the People’s Courts on cases brought by women and on attitudes to 
women.”241 This inspection would assist in “ensuring that day to day procedures 
within the People’s Courts are correct.”242 It would also look at the work of Party 
members who were employed within the courts. She was supported by Aleksandra 
Artiukhina, national director of the Zhenotdel, who announced that the first 
inspection of the courts would take place in line with Liubimova’s proposals.243 
Douglas Northrop and Gregory Massell have criticised the Zhenotdel for becoming 
involved in inspections of the personal behaviour of male Party members, and 
linked these inspections with methods used by Stalin in disciplining the population 
during the forced collectivisation which followed. Massell has described the 
evolution from “revolutionary legalism” to “administrative assault” to “social 
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engineering” which characterised Soviet policy in 1920s Central Asia. 244 Yet, the 
Zhenotdel did not have the same programme of the Central Committee. It wanted 
the Party membership to be pulled into line, as opposed to aiming to discipline an 
entire population through demands for conformity. I will examine this question 
further when considering the relationship of the Zhenotdel to the Party in chapter 
six.  
 
5.6 Response and effect of legislation on the lives of indigenous women 
In relaunching the legal strategy in 1923, Liubimova re-asserted Kollontai’s view 
of the importance of educating indigenous women on the legal rights available to 
them. She reported that Zhenotdel activists were united in their belief this was 
“a key means to win over the masses to conscious support of the emancipation of 
women.”245 This legal education policy was beset with difficulties and 
contradictions and accounts in Kommunistka highlight divergent reactions from 
indigenous women. Secluded Uzbek women were the least likely to be drawn into 
discussion around the law. Zhenotdel writers believed that the difficulty in 
engaging with them on this, and other questions, stemmed from their isolation 
and consequent lack of awareness. The veil presented both a psychological and 
physical barrier, inhibiting an understanding “of what we are saying about genuine 
equality and liberation for the women of the East.”246 Zhenotdel members 
struggled to teach secluded women that “from the moment of her birth she is 
likely to be sold off” to “become the wife of a man she does not know and does 
not love.”247 Club work was vitally important, and could provide an environment 
which was more conducive to interacting with women. In late 1924, the 
Organisational Bureau (Orgbureau) of the Party directed the Zhenotdel to “set up 
a network of legal assistance offices in clubs which will provide consultations and 
advice to women on how they can reject the traditional laws of Central Asian 
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society.”248 This decision was likely to have been a consequence of the adoption 
of the Criminal Legal Code that year which made kalym, polygyny and arranged 
marriage explicitly unlawful.249 This was one occasion when it seems that the 
Zhenotdel and the Party leadership were working together. As I will show in 
chapter six, Liubimova and other leaders were at pains to convince the Central 
Committee that joint working arrangements were vital.250 Liubimova hoped that 
the decision to promote legal awareness and advice would encourage “women to 
make use of the rights that have been granted to them under Soviet legislation 
and bring their claims to the People’s Courts.”251 Perhaps she also hoped that the 
mandate from the Orgbureau symbolised a new willingness to support the 
Zhenotdel. Unfortunately, as I illustrated in chapter four, little or no material 
support was forthcoming.252 
It was reported in Kommunistka that, in contrast to their Uzbek sisters, unveiled 
women in the mainly nomadic Kirghiz region were quite assertive in demanding 
their legal rights. In a report from October 1923 on a series of meetings with 
Kirghiz women, Liubimova was enthusiastic about how forthright Kirghiz women 
had been in “demanding the eradication of polygamy and the strict monitoring of 
kalym.”253 They also “complained at the lack of legal penalties for polygyny.”254 
Seifi wrote in 1923 that “Kirghiz women are already taking advantage of their new 
right to divorce and large numbers are leaving their husbands.”255 She claimed 
that women frequently “deserted their husbands for other poor men”, which 
showed how important it was to have choice and not be forced into an arranged 
marriage. She claimed that the Kirghiz family was facing its own demise”, but that 
there was no viable form to take its place. Despite the efforts of the Zhenotdel 
“to facilitate the transition to a new form of Kirghiz family” and to “take legal 
action against those who interfered with women’s rights”, it was extremely 
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difficult to provide a livelihood for women who wanted independence.256 There 
was a dearth of economic and social alternatives for women who left their 
marriages. The Zhenotdel struggled to keep a few small scale co-operatives 
functioning within the Kirghiz female population and it was in no position to 
provide economic solutions. This meant that many women who fled their families 
to the cities were left in desperate circumstances. Their decision to respond to 
the Zhenotdel’s call to “make use of their rights” often did not lead to their 
emancipation, but to a different form of oppression.257 In March 1926, Zavaryan 
reported that “divorce has taken on the character of an epidemic”, with “a 
spontaneous flight of second and third wives from their husbands, along with girls 
running away from arranged marriages.”258 She argued that this “is leading to very 
serious problems, including a tendency towards prostitution” among these 
women.259 This was a problem about which the Zhenotdel was painfully aware but 
could not resolve. There can be little doubt that the lack of an economic and 
social infrastructure was a major obstacle for the Zhenotdel. This was not just a 
problem in Central Asia. Women throughout the Soviet Union had found 
themselves thrown out of factories with the introduction of NEP.260 Unemployment 
and prostitution among women had become endemic.261 Lenin’s decision to 
introduce market forces had shut women out of Soviet society and economy, and 
had strengthened prejudice toward them. In Central Asia, where women’s 
economic activity outside the home was virtually non-existent before 1920, they 
were in an even more vulnerable position if they decided to depart traditional 
life.262 
                                                          
256 M. Seifi, ‘Pravovoe polozhenie zhenshchihy Vostoka - vopros ob ukreplenie Kirgizskoi sem’i’, 
Kommunistka, 10 (1923), pg.43 
257 S, Liubimova, ’Rabota sredi zhenshchin v Kirgizii’, Kommunistka, 10 (1923), pp. 43-45 
258 E. Zavaryan, ‘Brachnoe i semeinoe na Vostoke’, Kommunistka, 3 (1926), pp. 42-45 
259 E. Zavaryan, ‘Brachnoe i semeinoe na Vostoke’, Kommunistka, 3 (1926), pp. 42-45 
260 E. A. Wood, The Baba & the Comrade; Gender & Politics in Revolutionary Russia (Indiana University Press 
1997), pp. 160-169 
261 B. Evans Clements, ‘Working-Class and Peasant Women in the Russian Revolution, 1917-1923’, in Signs, 
Vol. 8 No. 2 (Winter, 1982), pp. 215-235 for a discussion of the economic problems facing peasant women 
after the introduction of NEP 
262 See further T. Martin, Affirmative Action Empire pp.129-132 for a discussion on the ‘cultural fund’ 
154 
 
In an effort to utilise all options for economic progress, the Zhenotdel pushed hard 
for the allocation of land to Central Asian women under the 1925 Land Reforms.263 
The legal entitlement to own property was argued to be the “most essential right 
for women in Central Asia” because it would allow them to be genuinely 
independent.264 Up until then women had not been permitted to farm land 
independently. Widows were reported to be the worst affected by lack of property 
rights as they “were transferred along with livestock and land to the deceased’s 
family.”265 This group of women were seen by Zhenotdel activists as potential 
beneficiaries of Soviet land reforms. Liubimova argued that “their successful 
farming of land will provide us with the best way to convince indigenous women 
of the benefits of socialism.”266 Yet, over a year into the land reform programme, 
Zavaryan complained that it had made almost no impact in Central Asia, with 
“land still almost exclusively being granted to men.”267 This lack of real support 
from the Soviet State left the Zhenotdel appearing weak and ineffectual.  
Another feature of the legislation programme was its reported misuse. Nukrat 
wrote in horror in 1929 of reports “of many incidents of divorce being used for the 
speculation and re-selling of women.”268 She argued that the availability of 
divorce needed to be restricted to prevent this manipulation. Liubimova had also 
been upset in 1924 to be approached with requests to lower the price of kalym in 
order to assist poorer men. She did not understand how these young men did not 
understand “that they are being exploited by having to save for decades for kalym, 
and not being able to buy a wife until they are 40 or 50 years of age.”269 Soviet 
legislation would release them from these burdens while also “striking a blow 
against the rich landlords, who buy wives to use them as a source of labour.”270 
However, Liubimova bemoaned the “fact that we have received calls to campaign 
for the lowering of the price of kalym because poor men cannot afford wives and 
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without being married have no rights to obtain properly irrigated land.”271 She 
could not understand how the Zhenotdel’s project could be misunderstood in such 
a fundamental way. Instead of Soviet law changing traditional society, traditional 
society was subverting it. The limits of Zhenotdel legalism were evident in the 
contradictions which emerged from the attempt to graft European norms of family 
life onto Central Asian society. 
Progress was therefore slow and contradictory. Niurina complained in April 1925 
that “despite the official decrees issued by the Soviet republics prohibiting 
polygyny and kalym, the overwhelming mass of women remain extremely 
repressed.”272 Those women who did attempt to go beyond their traditional roles 
faced hazardous obstacles. There were discussions about the need to be sensitive 
to indigenous culture as attendance at Zhenotdel meetings or educational courses 
could inflame tensions within families and lead to women being disowned. Kislova 
wrote in 1923 “we need to be aware of the dangers for women who are coming to 
the Zhenotdel for education, as it is causing big problems within their families and 
they are not safe.”273 Zavaryan reported that “the People’s Courts are besieged 
with women seeking help. The Zhenotdel is inundated daily by women who have 
been thrown onto the streets by their husbands.”274 Activists were extremely 
stressed about their inability to provide any practical economic and social support. 
Worse still were the reports of physical attacks on women who transgressed 
traditional culture. Divorce was a particularly dangerous option for indigenous 
women. In 1925 Niurina reported that “25 women have been murdered by their 
husbands within a period of 4 months this year because they obtained a divorce in 
the Soviet courts without their consent.”275  
Gregory Massell has argued that the Soviet Party, including the Zhenotdel, had a 
highly coordinated strategy to provoke women into rebellion against indigenous 
society, while simultaneously using their revolt as an opportunity to impose Soviet 
control over the region.276 However, it is problematic to suggest that the Central 
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Asian Zhenotdel was an unequivocal supporter of that policy. While Liubimova saw 
Soviet law as a crucial weapon against “the remnants of patriarchal society”, she 
also believed it needed to go hand in hand with social and economic 
development.277 In announcing the launch of a Zhenotdel campaign for legal 
change in 1923, Liubimova also pointed to the “fact that we are endeavouring to 
draw Eastern women into productive activity and to teach them skills for the 
workplace”.278 Moreover, all change had to be incremental. Indeed Zhenotdel 
activists were apprehensive of the consequences of provoking a revolt because of 
the terrible consequences for women. Yet, faced with an inability to contain, or 
to impact on the unintended and complex local responses to legal change, the 
recourse for the Zhenotdel seemed to be towards supporting ever-deeper state 
interference into private lives. Thus continuous calls to extend the law and 
provide more punitive measures for breaches resulted in an increasing 
identification with an ever more bureaucratic state machine.  
 
5.7 Discussions on Soviet Law and Indigenous Society 
Although Liubimova’s positive advocacy of Soviet law dominated coverage of legal 
issues in Kommunistka, other activists expressed concerns about its impact. One 
worry was the manner in which transgressors should be handled. Writing in 1923 
on the backlash against female initiated divorce in the Kirghiz region, Seifi 
counselled against taking too punitive an approach to indigenous men who resisted 
the law. Zhenotdel activists needed to understand that “men are very afraid of 
losing a woman’s labour in the home.”279 This situation, she argued, needed 
instead to be tackled “through providing economic assistance to the Kirghiz 
family.”280 Thus, “an improvement in conditions will help women who would 
otherwise seek divorce to escape poverty.”281 “But if their mass departure is a 
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revolt by women against their enslavement we must handle it very carefully.”282 
In September 1924, Seifi expressed concern about alienating the Central Asian 
indigenous population through advancing Soviet legal measures too vigorously. 
Comrades needed to be patient and be aware that “although our new society is 
winning the battle with the old way of life, we must be very careful when 
approaching questions of family life.”283 In July 1925, Kasparova wrote that “in a 
situation where the soviets are weak, there is a tendency among Zhenotdel 
activists toward officialdom and bureaucracy.”284 This tendency was exemplified 
“by the actions of Zhenotdel members in Central Asia who issued an order to the 
local militia to arrest a man for breach of family law.”285 Kasparova deplored this 
and demanded that “the Zhenotdel leadership take steps to eliminate this kind of 
highhanded behaviour.286 She also warned of the need to take care to “avoid a 
situation where women become free of the old laws but then are thrown into 
prostitution.”287 She counselled patience and argued that “crimes of everyday life 
will not be resolved in a single generation. The youth must therefore be trained 
well as their views will build a society based on communist ideas.”288 Kasparova 
can be seen as a voice of opposition against the pro-active legal strategy 
advocated by Liubimova. In Kasparova’s view the law was a model for society, not 
a set of rules to be rigidly enforced.289  
Not only was Liubimova preoccupied with the immediate implementation of Soviet 
law, but she saw it as a vital weapon in defeating all elements of Central Asian 
Islam. There could be no progress for indigenous women within the Muslim 
religion. She saw reformist elements as a particular threat, declaring in 1923, that 
we need “to enforce Soviet legislation so as to undermine their ability to use 
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reformism” to win women over.290 In September 1926, she demanded that “the 
clergy not be allowed to masquerade as progressives” and warned of the dangers 
from the so-called ‘Red Mullahs’.291 In 1927, then head of the Eastern Zhenotdel, 
she despaired of the situation in the Tatar region where the “mullahs have 
succeeded in finding a way of recruiting women.”292 They “go to these women 
with verses from the Koran which talk of allowing education for women, of 
permitting them to take part in broader society and even of allowing them to join 
the clergy.” Instead of seeing this as an indication of the opportunities for Tatar 
women to create a movement within the terms of their own cultural heritage, 
Liubimova saw it as an example of them being duped. She far preferred a situation 
where the clergy were conservative as “it is easier for the Party to conduct anti-
religious propaganda when the mullahs defend seclusion, arranged marriage and 
other barbaric customs.”293 Liubimova’s intolerant attitude toward religion 
reflected the growth of militant atheism in the Soviet Union, together with the 
creation of the League of the Militant Godless in 1925.294 
Liubimova had always advocated the view that Central Asian women ultimately 
needed to break with the indigenous family. In that sense she was simply 
reflecting the views of the Zhenotdel on the need to supersede the traditional 
family. She understood and worked hard to create safe and culturally appropriate 
spaces for them to begin that transition, while writing in glowing terms of those 
“brave women who reject the system of kalym and leave their villages for the 
city.”295 These women were “pioneers who were subjected to persecution within 
their own clan.”296 By 1925, Seifi had also begun to idealise women who rejected 
their families to become Zhenotdel organisers. Such a woman had chosen to “take 
the path of Lenin and break with her own family. She had been prepared to 
become a social outcast, left with no money and considered as a ‘fallen woman’.” 
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She called on the Central Committee to ensure that the Party gave full support to 
these women.297 Unfortunately, Seifi’s words fell on deaf ears.  
 
 
5.8 The Unveiling Campaign and the Law 
In contrast to this gradualist legal project, the Hujum was aimed at mobilising 
women en masse by dint of direct political pressure. Liubimova appeared to ignore 
the calls for mass unveiling demonstrations, and continued her legal campaign in 
the months leading up to March 8th. She demanded that “the People’s Courts be 
pulled into line” and “action taken to correctly implement Soviet law.” 298 In the 
aftermath of the unveiling campaign the following year, Liubimova once again 
raised the demand to “popularise Soviet legislation in respect for women” among 
the population.299 However, by then the key debate had shifted to discuss the 
demands emerging from among Zhenotdel activists for a state ban on the veil.  
Unsurprisingly, Liubimova emerged as a central proponent of a decree to ban the 
veil. Yet she was not the first to raise it, as the initial demand for a decree had 
come from “a debate among activists in the Azerbaijan Zhenotdel.”300 Azerbaijan 
had also been part of the Hujum, with unveiling demonstrations organised in 
1927.301 In August 1928 Kommunistka published a report of a meeting of Azeri 
Zhenotdel activists, where they discussed a resolution to be proposed to the All 
Union Meeting of Activists among Women of the East in December of that year.302 
The report of the discussion included an assertion from one activist that: 
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…women are being forced to wear the veil against their will because their 
husbands insist on it. These women are asking us for a decree as they believe 
it would help them to win their argument to unveil with male family 
members.303  
Liubimova relied on this claim that a decree would override cultural opposition to 
support her arguments for a ban, which, she reasoned, would be an act of 
enormous significance for women who wanted to unveil. It “would allow those 
women and men who have sympathy with unveiling to act according to their 
views.”304 Conscious of the devastating violence against women which had been 
provoked by the Hujum, Liubimova also considered that a state ban would produce 
a sense of safety and solidarity among those who wished to unveil. On the other 
hand, not issuing a decree would “give the mullahs the weapon of Koranic law to 
invoke against unveiling.”305 Liubimova was thus repeating an argument first made 
by her in 1923 of the necessity to use Soviet legislation as a weapon in a war 
against Sharia law. A “decree will show the enemies of the working class that we 
are serious.”306 
A decree would provide an indigenous man a “valid reason” to break Sharia law.  
There was an “urgent necessity” to legislate “so that “the Eastern woman is not 
isolated in her struggle against the remnants of the slavery of the past. It will give 
her the full support and opportunities introduced by Soviet power.”307 Liubimova 
provided an example of an Uzbek woman who came to the Zhenotdel asking for a 
ban on the veil to undermine the authority of her husband. She quoted the woman 
as arguing that:  
I want to remove my paranji but my husband won’t allow it. Tomorrow at a 
certain time I will be at a certain shop in the bazaar. Come up to me and 
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force me to remove it. Then I will be happy and my husband won’t say 
anything.308  
Marianne Kamp asserts that this argument revealed “an astute observation of 
Uzbek women’s etiquette” on Liubimova’s part. Kamp has found that “in many 
activist’s memoirs there are accounts of women unveiling in response to a direct 
request from a person in authority.”309 Liubimova and other supporters of a decree 
believed that women needed the state to step in and provide support to them in 
their battle within their own community. A “ban on covering the face would create 
an atmosphere of support and solidarity with uncovered women.”310 It will allow 
us to “go directly to the broader layers of the population in the struggle for 
women’s liberation and above all to organise women workers and peasants.”311 
This illustrates the strength of her belief in the role of state legislation as an 
instrument of liberation. It also begs the question of how indigenous women could 
genuinely be engaged in an act of self-liberation when they needed the state to 
take the lead. 
Krupskaya’s response to the call for a decree is noteworthy because of her 
opposition to Liubimova’s legal strategy. In her speech to the December meeting, 
Krupskaya took a stance which mirrored that of Lenin’s opposition to Kollontai in 
1920. She argued that “there is no problem with a ban on the paranji and chadra 
as it shows that the law supports unveiling.”312 But she believed that supporters 
of a decree were taking an overly legalistic approach and argued that:  
I of course want the paranji to go to hell like everybody else. But we don’t 
always get what we decree and cannot approach the question of liberation 
as though it is simply a legal issue.313 
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Instead of laws that demanded immediate unveiling, Krupskaya argued that 
economic incentives should be offered persuade indigenous men to allow their 
wives to unveil. Indigenous men needed to be educated and won over, not 
alienated. This included “only giving land to a woman if she is unveiled”, thus 
giving her economic independence and prestige.314 It would also mean that 
husbands would have an interest in allowing their wives to unveil so as to obtain 
a larger landholding. Krupskaya argued that reliance on the law was also a problem 
in other arenas of women’s rights. There needed to be a recognition that 
“polygyny is a disguise for economic exploitation”, for “the use of women as free 
labour.”315 This “exploitation is not just among kulaks but also exists among 
peasants working in handicraft production as well as the middle layer of 
peasants.”316 
Yet Zhenotdel activists would not have disagreed with the necessity to address 
women’s economic vulnerability. Liubimova argued in February 1927 that an 
enormous gap existed between the “world’s most impressive family legislation” 
and the reality on the ground.317 She and others had consistently argued for 
assistance to provide independence to women who wanted to leave their 
husbands. However, like Kollontai before her, Liubimova was not willing for that 
development to take place before attempting to enforce that legislation. She 
believed that the struggle for legal and economic change went hand in hand. It 
was vital to educate indigenous women in how to enforce legal action against “the 
crimes of kalym, polygyny and abduction of women.”318 The debate about a ban 
on the veil had only come about because Liubimova and her supporters were 
striving to protect women from the terrible backlash precipitated by the unveiling 
campaign of 1927. 
5.9 The political shifts of 1929 and the Legal Strategy 
Following the year-long debate, the final decision of the Zhenotdel All Union 
Meeting of Activists among Women of the East in December 1928 was to launch a 
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campaign to introduce a decree on a gradual basis by republics across the region. 
Perhaps Krupskaya’s call for moderation had made a difference. In January 1929, 
Aleksandra Artiukhina announced that the majority of the meeting had decided to 
conduct a more persuasive strategy to win over the population in favour of a 
decree before issuing a law. The Uzbek republic was expected to introduce a 
decree in 1929 after a campaign among the population to win support. This 
campaign was to link a legal ban with one against “the remnants of the old society 
in the form of kalym, polygamy, the paranji (veil), arranged marriage, child 
marriage, blood feuds and so on.”319 
Nukrat set out in her report of the meeting how “a great deal of work needs to be 
done to resolve the text of the decree” as “questions need to be answered as to 
how punishments for disobedience of a decree would be applied…would it only 
punish those who refused to allow the removal of the veil or also women who 
continue to wear it?”320 In the meantime however, the “Central Committee has 
issued a directive to all activists not to wait for a decree and instead to begin 
immediately to take resolute measures to bring about the liberation of women.”321 
It is interesting to note in that respect that no decree was ever passed. As 
discussed in chapter two, despite the campaigning of the Uzbek language 
Zhenotdel journal Yangi Yo’l and the demonstrations organised by activists to 
demand a decree the Uzbek republic never passed it. She reports further that this 
was despite the expectation of the Uzbek president that a decree would be 
implemented.322 Ultimately the Central Committee decided that it was not in its 
interests to introduce one. The push to impose the Plan meant that legal questions 
were marginalised, as was any debate or criticism. Now the Zhenotdel to put all 
its efforts into mass agricultural and industrial collectivisation. In this context 
calls for individual legal safeguards were denounced as vacillating, spineless or 
bourgeois. 
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5.10 Conclusion 
A close reading of Kommunistka from 1920 to 1930 reveals the Zhenotdel’s legal 
strategy to have been perceived as a crucial facet of its overall transformation 
project. Yet, there were deep conflicts within this strategy. On the one hand, 
Zhenotdel activists recognised the need, from an economic and social perspective, 
to work broadly within the parameters of indigenous society. But, on the other 
hand, these same activists were urging women to take legal action that would put 
them in conflict with that society, without any alternative support structure in 
place.  
Marianne Kamp argues that many of the legal measures that were proposed by the 
Zhenotdel also reflected the views of indigenous Jadid women, particularly when 
it came to a ban on the veil.323 Yet this does not mean that those measures were 
any less insensitive toward the circumstances of women within the broader 
population. When tackled on the intrusive nature of a ban on the veil, Liubimova 
replied that “this same argument could have been made against the ban on kalym 
as this also encroaches on the most intimate aspects of life for a peasant 
family.”324 Thus she believed that state intervention within the family was invasive 
but necessary. Similarly to Kollontai, she wanted a confrontational battle against 
the old institutions of power and their laws and believed the Soviet state’s 
legislative powers to be the most effective way of winning that struggle. 
In contrast to Liubimova’s impatience for legal change, the Central Committee 
was extremely cautious. While this may seem to conflict with its authoritarian 
tendencies, as exhibited in the unveiling campaign, in fact it simply suggests that 
the Central Committee preferred the Party to lead these campaigns. It perhaps 
wanted present the Soviet government as a more neutral force, even at this point 
On the other hand, the Zhenotdel wanted the Soviet government to be very pro-
active. This reflects both a belief in a separate progressive role for that body and 
an attempt to reach out beyond the confines of the Party. The argument of 
Liubimova, for example, that a decree would allow the Zhenotdel to go directly 
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324 S. Liubimova, ‘Decret o chadra i obshchestvo ‘doloi kalym I mnogoshenstvo’’, Kommunistka, 8 (1928), 
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to the masses illustrates the frustration of activists who felt imprisoned by the 
Party and wanted more autonomy. I deal with this question in detail in chapter 
six. 
The very divergent approaches of the Zhenotdel and Central Committee to the 
enforcement of Soviet family law provide further evidence to refute the argument 
made by Massell and Northrop that the Zhenotdel was an unequivocal supporter 
of the Hujum. As my research shows, the Zhenotdel’s enthusiasm for legal action 
contrasts very sharply with the attitude of the Central Committee, which was 
distinctly apathetic about this project. Moreover, the Zhenotdel saw utilisation of 
Soviet law as a way to bring about change within the safety of the Soviet 
structures. In contrast, the Central Committee and Sredazburo showed no similar 
concern for safety and instead sought to put indigenous women in direct and 
dangerous confrontation with their families and communities.  
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Chapter 6 
The Zhenotdel and the CPSU in Central Asia 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
As I have previously indicated, the view in the literature on 1920s Central Asia has 
perceived of the Zhenotdel as a loyal supporter of the Party leadership.1 Yet, my 
detailed consideration of the views and experiences of the activists who wrote in 
Kommunistka, in particular from 1920 to 1928, reflects a far more complex 
relationship than hitherto acknowledged. My research shows that Zhenotdel 
activists in Central Asia did not have a more harmonious relationship with their 
male comrades than their counterparts in Russia. I have illustrated that profound 
conflicts were engendered by the presence of the Zhenotdel in the region, as well 
as its attempt to implement a programme that, in practice, diverged very 
significantly in reality from the policies of both the Central Committee and local 
Party organisations. 
 
In previous chapters I have discussed the tensions which flowed from the 
Zhenotdel’s attempt to introduce forms of organisation, such as clubs and women-
only shops, as well as its efforts to make headway with its legal strategy. In 
chapter three, I looked at how the strategy of the Zhenotdel to create women-
only spaces diverged from the practice of the Party. I showed how Kommunistka 
reflected the disappointment and frustration of activists at the lack of support 
from the Central Committee and Sredazburo. In chapter four I detailed initiatives 
designed to build culturally responsive women-only organisation, and the clash 
between this strategy and the Hujum. In chapter five I considered how the 
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Zhenotdel’s legal policy conflicted with the Central Committee’s political 
priorities.  
As discussed in chapter one, existing secondary literature provides clear evidence 
of a deeply conflicted relationship between the Zhenotdel and the Party majority 
in the urban centres of Russia.2 In this chapter I show how this discord found 
reflection in the conditions of Central Asia. A common complaint among activists 
was that, despite the formal commitment of the Party to women’s emancipation, 
the Zhenotdel was burdened with the sole responsibility for carrying out that 
policy. Even Central Committee loyalists such as Anna Nukrat complained of this 
problem, pointing in 1927 to the fact that “local Party members consider [work 
among women] to be the sole preserve of the Zhenotdel and dump all 
responsibility for them onto it.”3 In this chapter I examine the consequences of 
retaining sole responsibility for work among indigenous women, and the attempts 
of some activists to overcome what they saw as an untenable situation. I also 
discuss the debate on autonomy which emerged in the aftermath of the Hujum 
and the suppression of dissent in the opening stages of the Five Year Plan.  
 
6.2 Relationship of the Central Asian Zhenotdel to the Party 
In October 1920, Kollontai appealed to the Central Party leadership to support the 
Zhenotdel’s decision to begin work in the Soviet East.  She argued that this project 
would be mutually beneficial as the “more the Party develops its work with women 
in the East, the easier it will be to achieve the aim of building communism.”4 The 
Zhenotdel believed that the full backing of the Central Committee was required 
to bring about a change in the attitudes of male Party members, both Russian and 
indigenous. Another writer, Kyraev, attributed the conservatism of male comrades 
to their lack of subjective experience; “[E]ven the most solid revolutionary leader, 
                                                          
2 W. Z. Goldman, ‘Industrial Politics, Peasant Revolution and the Death of the Proletarian Women’s 
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3 A. Nukhrat, ‘Delegatskie sobraniia na Vostoke’, Kommunistka, 7 (1927), pp.31-36 
4 A. Kollontai, ‘Posledniaia rabynia (k s’ezdu zhenshchin narodov Vostoka)’ Kommunistka, 7 (1920), pp. 24-
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the most profound theoretical brain does not really comprehend” the reality of 
women’s oppression. His “inner soul does not protest with indignation and does 
not seek to throw off the burden of slavery.”5 Thus Communist men needed to be 
educated in order to teach them to appreciate the problem of women’s 
oppression.  In a resolution to the All Union Meeting of Activists among Women of 
the East in April 1921, Kollontai called for specific efforts to “improve the Party’s 
struggle with existing prejudice.”6 Delegates agreed and resolved that “the 
Zhenotdel will encourage Party members to implant a spirit of communism among 
workers and peasants as well as an appreciation of their reciprocal interest in the 
emancipation of women.”7 
Wendy Goldman has described the constant battle for the Zhenotdel to make 
progress within the Party in Russia, with Zhenotdel activists embattled in a 
constant struggle to survive constant attacks to close down initiatives.8 In 
contrast, Central Asian activists appear to have been left alone for the first six 
years of their work in the region. Their isolation had a contradictory effect. While 
it made the involvement of women in Party structures very difficult, and allowed 
male Party members to ignore the existence of the Zhenotdel, it also appears to 
have provided Zhenotdel activists with far more independence to pursue their 
initiatives than their counterparts in Russia.  
Yet, activists did not see always their isolation as an advantage. The commitment 
of Communist men to women’s emancipation was crucial to its programme for 
socialism. From the outset, Zhenotdel leaders believed that it was imperative for 
working class and peasant men to be won over to support women’s liberation. 
Zhenotdel activists in Central Asia wanted their male comrades to support women-
only clubs, cooperatives, and shops, and also to take action themselves to “win 
indigenous men over to support women’s rights.”9 One of the first Zhenotdel 
activists in Central Asia, Putilovskaya made it clear that “Communist men must 
appreciate the importance of work among women and commit to carrying out this 
                                                          
5 ‘L’, ‘Krest’ianka i mezhdunarodnii zhenskii den’, Kommunistka, 8-9, (1921), pp. 4-6 
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7 A. Kollontai, ‘Posledniaia rabynia (k s”ezdu zhenshchin narodov Vostoka)’, Kommunistka, 7 (1920), pp. 24-
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9 Kislova, ‘Zapiska o rabote Turkmenskogo oblastnogo otdela rabotnits’, Kommunistka, 6 (1923), pp. 34-36 
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work in their Party committees and regions.”10 But this was a very ambitious 
demand, particularly, as she admitted that “Communist men especially from the 
Turkic population have not yet accepted women as comrades in the common 
struggle”. Worse still, they “are very unwilling to submit to Party discipline” in 
even allowing their own female relatives to join the Zhenotdel.11 Zhenotdel 
activists struggled “to convince them that the victory of communism is impossible 
without the involvement of Eastern women in a common revolutionary struggle.”12 
However, in the absence of the Central Committee adopting a policy to educate 
male comrades and make it clear what that they were required to support the 
Zhenotdel, it was almost impossible to achieve any real progress. 
The policy changes at the heart of the CPSU also hindered the ability of Zhenotdel 
members to convince their male comrades. Liubimova protested that “the 
introduction of NEP in Central Asia has made our situation even worse and 
entrenched the chauvinistic views of Communist men even more deeply.” There 
were constant pleas to the Central Committee and Sredazburo to take a firm line 
with local comrades. As with other requests for help, little more than formal 
support was ever forthcoming. Seifi complained in 1923 that “although in 1921 the 
Politbureau demanded that every Party member had to support our work on the 
woman question”, it “is very reluctant to take a firm line to enforce this demand 
among the membership.”13 Liubimova argued that “our struggle to overcome 
hostility from male Party members is seriously undermined by a total lack of 
support for these efforts from the Party leadership.”14 By 1925 reports continued 
to reflect frustration with the lack of progress in changing attitudes, as indicated 
by Niurina’s complaint in 1925, that more than four years after the launch of the 
Zhenotdel in Central Asia, “local Party members still refuse to recognise the 
importance of work among women.”15  
                                                          
10 Putilovskaya, ‘Rabota Kommunistcheskikh Partii sredi zhenshchin narodov Vostoka’, Kommunistka, 12-13 
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13 M. Seifi, ‘Kashgariia’, Kommunistka 8 (1923), pp. 34-37 
14 S. Liubimova, ‘Vostok’, Kommunistka, 11 (1923), pp. 28-30 
15 F. Niurina, ‘V Srednei Azii’, Kommunistka, 4 (1925), pp. 77-84 
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However activists retained a stubborn belief that the Central Committee would 
overcome its apathy once it saw how important the Zhenotdel was to the overall 
Soviet project. Liubimova argued that its organisational flexibility and, in 
particular, its ability to reach secluded women through women-only clubs and 
cooperatives had to be recognised by the Central Committee. The Zhenotdel was 
uniquely placed “to spread the influence of the Party to the most backward 
section of working women of the Eastern population.”16 Liubimova demanded that 
there needed to be acknowledgement of the “successes we have achieved already, 
including the fact that we have organised thousands of backward Eastern 
women.”17 The Zhenotdel deserved not only full political and economic support, 
but also “the allocation to it of the most experienced and best qualified Party 
members.”18 Unfortunately, despite these calls, the Zhenotdel continued to 
experience staff shortages and financial hardship. During a year when the entire 
Party was ostensibly mobilised to free veiled women from seclusion, in July 1927 
Niurina expressed her disappointment at the lack of material support from the 
Central Committee. She protested that “the leadership still neglects the 
Zhenotdel and does not provide us with either funds or personnel.” It has “yet to 
understand that the liberation of indigenous women is the only way to resolve all 
issues in the Soviet East.”19 This comment is extraordinary, in a period when the 
Sredazburo had formally committed the Party membership to mobilising women 
through the Hujum. It indicates that the Party leadership, both in Moscow and 
Tashkent, had little real interest in women’s emancipation beyond its use as a 
slogan to facilitate the achievement of Soviet mastery over indigenous society. 
Zhenotdel activists were careful to express their criticism of the Central 
Committee in terms which did not directly question its political commitment to 
women’s emancipation. Instead, they lamented about its lack of a proper 
understanding of the importance of the Zhenotdel to achieving that goal. In 
contrast, local male Party members were derided for their political backwardness 
and continued adherence to traditional norms. It was argued that “the hostile 
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attitude of the male population to our work, and the persistence of prejudice 
toward women among our own male comrades makes our work really dreadful.”20 
This disapproval of male comrades reflected the Zhenotdel’s frustration at trying 
to make progress in an environment where purported allies were in fact 
opponents. The majority of male Party members, whether Russian or indigenous, 
appear to have not supported women’s emancipation when it came to themselves 
as individuals. Indigenous Party men had been brought up in a society that was 
deeply divided on the lines of gender, where it had been hitherto unheard of for 
women to attend meetings or to participate in activities outside of the home.21 
Despite the depth of resentment shown by these men toward the imposition of 
radical changes to their personal lives, and mirroring Kollontai’s earlier refusal to 
exercise restraint, Liubimova called for the Central Committee to take action to 
ensure that indigenous Party members abide by Soviet standards in their personal 
lives.22 Her demand coincided with a decision made at a Party conference in Baku 
in January 1923, to bring indigenous members into line. The conference resolved 
“that a stricter attitude to polygyny among native members of the Party will be 
adopted, along with an insistence that they conform to the Party rules just as 
European members do.”23 The Baku conference also instructed “Communist men 
to show an example to the masses by sending their wives, sisters and daughters to 
school.”24 In the same year a decree was passed by the Soviet government 
“abolishing kalym and punishing forced marriage” in Central Asia.”25 The Kazakh 
Komsomol also passed a number of rules, including one which stated that 
“members are forbidden from beating their wives or using kalym to buy a wife.”26 
The decisions of the Baku conference, the decrees specifically banning kalym and 
polygyny and their reflection in the Kazakh Komsomol appeared, on the surface, 
to reflect a new commitment to women’s rights. It seemed that the Party 
leadership was beginning to recognise the necessity to take action alongside the 
Zhenotdel. Liubimova used the opportunity to call on her indigenous male 
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comrades “to provide an example to the rest of the population in their behaviour 
towards women.”27  
Much to the disappointment of Zhenotdel activists, the decisions of the Baku 
conference, as with other Party pronouncements did not translate into meaningful 
action. Zavaryan reported in June 1926, that kalym and polygyny remained a 
serious problem among local Party members. She complained that “in Uzbekistan 
alone there have been 283 cases of polygyny and 1,170 cases of kalym among Party 
members.”28 Polygyny was viewed as something characteristic of those men from 
relatively privileged backgrounds, as a poor peasant could not afford two wives. 
The apparent predominance of polygyny among a section of Party members 
suggests that these men were drawn from native intelligentsia.29 Thus, 
paradoxically, the men who the Zhenotdel railed against for their backward 
practices were allies of the CPSU in government in Uzbekistan and elsewhere in 
Central Asia. Until the Hujum in 1927, the Central Committee appears to have 
been unwilling to impose any lifestyle changes that would cause friction with these 
political allies. 
 
6.3  Mobilisations around March 8th 
In an effort to promote work among women and to overcome its isolation, the 
Central Asian Zhenotdel placed a great deal of effort into building all-Party 
campaigns to coincide with annual International Women’s Day celebrations. 
International Women’s Day had its roots in the Socialist Second International. It 
was especially meaningful in the Soviet Union because action taken by women on 
International Women’s Day 1917, which had sparked the first phase of the 
revolution.30 It was declared a national holiday in 1922. In Central Asia, the 
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discussions and events surrounding this symbolically charged day acquired 
particular significance in the Hujum of 1927.  
Liubimova began a campaign to build all-Party organisation in early 1923 with a 
call for Zhenotdel activists to use March 8th to build awareness. In January of that 
year pointed to the problem of “continuing isolation of the Zhenotdel from the 
Party.”31 She called for “the woman question to be put on the agenda of every 
cell and made a normal part of the work of the Party.”32 In June of the same year 
she claimed success had been achieved already that year and that the Zhenotdel 
had organised a festival with “a distinctively proletarian atmosphere, involving 
both men and women in all events.”33 Of particular note was the fact that 
secluded women had participated. Liubimova declared proudly that “thousands of 
women wearing veils took part in the celebrations, including in a public march 
through Tashkent.”34 Photographs in Kommunistka show groups of veiled and 
unveiled women with banners. In 1924 Liubimova announced further success with 
the Sredazburo agreeing to “include the women question on the agendas of cells, 
training courses and Party schools.” The Sredazburo had also agreed to enforce 
behavioural conformity among the membership with “a campaign for the removal 
of the veil among Komsomol and Party members in city areas.”35  
In the years that followed, official Party pronouncements became a standard 
aspect of March 8th campaigns. In February 1925 the Central Committee called on 
all Party organisations in the East to implement measures aimed at “the maximum 
recruitment of indigenous women, the creation of crèches, canteens and other 
supports and the education of women.” Also, “all Party cells [were] to assist and 
facilitate indigenous women in becoming active in social production outside the 
home.”36 Kommunistka writers applauded these initiatives and claimed that 
support from the Party had encouraged indigenous women to participate in larger 
numbers in March 8th events that year. Such events were a positive example of 
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how enthusiastically women would become involved in building the Soviet Union, 
when they saw the Party as their ally.  
1926 witnessed a shift towards more authoritarian calls within the March 8th 
campaign. A tightening up of legislation against ‘crimes of everyday life’ was 
announced by the Party leadership that year, with kalym, polygyny and child 
marriage particularly targeted.37 This move by the Soviet government was 
welcomed by Zavaryan as a major step forward in “the real liberation of 
women.”38 While her endorsement of state-led transformation is in keeping with 
previous policy, her enthusiasm for the criminalisation of customary family 
practices is a sign of a new intolerance. While this did not indicate support for the 
kind of mass confrontation with indigenous society that would be evidenced in the 
Hujum the following year, it did show that Zhenotdel’s support for state 
intervention could lead it to support oppression of indigenous society. 
March 8th campaigns were typically short-term and largely ceremonial. This 
problem had been criticised by Kommunistka from the outset, with Tineva 
complaining in 1924 that “the commitments given by the Party leadership are 
meaningless because of the persistence of traditional views and self-centredness 
among our male comrades”.39 Glebeva protested that “our work is impeded 
because Party cells still consider that work among women is the responsibility of 
the Zhenotdel and pay absolutely no attention to it.”40 This problem also found 
reflection in the context of the Hujum, with the majority of criticisms being that 
local Party members viewed it at best as a short-term stunt. The Zhenotdel was 
not in a position to cope with the social dislocation and backlash which had 
followed, even if it had wanted to. Indeed its members were also under attack, 
with the murder and intimidation of activists and the closure of many of its 
projects.41 Artiukhina’s anger was evident in January 1928 when she complained 
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about “those members who have refused to implement the directives of the 
Party.”42 They had “done nothing to assist unveiled women or involve them in 
Soviet activity after March 8th.”43 Indeed, as described in chapter four, many 
existing Zhenotdel initiatives had been closed down in that period, without its 
knowledge or consent.44  
The Five Year Plan prompted a reversal in the manner that March 8th campaigns 
were presented in Kommunistka. Up until 1928, articles had attempted to win 
Central Committee and local Party organisations to support the Zhenotdel. Now, 
Zhenotdel activists were told they had to recruit to the Party’s perspectives, and 
in particular fulfil its economic targets. Liubimova loyally demanded that 
Zhenotdel activists put all their energies into winning indigenous women to the 
Five Year Plan. They were told to “go out to win the mass of working women to 
Party slogans, and bring them out of seclusion and onto the streets and into 
clubs.”45 It was vital to ensure “a successful start to the Five Year Plan through 
increasing production, creating productive co-operatives in the villages and 
recruiting the best women activists to the Party.”46 1929 saw a continuance of this 
theme: 
…the March 8th campaign must be used to promote women’s participation in 
elections to the Soviets”, the “implementation of land reforms, seizure of 
land from the wealthy and the clergy, all as part of sharpening the class 
struggle.47  
The March 8th campaign of 1930 was addressed in an article in the last issue of 
Kommunistka, in which Sokolova demanded that the: 
March 8th campaign must spark an offensive to involve young women, 
agricultural workers, poor women and collective workers in the Party, trade 
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unions, Soviets and cooperatives. They must also be propelled into 
production, into factories, industrial plant, Soviet farms and collective 
farms.48  
Women activists, soon to become members of the Zhensektory under the discipline 
of the local Party, were told that “March 8th will be really huge if the mass of 
workers are persuaded to take a direct part in the work of liberating women and 
drawing them into the building of socialism.”49 
The demand for unveiling had not receded but was now being channelled toward 
the mass recruitment of women to the new factories and collective farms.  The 
elimination of “the outmoded and harmful veil” was urgently needed to free 
women up for entry into mass production.50 The aspirations of both Russian and 
Central Asian women activists were manipulated to fulfil the needs of the Five 
Year Plan. Their recruitment was simply one of the many quotas to be reached. 
The Zhenotdel struggled hard to maintain March 8th as a festival which was based 
on the elevation of the woman question within the ranks of the Party, as a way to 
take a step forward. Ultimately however it was unable to hold onto this message, 
and the dictates of the Five Year Plan swamped all calls for women’s 
emancipation. 
 
6.4 Recruitment, delegate meetings and the soviets 
By 1923, the number of women Party members in Central Asia remained very 
small. Attendance of women at Zhenotdel events and the developing club network 
did not translate into Party membership. The Zhenotdel had been able to achieve 
some success in recruiting indigenous women in women-only organisations but had 
not many had joined the Party. This situation precipitated a debate over the role 
of the Zhenotdel, and in particular whether it was to be a transmission belt into 
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the Party or an organisation to develop the autonomous self-activity of indigenous 
women. 
Proponents of the former view began to put forward their criticisms of Liubimova’s 
strategy in Kommunistka from 1924. Seifi, who appears to have worked mainly 
among nomadic and semi-nomadic women in Kirghizia, called for an 
acknowledgement of “the importance to our revolutionary movement of the mass 
recruitment of indigenous women to the Party.”51 As highlighted in chapter four, 
Seifi was among a number of activists who held the view that there was too much 
focus on women-only clubs, which were unable recruit to the Party because of 
their distant relationship to it.52 Seifi endorsed the recruitment drive by then then 
Director of the Zhenotdel, Sofia Smidovich. At a meeting of Zhenotdel Managers 
and Organisers in the East that year, Smidovich had demanded progress in 
recruiting “a strong cadre of women who are capable of building the Party among 
indigenous women.”53 Unlike Kollontai, Smidovich wanted a direct relationship 
between work among women and the Party. 
Seifi believed that delegate meetings were the best form of organisation to 
ensure recruitment to the Party. They would “establish a strong bond between 
the Party and the mass of women” and “spread our communist influence among 
the broad layers of Eastern women.”54 There is an echo of Lenin’s attitude to 
the Zhenotdel in Seifi’s arguments, where he has discussed the need for the 
Party to exert influence over the women through the Zhenotdel. It is certainly 
quite different to that of Liubimova, who regarded autonomy from the Party as 
vital for the development of the women’s movement in Central Asia. As 
discussed in chapter four, National Delimitation had brought indigenous women 
into the Party and Zhenotdel. Writing again in 1925, Seifi emphasised that the 
“training of activists and recruitment to the soviets and the Party is central to 
the Zhenotdel’s work.”55 She demanded funding from the Party leadership to 
expand activist courses, recently initiated in Tashkent.56 The focus on training of 
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indigenous women was reported as producing some success, evidenced in “a 
doubling of women organisers in the Central Asian Zhenotdel in 1925, with 67 
Russian women and 36 indigenous women recruited to those positions.”57 Female 
Party membership had also risen to 675, with 117 of them being indigenous 
women.”58  
But to be an active Party member was an enormous challenge for indigenous 
women. Liubimova described how potential recruits had to be “prepared to break 
with their families, leave their villages and immerse themselves in the work of the 
Party and soviets.”59 Niurina reported that male Party members were opposed to 
the recruitment of women, both to the Party and to delegate meetings. She 
stressed that “we in the Zhenotdel cannot, despite our best efforts, overcome the 
obstruction of the delegate meetings by the local Party membership.”60 There 
were additional pressures also as “veiled women find it very difficult both to take 
part in meetings with covered faces and to be able to discuss political and social 
questions with men.”61 This was a very alien environment for those who had been 
used to highly differentiated roles for men and women. And, while for such women 
to unveil may have appeared to resolve some problems, it caused other 
difficulties. Indigenous women who unveiled were often seen as prostitutes in 
Uzbek society. Niurina pointed to the difficult tensions within the Party on 
recruiting women and argued that a decisive and clear positon needed to be taken 
by the local Party leadership. It needed to decide whether “it wants only to recruit 
those ‘so-called good women’ or the most vulnerable and dispossessed.”62  
Seifi and other Zhenotdel activists also reported problems with female Party 
members who had forced into prostitution. Douglas Northrop has argued that the 
coolness shown by activists towards recruiting prostitutes evidenced their 
disdainful attitude towards such women. He quotes the Head of the Zhenotdel in 
the Fergana region of Uzbekistan, Olimpaida Ermakova, who in September 1927 
reportedly warned her comrades that “as soon as you fuss over two or three 
                                                          
57 K. Tineva, ‘Itogi raboty del sobranii na Vostoke’, Kommunistka, 9 (1925), pp.21-26 
58 M. Seifi, O rabote na Vostoke i hashem kadre‘, Kommunistka, 4 (1925), pp. 73-77 
59 S. Liubimova, ‘Kursy volostnykh organizatorov‘, Kommunistka, 10 (1924), pg. 49 
60 F. Niurina, ‘V Srednei Azii’, Kommunistka, 4 (1925), pp. 77-84 
61 N. Zavaryan, ‘Nekotorye momenty iz raboty sredi zhenshchin Srednei Azii‘, Kommunistka, 6 (1926), pp.66-
70 
62 F. Niurina, ‘V Srednei Azii’, Kommunistka, 4 (1925), pp. 77-84 
179 
 
prostitutes, hundreds of the people we need will run away from us.”63 Northrop 
concluded that “rather than trying to change the way that Uzbek men and women 
saw prostitutes – as economically disadvantaged women in need of compassion 
and aid, not the targets of scorn – party and Zhenotdel leaders directed grassroots 
workers to take popular attitudes into account.”64 In other words that the 
Zhenotdel was unwilling to challenge prevailing conservative views. Yet this 
interpretation is contradicted by Niurina’s arguments, which point to the 
difficulties both of those ‘good women’ and those who been “dispossessed.”65 For 
Niurina, the problem was the attitude of indigenous male Party members, not 
women. What both accounts show however is that the strict moral codes of 
indigenous society made it enormously difficult to recruit women to the Party.  
Opposition from indigenous male comrades was not restricted to recruiting women 
to Party membership. Antonina Nukhrat was forced to admit that “the 
backwardness of male Communists on the woman question hinders recruitment to 
delegate meetings.”66 Despite her efforts to use delegate meetings to create 
direct links with the local Party, and involve her male comrades in work among 
women, Nukhrat complained that they dumped it onto the shoulders of the 
Zhenotdel.67 Perversely, however, Nukhrat also blamed Zhenotdel activists for not 
trying hard enough and, in particular, for “putting all their efforts into clubs and 
corners, rather than trying to build delegate meetings.”68  
For Nukhrat, the existence of clubs and women-only organisation created a barrier 
between men and women within the Party. She did not have any sympathy with 
the needs of indigenous women to a culturally sensitive environment. She was 
determined to press on to “set delegate meetings up wherever the Party or 
Komsomol [had] a presence so as to assist recruitment.”69 Notwithstanding the 
refusal of her male comrades to engage with the process, she was committed to 
                                                          
63 D. Northrop, The Emancipation of the Unveiled, pg. 134 
64 D. Northrop, The Emancipation of the Unveiled, pg. 134 
65 D. Northrop, The Emancipation of the Unveiled, pg. 134 
66 A. Nukhrat, ‘Delegatskie sobraniia na Vostoke’, Kommunistka, 7 (1927), pp.31-36 
67 A. Nukhrat, ‘Delegatskie sobraniia na Vostoke’, Kommunistka, 7 (1927), pp.31-36 
68 A. Nukhrat, ‘Delegatskie sobraniia na Vostoke’, Kommunistka, 7 (1927), pp.31-36 
69 A. Nukhrat, ‘Delegatskie sobraniia na Vostoke’, Kommunistka, 7 (1927), pp.31-36 
180 
 
the task of building the Party. Autonomous organisation was to be actively 
discouraged.  
In addition to being a transmission belt to the Party, delegate meetings were to 
be used to build participation in elections. In March 1925 the Presidium of the 
Executive Committee of Soviets instructed “the governments of Soviet Republics 
to address the fact that indigenous women have still not been freed from their 
historic oppression.”70 In particular they had to “ensure that a woman can vote 
and be elected to the Soviets” and “assist her to become an active member of her 
local soviet.”71 As with other Party pronouncements concerning women during the 
period of National Delimitation, it seems nothing or nothing was done to enforce 
this instruction. Then, suddenly in July 1927 Prishchepchik claimed that “90,000 
women have taken part in the elections to the soviets this year.”72 Interestingly 
the number of women who reportedly participated in the election is exactly the 
same as that claimed to have unveiled.73 Nikolaeva, was anxious to make the link 
and declared that the surge in participation “rested on the fact that the election 
was organised within the Hujum campaign.”74 In December 1927 Nukrat wrote 
enthusiastically: 
In spite of both open and clandestine opposition from Communist men to the 
involvement of women in elections”, the “number recruited to the soviets 
has risen from 7.7% in 1926 to 15.7% in 1927.75  
Thus, even for loyal Central Committee supporters like Nikolaeva and Nukrat, the 
Hujum was about far more than the destruction of indigenous society. For Nukrat 
it was an opportunity to recruit women into Party, which she believed to be the 
only manner to bring about positive change. She was absolutely opposed to 
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anything which detracted from this strategy right up to the closure of the 
Zhenotdel in March 1930.76 
In contrast, Liubimova remained loyal to the semi-autonomous strategy of club 
and other women-only organisation until 1929. In January 1927 she defended her 
record of leadership in the work and contended that “the decision of the 
Zhenotdel to utilise the method of clubs to organise women has been absolutely 
vindicated.”77 In October that year she persisted in insisting that clubs continued 
to “be at the centre of work in Uzbekistan.”78 Liubimova’s stubborn assertion that 
the original strategy of work was still alive in Central Asia contrasted with 
Artiukhina’s rather more sober report of neglected clubs and other women only 
organisation in the same period. The tension between Nukrat and Liubimova 
regarding the relationship of the Zhenotdel to the Party spilled over into a debate 
on autonomy in 1928 which I deal with in section six of this chapter.  
 
6.5 Relationship to co-operatives 
The Zhenotdel’s isolation from the Party has already been discussed above in 
terms of the refusal of male Party members to support its work and the difficulties 
of recruiting indigenous women to the Party. Another manner in which this 
isolation expressed itself was the isolation of women-only cooperatives and shops 
from Soviet economic organisations. Here, the apathy of the Party to the 
Zhenotdel translated into refusal to assist economic development among 
indigenous women. In 1925 the Zhenotdel called for the Party “to assist the 
establishment of links between the Zhenotdel and Soviet economic organisations 
to support organised economic activity among these women.”79 This included “the 
setting aside of a quota of places for women in the economy”, “the guarantee of 
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funds to women-only cooperatives” and “an insistence that the cooperative 
leadership support initiatives to recruit women.”80  
As I illustrated in chapter four, neither the Central Committee nor the Sredazburo 
appear to have responded positively to these calls for support. In 1923, Liubimova 
complained that the Party leadership believes that “funding for women-only co-
operatives is a waste as they are not currently financially profitable.”81 There was 
no recognition of the need to train a skilled female workforce, “in spite of the 
clear need for a strong economic base in the years to come.”82 Still in 1925, Seifi 
was expressing frustration that “absolutely nothing has been done to organise 
women handicraft workers.”83 Kasparova protested that the “Zhenotdel just 
cannot do all of this work on its own.”84 Yet again the Zhenotdel found itself 
ignored by the Central Committee. It was clear that economic organisation of 
women on the terms put forward by the Zhenotdel was deemed a low priority. 
Such indifference from the highest echelons of the Party seriously undermined 
efforts to establish links with cooperatives on the ground in Central Asia.  
By 1927 little had changed. In February, Liubimova criticised the Central 
Committee for “not having learned the centrality to the economy of attracting 
women into co-operatives.”85 In September of the same year Butusova complained 
of the attitudes of male comrades “who do not understand the importance of 
women’s shops and place far too much emphasis on boosting commercial 
success.”86 However, even when these methods were disbanded, and the Five Year 
Plan imposed, women workers continued to be viewed negatively by male Party 
members. In 1928, Antonina Nukhrat was forced to admit that “Party members 
just do not see the importance of recruiting women to the workforce.”87 They 
treated women workers in a highly derogatory way, “giving them dirty and 
difficult work, making them carry heavy loads, wash floors or ignoring them 
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completely.”88 In November 1928, after the formal commencement of the Five 
Year Plan, Safodoi protested that “the majority of Party members hold very 
conservative views on the involvement of women. They constantly debase their 
participation in the building of socialism in the Soviet East.”89  
As with other areas, the character of the discussion around the position of the 
Zhenotdel within economic initiatives shifted very significantly after 1928. From 
January 1929, Zhenotdel activists no longer pleaded for Party members to support 
women-only organisations. Instead they battled to achieve the ambitious 
recruitment targets of the Five Year Plan.  
 
6.6 The debate on autonomy 
One of the most interesting debates to emerge within Kommunistka concerned a 
proposal which emerged in 1928 from the Kazakh Zhenotdel, to set up an 
organisation separate from the Party, to campaign against polygyny, kalym and 
other practices seen by activists as oppressive. There had already been some 
discussion on this issue in 1925, connected with complaints from activists that 
remaining within the Party was a serious obstacle to making progress. In 
September 1925, Kasparova reported that “some Zhenotdel members have 
become so exasperated with the inability to make progress that they have 
proposed we set up a special women’s campaign outside of the Party.”90 For 
Kasparova the problem was that “while it is undoubtedly true that such a 
campaign would benefit the women’s movement, it would be independent of the 
Party and Communist ideas.” This would lead it to “become infected by alien anti-
Soviet elements” and thus “undermine our attempts to win the Party and soviets 
to take responsibility for work on the woman question.”91 Kasparova argued that 
any separate organisation would be bound to be “feminist in ideology, with all of 
the problems which accompany such views, the most serious being the idea that 
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the work of women’s liberation is the responsibility of women alone.”92 She 
dismissed those who proposed a new organisation as “simply Russian women who 
lack a proper understanding of conditions in the East.”93 Yet this was 1925, a year 
when the Zhenotdel was finally able to announce that some progress was being 
made in recruiting indigenous women. Seifi reported proudly that the training 
programme of the Zhenotdel had produced “24 Uzbek women, 22 Kirghiz women 
and 9 Turkmen women organisers.”94 This suggests that those who wanted to 
organise independently of the Party saw it as a necessary step to overcome the 
objections to recruitment from male Party members, discussed above. Indeed 
Kasparova admitted that a separate organisation would be of benefit to work 
among women. Yet she could not countenance severing the organisational 
connection with the Party. Her remarks expose the dilemma faced by Zhenotdel 
activists who, time and again, found the CPSU itself to be a fundamental 
impediment to building an indigenous women’s movement. 
Similar proposals resurfaced in the debate in the run-up to the December 1928 All 
Union Meeting of Activists among Women of the East. This time, however, the 
proposal for autonomy had real substance, because the Kazakh Zhenotdel had 
already formed such an organisation, entitled Society for the Eradication of Kalym 
and Polygamy.95 The Society appears to have been set up in 1927, soon after the 
Zhenotdel began work in that region of Central Asia. One of the leaders of the 
Kazakh Zhenotdel, Arikova, explained that the Society was formed precisely of 
the impossibility of making headway as a bureau of the Party, despite 
opportunities to do so. She reported that male comrades had refused to support 
work among women, despite “an increase in the participation of Kazakh women 
in the soviets from 6% to 10.3%” in 1927.96 What is more, “Communist men in 
Kazakh villages continue to practice polygyny and kalym, and consider that Soviet 
legislation to protect women has no meaning for how they conduct their lives.”97 
Also, the Soviet People’s Courts and militia tolerated breaches of the law, “and 
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no action taken against wrongdoers.”98 Arikova explained that the Kazakh 
Zhenotdel concluded that it had no option other than to approach the indigenous 
population directly and “win it to support for Soviet law and the implementation 
of measures to emancipate women.”99 Activists determined that “it was necessary 
to build a mass campaign which reached out to the population.”100 By 
circumventing the Party membership, the Kazakh Society could “work more 
effectively with the soviets” and also “supervise the work of the Courts.”101 It 
allowed progressive men “to be models to the backward population showing how 
to behave in humanitarian manner towards women.”102 Attempts to persuade 
Communist Party men to behave in a civilised manner had continually failed. 
Supporters of the proposal did not want to waste their energies within a male 
dominated Party. Some argued Ishkova spoke of their shame at “seeing the wives 
of Communists still covered by the veil.”103 The existence of the Kazakh Society 
provided activists throughout Central Asia with an alternative and effective model 
of organisation. 
An important contribution to the debate came from a ‘ZP’ who almost certainly 
was Zinaida Prishchepchik, Head of the Uzbek Zhenotdel. Prishchepchik wrote 
approvingly about the “spontaneous rise of new forms of work” in Uzbekistan 
during the Hujum, which included  
…family circles where unveiled women were brought together with their 
husbands to agitate for an end to seclusion within their community and to 
protect unveiled women against the mullahs and the rich who had organised 
together against the abolition of seclusion.104  
She claimed that “the number of circles rose rapidly after March 1927, with 
several hundred by May” and it was proposed that a separate organisation be 
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formed.105 The proposed organisation was to be called ‘Society for a New Way of 
Life’ and it was aimed to “both men and women together in a struggle against 
seclusion.”106 With the collapse of the unveiling campaign in June 1927 Hujum, 
the circles had collapsed but apparently the idea of non-party organisation 
remained popular.107 Prishchepchik supported the proposal because it “would be 
a big support for unveiled women and would help the battle against kalym, 
polygyny and underage marriage.”108 Gregory Massell has written of family circles 
having been set up by the Sredazburo as a device to unveil the wives of Party 
members.109 It is interesting to see that this organisational form, created in order 
to destroy cultural autonomy in Uzbekistan, actually increased calls for 
independence from the Party. 
In her contribution to the debate, Liubimova launched a strong defence of the 
Kazakh Zhenotdel. She argued that “the Kazakh Society is not in any way feminist, 
shown by the fact that a number of its members are men.”110 Furthermore, it was 
“not a cross-class coalition as all those who do not have voting rights under the 
Soviet constitution - kulaks, the wealthy, merchants - are prohibited from 
membership.”111 It is of note that in 1928 the CPSU was in rapid retreat from the 
policy of Korenizatsiia, discussed previously in chapter five, which had hitherto 
involved the co-option of indigenous Muslims into the Party leadership and local 
government. With this reversal in policy, there had been a purge of “the 
nationalist intellectuals who had accepted the Bolshevik offer to work on behalf 
of korenizatsiia.”112 Numerous “Muslim Communists were thoroughly vilified as 
‘deviationists’, ‘traitors’, ‘agent provocateurs’, ‘deserters’, ‘bourgeois 
nationalists’, ‘enemies of the people’ and members of the ‘Bukharinist-Trotsky 
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clique’.”113 The claim, countered by Liubimova, that the Kazakh Zhenotdel was a 
cross-class clique, was a very damaging one in the prevailing political conditions.  
Taking a brave stance against these political pressures, Liubimova stated that 
“there cannot be anything wrong about a group of Kazakh workers playing a 
pioneering role in the area of everyday life.”114 Nor could there be anything wrong 
with the fact that the Kazakh Society “prohibited its male members from beating 
their wives and practising kalym.”115 Indeed the “influence of its members could 
be of great benefit to the work of the Party and the Soviets in the liberation of 
women.”116  
Liubimova’s support for the Kazakh Society engendered an angry response from 
Party loyalists. Nukrat condemned the proposal to establish an autonomous 
organisation as “a pointless project detached from the soviets and Party, with 
little in the way of funds or support, unable to realistically offer assistance to 
indigenous women.”117 In Nukrat’s view, fundamentally, such an organisation 
“would be a popular non-working class organisation within which the Party would 
find it difficult to provide leadership”.118 In the context of an environment where 
the accusation of not being working class was equivalent to being an enemy of the 
Soviet Union, Nukrat’s words were ominous. 
One contributor, Zhukova, was particularly upset that the existing work of the 
Zhenotdel would be damaged by the creation of an independent organisation. She 
argued that such an organisation would “disorientate projects which are only now 
beginning, and profoundly damage the fight for the liberation of women.”119 It 
would “divide and undermine the activity of our members and destroy the Party 
leadership of the struggle.”120 Yet, it should be noted that existing work was 
already in ruins after the Hujum. The unveiling campaign had clearly been a major 
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cause of demoralisation among Zhenotdel activists. The strong response from 
Zhukova and Nukrat indicated that that the proposal that the Zhenotdel should 
break away from the Party had touched a raw nerve. It highlighted the harsh 
reality for Zhenotdel members who perceived the Party as deeply hostile to their 
goals. In 1927, Nikolaeva had condemned leading Party members in Uzbekistan, 
like “a former member of the Uzbek Central Committee of the Party, who arrested 
a worker for unveiling his wife” and “the secretary of the Komsomol who refused 
to unveil his wife”.121 It was clear that there was now enormous tension within 
the Party, as authoritarian demands emanated from the Central Committee and 
produced fear and resentment among both male and female Party members. 
It is, therefore, unsurprising that Liubimova chose not go as far as to recommend 
that the Kazakh Society be adopted as a method of work by the Zhenotdel across 
the region. To do so would undoubtedly have resulted in her being denounced as 
a bourgeois feminist. Against this hostile backdrop, she cautiously recommended 
that activists who were unhappy with conditions within the Party, concentrate on 
the ‘way of life’ sections recently established within the soviets. These, she 
argued, had exactly the same aims as the Kazakh Society. She reasoned that to 
create a separate organisation which replicated the ‘way of life’ sections, 
especially when it would lack status and financial resources be “a waste of 
time.”122 Thus, continued involvement in the soviets was a compromise solution 
for those deeply frustrated with the Party. The soviets were proffered as a non-
Party compromise which did not deviate from the Party line.  
As editor of Kommunistka, Krupskaya made a significant effort to bring disgruntled 
activists into the debate on the Kazakh proposal. Writing in June 1928, she stated 
that “[a]s editor I make the call for local activists to fully participate in discussions 
on this proposal.”123 She expressed the concern that “not all Zhenotdel workers 
are taking part in this debate and many articles do not relate to the main 
discussion”.124 This is likely to be a reference to Nukrat, who had made a 
substantial number of contributions to the discussion list, almost all of which 
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focused on recruitment rather than the issues under debate.125 Unfortunately 
Krupskaya did not succeed in stimulating many contributions from rank and file 
members to Kommunistka. Clearly, within the prevailing political climate, they 
would have been nervous about publically supporting a call for autonomy or 
criticism of the Hujum. The fact that Prishchepchik and Liubimova were prepared 
to speak must be acknowledged as remarkable. 
At the All Union Meeting of Activists among Women of the East in December 1928, 
Krupskaya sympathised with the proposers of autonomous organisation but 
declared that “we should not set up a separate society.”126 Her rationale for taking 
this stance was that she considered that it would undermine the class struggle. It 
was crucial “to link the struggle for women’s liberation with the class war and win 
over men and women on that basis.”127 Doing so meant staying within the Party. 
Although Krupskaya did not denigrate the proposal as feminist or perfidious, the 
fact that she expressly opposed it was sufficient. The report of her speech in 
Kommunistka notes that her declaration of loyalty on this question was met with 
resounding applause. The proposal for an autonomous society was defeated. 
Krupskaya was prepared to criticise the Central Committee, but not to advocate 
deserting the Party.  
It is remarkable that a discussion on autonomy took place in the conditions of 
1928, not to mind a separate organisation actually being set up by the Kazakh 
Zhenotdel. 
In that context it is notable that in the first edition of Kommunistka in 1929, 
Nukrat took the opportunity to present the reject of an autonomous society as a 
trouncing for the Kazakh Zhenotdel. She derided activists who “had insisted on 
setting up this Society before the All Union Meeting.”128 She was glad that this 
decision had been disapproved of by “the majority of those who attended the 
meeting, who had viewed this decision negatively, and considered it wrong to 
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have done so.”129 The meeting instead had decided that all work among women 
should remain directly under the authority of the Central Committee and “focus 
on building the ‘way of life sections’ within the soviets.”130  
An article on Kazakhstan in June 1929 makes no mention of any Society, which 
suggests it was closed down after the December meeting. It also shows Zhenotdel 
activists still struggling to obtain support from the Party, with the writer, Vekova, 
complaining about lack of funds and staff.131 Her familiar pleas reflect the 
continued difficulty for the continued difficult position of the Zhenotdel in the 
Party.  
Thus, despite the significance of these debates around a separate organisation, 
ultimately, for Zhenotdel members there was no alternative but to carry on within 
the Party structures. The Kazakh initiative had been crushed along with the 
proposals from Uzbekistan. Members were now required to return loyally to the 
fold.132 Yet the difficult relationship between the Zhenotdel and the Party 
persisted. Even Nukrat, as the most prominent voice against autonomy, objected 
in April 1929 to the fact that “Party members continue to undermine the work of 
the Zhenotdel.”133 During the 1928 debate, those who wanted an independent 
organisation were warned that it would be even worse outside the Party, as there 
would be no resources available.134 Zhukova advised activists to remain patient 
and to understand that bringing about change “requires a lot of stubborn effort 
and time.”135 Zhukova’s stance belittled the experiences of activists who had 
found it impossible to make progress in an environment where male Party 
members were often more conservative than their indigenous counterparts. 
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6.7 The role of the Zhenotdel as enforcer of the Party Purge and the Five 
Year Plan 
Kommunistka of 1929 presents as a very different journal to that of previous years. 
In 1929 it reflected a pronounced loyalism toward the Central Committee and 
other leading Party bodies. Individual activists were not individually denounced 
for their oppositional views, but it was clear that the Central Committee would 
not tolerate any further criticism and the Party line had to be faithfully followed. 
Yemelyan Yaroslavsky, Central Committee member, close supporter of Stalin, and 
Head of the Anti-religious Commission had given a speech to the December 
meeting.136 Given his position as a key figure in the war on religion, his 
intervention was clearly planned. Excerpts of his speech were printed in the 
January edition of Kommunistka. In this speech, Yaroslavsky stated that a tougher 
line would be taken to eradicate the influence of Islam among Party members. 
This included a crackdown on all those who opposed unveiling and “prosecutions 
taken against those who committed what now must be regarded as counter-
revolutionary crimes.”137  
Quoting from Nikolai Zelenskii, another Central Committee member and ally of 
Stalin, Yaroslavsky repeated Zelenskii’s demand that “[a]ll Communists 
demonstrate a correct attitude on the woman question.”138 Yaroslavsky 
announced that “an inspection of our Party will be carried out very soon in order 
to cleanse it of all alien elements.”139 He was adamant that Party members could 
not “ingratiate themselves with the clergy or assist their oppressive practices.”140 
We “need to consider the suitability of a Communist who keeps his wife locked 
up, who imprisons her under a paranji, who forbids her from attending meetings, 
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who sends his children to be educated in the madrassa, who supports the 
mullahs.”141 He asked “Can we really consider this person to be a Bolshevik?”142 
Thus, Yaroslavsky sought to co-opt Zhenotdel members into a campaign which 
purported to answer longstanding demands, crystallised in that put forward by 
Liubimova in February 1928 for “the leadership to take action to change the 
attitudes and behaviour of male Party members when it comes to the question of 
women.”143  
In reality it seems that the Central Committee was initiating purges at an early 
stage to pre-empt a backlash to the Five Year Plan. The Hujum of 1927 had 
revealed the hopelessness of issuing orders to those who refuse to obey them. The 
antagonism of Party members had been pointed to by Zhenotdel activists from the 
commencement of its work in Central Asia. However, before 1927 leading Party 
committees had not demanded compliance with their formal edicts on behaviour. 
Then attitudes shifted remarkably swiftly from tolerance to profound hostility 
toward those who did not act in accordance with the Party rules. Sredazburo 
representative Nikolaeva asserted in August 1927 that the Hujum “was a test of 
who was a genuine supporter of the Soviet regime.”144 She referred to a report 
from the first formal inspection into the behaviour of Party members in July 1927 
and railed at “the hypocrisy of those who call for unveiling in public but in reality 
continue to veil their wives and female relatives.”145 She also commended “the 
recent arrest of the secretary of a Komsomol cell for refusing to allow his wife to 
unveil” as the kind of action which needed to be taken.146  
While Nikolaeva’s attitude resonated with that of the Sredazburo, she was alone 
among Kommunistka writers at that time in demanding such tough action. Writing 
in January 1928, Artiukhina, did not advocate the targeting of individual lifestyle 
among the Party membership. Her concern about the findings of the inspection of 
July 1927 was that it showed that the Party had done nothing to protect women 
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who had unveiled.147 She believed that this failure revealed lack of understanding 
which needed to be addressed through education. However, she too had fallen 
into line behind a crackdown on individual lifestyle. She wrote then that “learning 
from the experience of 1927 means we need to cleanse our ranks of those who do 
not fulfil the requirement set by the Party to liberate women.”148 She agreed with 
Yaroslavsky that those who did not obey the demand to unveil their female 
relatives, and forsake kalym and other illegal cultural practices, were to be 
considered enemies. Artiukhina reflected the sense that the Party had to get ready 
for another rebellion against it and wrote that: 
Our attack on the paranji and chadra was without doubt a provocation to the 
counter-revolutionary kulaks, wealthy landowners and clergy. Now we need 
to prepare to resolutely crush any attempt by the enemy to wreck our work 
again.149  
This theme was continued by another high-ranking Central Committee supporter, 
Amosov, later that year when he warned of the need to obstruct “the backlash 
and terror triggered by the Hujum in Uzbekistan.”150 Zhenotdel activists were told 
by Artiukhina that they had to comply with the orders of the Party leadership and 
assist with the liquidation of disloyal elements within the Party. Zhenotdel 
activists were told that they must put themselves at the disposal of “an inspection 
into Party and Komsomol members to establish which of them will comply with 
the requirement to liberate women in reality.”151 Nukrat confirmed that activists 
had to assist in “enforcing the decision of the Central Committee to rid the Party 
of members who do not implement the decisions of the Party on the woman 
question.”152 
Another aspect of this new rigidity was a call for more action against the clergy 
and religious practices. This again was in direct conflict with Krupskaya’s call for 
patience and tolerance. In March 1929 a comrade Dimanstein complained “there 
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is a threat to the Party from the Mullahs, who direct their propaganda to the youth 
of the Party and Komsomol, particularly women.”153 This menace was emphasised 
in articles over the following months, with demands increasing for a clampdown 
on the clergy under the slogan “against religion for culture” with all supporters of 
the Soviet government called upon “to take a stand in the fight against the Muslim 
religion because of its serious repression of women.”154 Party members were 
exhorted to abolish religious practices in their families. And alongside the 
continued Hujum against unveiling, there were demands for the general 
rationalisation of clothing among women activists along with the development of 
“healthier clothes for women who are being drawn into the developing 
economy.”155 The dress codes of peasant society had to be cast aside in the 
conditions of the industrialisation of agriculture. 
Speaking at the meeting in December 1928, Zhukova expressed hope that the new 
tough tactics announced by Yaroslavsky would prompt “a male revolution and the 
emergence of a Communist who actively desires a ban of the veil.”156 She was 
soon to be disappointed as reports show that local male Party members continued 
to exhibit a belligerent refusal to comply with the orders of the Central 
Committee. In an article on Turkmenistan in May 1929, Mukhitdinova reported 
that women continued to be “deprived of any rights within the family.”157 Another 
article by Perimova in the same issue complained about the continual refusal of 
Party members to abide by the laws on polygyny and argued that “there are some 
members who still insist that their wife wears a yasmak.”158 It seems from 
Kommunistka that, like the Hujum, the Zhenotdel were expected to lead a 
campaign for the compliance with Yaroslavsky’s orders but with no real support. 
And now the Zhenotdel had lost all autonomy. 
Having prevented the creation of an autonomous organisation and harnessed the 
energies of the membership for the first Five Year Plan, an announcement was 
made in February 1930 of a major reorganisation of Party work among women. 
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The article which was reprinted from the Party newspaper, Pravda, was by Lazar 
Kaganovich, one of Stalin’s chief political associates, who informed Zhenotdel 
activists that the organisation was to be closed down.159 The reasoning he gave 
was the necessity “to overcome conservatism on the woman question” and “make 
it a task for the organisation as a whole.” 160 Meanwhile “[s]pecial methods of 
work [would] continue to be used among women, especially in the East”, known 
as the Zhensektory, but would be “under the direct supervision of the Party 
apparatus.”161Indigenous women had to be transformed into a mass proletariat to 
fulfil the ambitious aims of the Plan. Nukrat had earlier declared war on the veil, 
the yasmak and any other form of indigenous dress that tied peasant women to 
their old lives.”162 The liberation of women became synonymous with the 
imperatives of the Soviet state. 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter traced the Zhenotdel’s relationship with the Party as reflected in the 
pages of Kommunistka during a decade of involvement in Central Asia. Clearly this 
period proved to be a very difficult experience for the Zhenotdel, with activists 
fighting a frustrating battle for recognition of their project. The core problem 
from the outset, as mirrored in other aspects of the Zhenotdel experience, was 
that the local Party membership largely antagonistic to work on the woman 
question, and the Central Party leadership was indifferent, at least until it 
coincided with its own political goals. Central Asian women then only became of 
interest to provide a veneer of emancipation to a profoundly authoritarian 
campaign. 
The Central Committee had never wanted an independent women’s movement. 
This was reflected both within the manner in which the Zhenotdel was formed and 
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in the abandonment of non-Party meetings in 1921. It declined to enforce 
compliance with Party rules in relation to women during the period of what Terry 
Martin refers to as “functional Korenizatsiia.”163 Clearly to do so would have 
conflicted with its goal of developing compliant national elites in Central Asia. 
Following the purge of the opposition within the Central Committee and the 
cementing of Stalin’s hold on power, the priorities shifted away from Korenizatsiia 
and towards a bureaucratic ‘class war’ to ready society for the mass mobilisations 
of the Five Year Plan. This goal implied a necessity to destroy the social fabric of 
Central Asian society and uproot the hold of Islam. The Hujum was the beginning 
of this process. Party members who had previously been able to combine their 
Marxism with their Muslim traditions now found themselves under immense 
pressure to conform. The lesson that the Central Committee took from the Hujum 
was the need to purge the national elite and pull the Party membership into line 
through threats and intimidation. 
The Zhenotdel leadership had been hopeful in 1919 that its creation as a bureau 
of the Central Committee would validate the importance of women’s liberation in 
the eyes of the membership of the Party. However, as I have discussed in chapter 
one, this proved not to be the case, and the Zhenotdel struggled against attempts 
to close it down and undermine its work from the beginning. In contrast to Russia, 
the Central Asian Zhenotdel’s isolation from the rest of the Party had allowed it 
time to develop its own programme, and create the first shoots of indigenous 
organisation. Yet its efforts to work with other Soviet organisations, in particular 
the cooperatives, were impeded by the fact that neither the Sredazburo nor the 
Central Committee treated its work seriously. Some activists believed that they 
could overcome this problem by substituting delegate meetings for clubs and 
building direct connections with local Party organisations and Soviets. But this did 
not make any difference as long as the Party leadership remained disinterested. 
And when finally the Sredazburo decided to become involved, at the behest of the 
Central Committee, it was certainly not because it had become convinced of the 
Zhenotdel’s programme.  
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The debate surrounding autonomy in 1928 is enlightening as it reveals the deep 
alienation felt by Zhenotdel activists. The Party was seen as a straitjacket which 
prevented the Zhenotdel reaching out to progressive sections of the indigenous 
population. Communist men were described as some of the worst offenders when 
it came to women’s rights. The arguments for independent organisation published 
in Kommunistka in 1928 must have caused some alarm on the Central Committee. 
The presence of Yaroslavsky at the 1928 All Union Meeting of Activists among 
Women of the East reflects this concern. Yaroslavsky was there to send out a clear 
message that the Central Committee was taking charge of the situation, and both 
male and female Party members were to be brought into line. Instead of allowing 
autonomy to develop in the region, which could assist the project of women’s 
emancipation, the entire debate had to be shut down. Instead the Zhenotdel was 
told it was to confront local Party members, but this time as an agent of a 
repressive purge. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
7.1 The Zhenotdel’s disappearance in Central Asia 
March 1930 witnessed the end of the project of Zhenotdel Socialism. Kommunistka 
ceased publication and the Uzbek language Zhenotdel journal, Yangi Yo’l was 
transferred to the Department of Agitation and Propaganda and, according to 
Marianne Kamp’s research, it no longer focused on women’s issues.1 Zhenotdel 
sections in Central Asia were converted Zhensektory, sections of local Party 
committees without any autonomy.2 In the final issue of Kommunistka, Sokolova 
announced that activists now had to turn their attention to “uprooting the 
remnants of capitalism and feudalism” and would be sent out to the villages to 
push for women to unveil and to recruit them to the collective farms.3 Marianne 
Kamp states that the majority were sent to the machine-tractor stations, which 
were in charge of supervising the “rapid and forced” collectivisation of 
Uzbekistan.4 
The impact of the Five Year Plan was even more serious for the nomadic peoples 
of Central Asia. Alun Thomas describes “the chaos and turmoil of collectivization” 
in Kazakhstan, which produced famine and immense state repression. He states 
that the CPSU sent militia to force: 
…famine refugees to settle in delineated areas, grossly exacerbating acute 
hardship. The demographic impact of collectivisation, sedentarization, and 
famine was catastrophic. Figures vary, but overall Soviet Kazakh fatalities 
                                                          
1 M. Kamp, The New Woman in Uzbekistan: Islam Modernity and Unveiling Under Communism (University 
of Washington Press 2006), pp. 217-218 
2 M. Kamp, The New Woman in Uzbekistan, pp. 217-218 
3 A. Sokolova, ‘8 Marta na Sovetskom Vostoke’, Kommunistka, 2-3 (1930), pp.40-43 
4 M. Kamp, The New Woman in Uzbekistan, pg. 218 
199 
 
reached perhaps 1.5 million between 1928 and 1934, when collectivization 
was largely finalized.5  
In the midst of this social disorder, veiled peasant women were subjected to 
continued coercion to unveil and begin work on collective farms. The success of 
the unveiling campaign in this period is disputed. Kamp reports that despite 
resistance, “veiling [had] decreased in a significant way by the late 1930s with 
collectivisation and an increase in the availability of both urban and rural 
schools.”6 Douglas Northrop, whose research is based on OGPU police records, 
argues that resistance was more marked than Kamp believes. He concludes that 
“the party’s continuing efforts during the 1930s to emancipate Uzbek women 
often had the opposite result: they only strengthened local practices of veiling 
and seclusion.”7 Despite this disagreement on the level of opposition, it is clear 
that, the unveiling of women acquired a new significance in a period when the 
obliteration of cultural barriers to the mass mobilisation of women for the Soviet 
industrial machine became crucial.  
In these challenging times in Central Asia, women were profoundly weakened by 
their inability to organise as women or to share their experiences and ideas in a 
journal like Kommunistka or Yangi Yo’l. Goldman makes the point that this was 
precisely what that the Central leadership wanted.8 It feared that “separate 
women’s organisations such as the Zhenotdel would distract women from 
production.”9 No doubt, an organisation based on women’s rights would be likely 
to challenge the male chauvinism inherent in the authoritarian system of mass 
collectivisation. It would likely, as it did in 1928, raise questions that went to the 
core of the formal adherence of the Party to women’s emancipation. Even in 1928, 
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the Zhenotdel in Central Asia had proved to be too great a challenge to the Central 
Committee. Independent ideas and attempts at autonomy were no longer allowed. 
 
7.2 The Zhenotdel – a complex organisation 
The grim reality of women’s lives in 1930s Central Asia reflected the death of an 
idealistic vision. Peasant women who had once been described as the “slaves” of 
a patriarchal society had now become victims of forced collectivisation. Kollontai 
had condemned the repression of women under capitalism and demanded their 
political and economic independence and liberation from the family under 
socialism. She had argued that “the solution of the family question is no less 
important than the achievement of political equality and economic 
independence.”10 Now, Central Asian women remained burdened with domestic 
labour and childcare and were being forced to leave their traditional lives and to 
work in degrading conditions. The conditions in the collective farms of Soviet 
Central Asia were arguably worse than those in the factories of pre-revolutionary 
Petrograd. In sum, women were still repressed and impoverished but now that 
repression was veiled in the language of liberation.  
It was always going to be a difficult battle to make progress as a Bureau of a Party 
with such entrenched ideas of female inferiority. A women-centred project in 
Central Asia could only make genuine advances if indigenous women assumed 
proprietorship of that project. Marianne Kamp argues that many of the initiatives 
after 1924 reflected the ambitions of a female Muslim intelligentsia and were not 
simply an imposition of a Zhenotdel ideal from above.11 This point is significant as 
it shows that the Zhenotdel had succeeded in connecting with something real 
within indigenous society, and that its project was therefore not simply a top-
down Russian one. From 1925 until 1927 Kommunistka reflected a new far more 
successful phase of work, with indigenous women running shops in Uzbekistan.  
                                                          
10 A. Kollontai, ‘The Social Basis of the Woman Question’ in Alexandra Kollontai on Women’s Liberation 
(Bookmarks 1998) 
11 M. Kamp, The New Woman in Uzbekistan, pp.49-52 
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Certainly while Zhenotdel activists displayed a highly critical attitude toward 
indigenous culture, they attempted, as far as possible, to work within its 
boundaries. In chapter four I highlighted the significance its attempts to transform 
the existing skills base among indigenous women into economic enterprises led by 
women. The women’s shops were examples of this, as were the cooperatives 
organised around carpet making, silk weaving and farming. The club model was 
aimed at providing women with work, education, childcare and other facilities in 
a safe and culturally appropriate environment. It appears from reports that these 
initiatives began to show real signs of success in 1925 and 1926, with the influx of 
indigenous women. The Zhenotdel’s pragmatism in organisation had, despite its 
prejudices, allowed it to connect in an organic way with the female population. 
On the other hand, the Zhenotdel’s status as a bureau of the Central Committee 
meant that any organic women’s movement would be directly under the control 
of the Party leadership. Its ability to develop self-activity among indigenous 
women would be ultimately determined by the political ambitions of the Central 
Committee. The Zhenotdel’s loyalty to the CPSU had persisted over the decade, 
despite the enormous antagonism it faced within it. It was only in 1928 that some 
Zhenotdel activists began to reassess their organisational link to the Party and to 
see the advantages of independence. But by then it was too late. The battle within 
the Central Committee had been won by Stalin and there could be no more 
experimentation or debate on alternative ways forward. 
The Zhenotdel’s political and organisational dependence on the CPSU meant that 
it was crippled both morally and practically. It lacked resources for its 
cooperatives, buildings for clubs and shops and connections to the markets to sell 
goods. Activists also had little real support from the Central Committee in dealing 
with antagonism from male Party members, or in providing a model of progressive 
behaviour for indigenous men. The continued appeals to the Central Committee 
within articles in Kommunistka illustrate the depth of the disappointment and 
frustration among activists. Liubimova did not appear at the time to recognise 
that the isolation of the Central Asian Zhenotdel was also a strength. But it is clear 
that activists had attained a  sense of identity and pride in their work. The 1928 
debate on autonomy reflected the determination among a significant section to 
make progress without the impediment of the Party, either in terms of the local 
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membership’s antagonism or the Central Committee’s authoritarianism. As I 
demonstrated in chapter six, local male allies had been identified who were more 
advanced in their ideas toward women than Party men. 
My research demonstrates that a weakness in the Zhenotdel’s programme was its 
reliance on legislation to bring about new models of behaviour. In the absence of 
real social and economic alternatives, this state orientated policy was always 
going to result in crisis. One Kommunistka writer, Seifi, wrote of the problems 
among Kirghiz women who decided to apply for divorces and then found 
themselves in very dire circumstances, homeless and unemployed.12 These women 
exchanged difficult and repressive marriages for homelessness and often 
prostitution. There was also hardship for the families that they left behind, who 
remained dependent on women’s labour to supplement subsistence farming. Seifi 
expressed acute awareness of the consequences of divorce in a society that lacked 
an infrastructure to cope with new family forms. It is clear that at least some 
within the Zhenotdel recognised the limitations of a legalistic strategy. However, 
Seifi, like other Zhenotdel activists, was powerless to prevent such unintended 
consequences. She and others struggled to adapt Kollontai’s ideal of family 
transformation to a society in which it was not easily applicable. To be sure, the 
Zhenotdel provided information and support to indigenous women on their legal 
rights and advocated that they use these rights.  If women decided that they 
wanted a divorce or to reject an arranged marriage then Zhenotdel activists gave 
them assistance. Activists provided advice and promoted policies aimed at 
providing single women with economic independence. Yet, while women’s 
cooperatives and shops were a beginning, they could not make meaningful 
progress in the conditions of Soviet Central Asia. 
It is my contention that the Zhenotdel’s confidence in the Soviet state as an 
instrument of liberation presented a more serious problem than the ethnocentric 
views of activists. The experience of club and cooperatives show that 
notwithstanding their often negative views of indigenous culture, Zhenotdel 
activists were committed to the self-organisation of indigenous women. They also 
recognise the importance of traditional skills like silk-weaving or carpet-making. 
                                                          
12 M. Seifi, ‘Pravovoe polozhenie zhenshchiny Vostoka - vopros ob ukreplenie Kirgizskoi sem’i’, 
Kommunistka, 10 (1923), pg.43 
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Liubimova’s antagonism toward the influence of the Muslim religion within society 
and her determination to fight it with the weapon of Soviet law undermined what 
effectively were culturally sensitive policies. A debate around a more nuanced 
understanding of the interpenetration of culture and economic forms such as that 
put forward by Krupskaya at the December 1928 would have been very valuable, 
if conditions had allowed for it to take place. Krupskaya made important points 
against Liubimova’s legal agenda, because of its overly bureaucratic tendencies 
and intolerance. However, at the point that these criticisms were made the entire 
project was coming to an end and the debate was over. 
Yet, as I have demonstrated in chapter six, the legalism of the Zhenotdel 
programme did not lead it to support the Hujum. Activists sought to use legal 
transformation alongside safe women-only economic and social organisation, and 
did not want to jeopardise this programme. It is unsurprising that Liubimova and 
her supporters ignored the Hujum in their articles in Kommunistka in 1927. She, 
Butusova, Tunik and Bolshakova continued to make the case for shops and 
cooperatives throughout that year. It is little wonder that Nikolaeva accused them 
of not fulfilling their obligations as Party members. When Liubimova finally 
mentioned the Hujum in October 1927, it was only in the conclusions to an article 
which had praised the work of women-only cooperatives and clubs.13 Those 
Zhenotdel activists who had been involved in club and co-operative work from 
1923 were opposed to an aggressive attack on society which would endanger these 
initiatives. Liubimova and her allies had fought from 1923 to realise a programme 
first put forward by Kollontai in 1921. Their persistence in conducting this work 
right up to its collapse of clubs and cooperatives under the pressure of the Hujum, 
shows their strong commitment to Zhenotdel Socialism.  
Barbara Evans Clements identifies the overall commitment of the Zhenotdel in 
Russia to small scale cooperative rather than mass production. She argues that 
Zhenotdel activists “stressed the importance of the creation of local organisations 
– day care centres, public dining rooms – as the means to communalising 
society.”14 These Zhenotdel policies were not in keeping with the dominant views 
                                                          
13 S. Liubimova, ‘Vostok k desiatletiiu Oktiabria’, Kommunistka, 10 (1927), pp.55-61 
14 B. Evans Clements, ‘The Utopianism of the Zhenotdel’ in Slavic Review Vol 51 No. 3 (Autumn 1992), pg. 
485 
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of the Central Party leadership, whose representative Preobrazhenskii “argued 
that large centralised structures would be employed both to build communism and 
to run it; society would be a mammoth cooperative presided over by ‘various kinds 
of book-keeping offices or statistical bureaux”.15 This divergence illustrates a 
further difference between the policies of the Central Committee and what Evans 
Clements calls the Zhenotdel’s utopianism, and I describe as Zhenotdel Socialism. 
The Zhenotdel wanted the collective to take over the tasks of the family and 
therefore its economic strategy necessitated communal forms of domestic labour 
and child care. The clubs, cooperatives and shops of Central Asia provided a 
framework for women to come together in economic activity which was very 
different to the large scale collective farms of the 1930s. The former allowed for 
the slow drawing in of women, as opposed to their forcible recruitment under the 
latter. 
The failure of Gregory Massell and Douglas Northrop to consider Kommunistka in 
its entirety from 1920 to 1930 has led them, in my view, to wrongly interpret the 
role of the Zhenotdel in the Hujum and other CC-imposed policies, and to 
misunderstand its relationship to the CPSU. It is true that Massell drew very 
significantly from Kommunistka, but only from 1925. Although both writers 
conceded the existence of women-only shops and clubs prior to the Hujum, they 
did not recognise that these forms of work indicated a very different approach to 
that of the Central Committee. They did not see that the Zhenotdel was firmly 
grounded in a programme that conflicted with the Central Committee’s strategy 
of putting indigenous women in direct conflict with their own society. Instead both 
writers focused on the Zhenotdel’s legalism as the implicit link between it and the 
Hujum. However, as I have shown in this thesis, the legal strategy operated as 
part of a multi-faceted strategy of incremental change, rather than an assault. 
Zhenotdel activists believed that the Soviet courts would issue decisions that 
supported women and provided a model for the rest of society. 
Furthermore, I have shown that the Zhenotdel cannot be judged as a monolith, 
and that there were significant differences within its ranks over its programme of 
semi-autonomous activity. Furthermore, a rising layer of Party loyalists existed 
                                                          
15 B. Evans Clements, ‘The Utopianism of the Zhenotdel’, pg. 485 
205 
 
led by Nukrat, were insistent on cementing the authority of the Sredazburo and 
the Party Centre over the Zhenotdel. The number of articles printed in support of 
the Hujum, were very few in comparison to the many others which either ignored 
or criticised it. It is also true that leading activists like Liubimova demanded a 
legal ban on the veil in the aftermath of 1927. But again Liubimova’s position 
needs to be understood in the context of her desire to protect and reassure 
indigenous women who faced enormous pressure and physical danger in that 
period. It should also be recognised as a compromise with the Party leadership. If 
there was to be unveiling then it needed to take place in such a way as to provide 
women with the security of knowing the government was on their side. 
Interestingly, Marianne Kamp sees Liubimova’s view as reflecting an astute 
understanding on her part of the importance of formal rules within indigenous 
society.16 Kamp also confirms that the call for a ban was supported by many 
indigenous women and was campaigned for by Yangi Yo’l after 1928. The fact that 
no ban was ever issued shows that the Central Committee was not in favour of 
such a move, preferring to use the Party to exert political and social pressure to 
conform. 
In truth it was only in 1929 that the Zhenotdel can be described as having been 
reduced to a servant of the Central Committee. By then, all effective dissent had 
been quashed, most notably that of Krupskaya and Liubimova. However, even in 
1929, there were continuing complaints from activists about the gap between 
official Party policy and regressive attitudes among male Party members. Even at 
this stage, a genuine commitment to indigenous women appeared to prevail 
among some Zhenotdel activists. The decision to close the Zhenotdel had 
everything to do with silencing those voices. It had nothing to do with the claim 
made by Stalin that the woman question been resolved.17  
Kaganovich had informed Zhenotdel activists in February 1930 that the ‘organising 
of women would henceforth be taken up by the entire Party and no longer be left 
                                                          
16 Marianne Kamp, The New Woman In Uzbekistan, pp. 205-214 
17 Scheide C., ‘Born in October: the Life & Thoughts of Aleksandra Vasil’evna Artyukhina 1889-
1969’ in Women in the Stalin Era editor Melanie Ilič (Palgrave Macmillan 2001), pp.9-28 
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to the Zhenotdel to cope with on its own.18 This article mirrored the speech of 
Yaroslavsky to the December 1928 meeting, where he pledged the support of the 
Central leadership to ensuring a purge of all Party members who refused to treat 
women as equals.19 Yet reports in 1929 showed Yaroslavsky’s commitment to have 
been meaningless. The purge did not change attitudes among men in the Party.20 
Those now deemed to be working class and trustworthy by the Central Committee 
were no different in reality to the petty bourgeois intellectuals who had been 
purged.21 Even Nukrat admitted in late 1929 that attitudes among male Party 
members toward women entering the workforce were hostile and disrespectful.22 
The purge, like the Hujum, was aimed at exerting control over the Party 
membership and eradicating religious practices among them, not with creating 
more enlightened views toward women. If the Central Committee genuinely 
wanted to change attitudes then it would have adopted Krupskaya’s proposals and 
begun educational initiatives rather than expulsions.  
In conclusion, I consider that the leadership of the CPSU in 1919 was forced to 
create the Zhenotdel so as to prevent the rising women’s movement becoming an 
oppositional force. Its decision to do so connected with the desire among a section 
of Bolshevik women to develop the Marxist programme in the conditions of the 
Soviet Union. And although ultimately unable to achieve their ideals, the Central 
Asian Zhenotdel did develop a multi-faceted strategy, aspects of which were 
successful momentarily in creating autonomy among women in their working and 
family lives. Its activists were able to provide a limited glimpse of what was 
achievable through a nuanced and to some degree culturally sensitive approach. 
In the final analysis it can be argued that the attempt of some to split from the 
Party should have taken place far earlier, or indeed that activists should have 
refused to allow the women’s movement to be led by a bureau of the Central 
Committee. It seems to me that it was this very problem that lay at the heart of 
its ongoing contradictions and ultimate demise.  
                                                          
18 L. Kaganovich, ‘Reorganizatsiia partapparata I ocherednye zadachi partraboty’, Kommunistka, 2-3 (1930), 
pp. 3-5 
19 Y. Yaroslavsky, ‘Reshitel’nee udarim po bytovymi perezhitkam (iz rechi Tov. Yaroslavskovo na 
Soveshchanii’, Kommunistka, 1 (1929), pp. 28-31 
20 N. Vekova, ‘Za Novyi Byt’, Kommunistka, 11 (1929), pp. 39-40 
21 N. Vekova, ‘Za Novyi Byt’, Kommunistka, 11 (1929), pp. 39-40 
22 A. Nukhrat, ‘Na vazhneishem uchastke nashei raboty’, Kommunistka, 19 (1929) pp. 34-27 
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The Zhenotdel was motivated by a liberatory agenda which was flawed in many 
respects. It provided glimpses of what was possible if indigenous women had 
autonomy over their lives. Moreover, it created pockets of opportunities for 
indigenous women to do begin doing so. Ultimately however, the Zhenotdel was 
trapped politically and organisationally in a Party that had failed to genuinely 
absorb its formal support for women’s rights. This Party was to transform into a 
machine bent on subjugation.  
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Appendix 1 
Timeline – significant events for the Zhenotdel in Central Asia 
 
October 1917 (November according to the old Julien Calendar) – the Bolsheviks 
take power in the Russian Empire. 
November 1917 – Petrograd Conference organised by Bolshevik women’s journal 
Rabotnitsa. 
November 1918 – All Russian Congress of Working Women organised by Bolshevik 
women which formed Women’s Commissions, the precursors of the Zhenotdel. 
March 1919 – 8th Congress of the Communist Party which endorsed formation of 
Women’s Commissions. 
August 1919 – formal creation of the Zhenotdel as Women’s Department of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party. 
June 1920 – first issue of Kommunistka published. 
September 1920 – death of Inessa Armand, first Director of the Zhenotdel and 
replacement by Alexandra Kollontai. 
April 1921 – First All Union Meeting of Activists among Women of the East. 
June 1921 – death of Konkordiia Samoilova, central founding member of the 
Zhenotdel. 
April 1922 – Removal of Alexandra Kollontai as Director and replacement with Sofia 
Smidovich. 
January 1923 – Appointment of Serafima Liubimova as Head of the Central Asian 
Zhenotdel. 
March 1923 – Second All Union Meeting of Activists among Women of the East. 
1924 – Resignation of Sofia Smidovich as Director and replacement with Klavdiia 
Nikolaeva. 
1925 – Removal of Klavdiia Nikolaeva as Director and replacement with Alexandra 
Artiukhina. 
1925 – Third All Union Meeting of Activists among Women of the East. 
1926 – Central Committee instructs Central Asian Party to launch radical campaign 
against indigenous society and meetings with Zhenotdel activists take place 
between June and December. 
Late 1926 – Removal of Serafima Liubimova as Head of Central Asian Zhenotdel. 
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March 8 1927 – First unveiling demonstrations take place in Uzbek cities. 
May 1 1927 – Second unveiling demonstrations take place in Uzbek cities. 
December 1927 – 15th Congress of the Communist Party, where Stalin announced 
Five Year Plan to commence in October 1928. 
December 1928 – Fourth All Union Meeting of Activists among Women of the East. 
March 1930 – Final issue of Kommunistka.  
March 1930 – Zhenotdel closed down. 
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